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AUTHOR 


CH 


? 


YUEH  LIU 


JL  A  A  JLdMjj  • 


THE  POLITICAL  THEORY 


OF  THOMAS  HILL  GREEN 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 


DA  TE : 


1920 


C X)  LU  M  B I A  U  N  i  V  \1  RS 1 1^   i ,  1 13  R  A  R 1 ES 
PRESERVATION  DEl'ARTMENT 


Master  Negative  # 


BIBLIOGRAI'MICMICROIORM  TARGET 


Original  Maleriai  as  Lilnied  -  lixisting  Bibliographic  Record 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


W|»#*"  •*•«»»*■■ 


192G82 


i 


Chill,  Yueh  Liu. 

The  |»o!itical  thcMjry  (if  Thomas  Hill  Green,  by  Y.  L.    \ 
Cluii  ...    New  York,  W,  1).  Urav,  192U. 

2  1^  1.,  i/j-^loo  |..,  1  I.    18^". 

Tiiesis  (rii.  i).)-— Columbia  university,  1920.    • 
Vita. 

Bibiic^graphy  :  p.  iloSi-Ux?. 


C442 

1.  Green,  Thomas  Hill  1836-1882.       i.  Title. 


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Library  of  Consrest 

Columbia  Univ.  Libr. 


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Ills  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF 
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THE  POLITICAL  THEORY  OF 
THOMAS  HILL  GREEN 


vV 


BY 


Y.  L.  CHIN,  B.  S.,  M.  A. 


Submitted  in   Partial  Fulfilment  of  the  Require- 
ments FOR  THE  Degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy 
IN  THE  Faculty  of  Political  Science, 
Columbia  University 


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4 


PREFACE 

Shrouded  in  mysticism,  the  idealist  political  philosophy 
seems  to  be  as  far  removed  from  practical  politics  as  the 
Einstein  formula  is  from  everyday  engineering;  but  far 
removed  as  it  may  seem,  it  v^as  and  yet  remains  an  influence 
to  be  reckoned  with.  It  is  on  this  ground  that  this  mono- 
graph is  justified,  and  readers,  if  any,  are  requested  not  to 
regard  it  as  unnecessary  exertion  in  a  mental  gymnasium. 

Errors  and  inaccuracies  there  may  be.  Writing  in  a  lan- 
guage that  is  not  his  mother  tongue,  the  author  is  con- 
fronted with  difficulties  which  only  those  who  have  strug- 
gled hard  to  express  themselves  in  distant  lands  can  ade- 
quately appreciate.  Fortunately  he  has  enlisted  the  aid  of  a 
number  of  his  friends.  To  them  he  is  grateful.  He  is 
thankful  to  the  Professors  whose  lectures  he  attended. 
Finally,  he  is  at  a  loss  to  express  adequately  his  indebtedness 
to  Professor  Dunning,  whose  suggestions  and  criticisms  have 
been  at  all  stages  helpful ;  but  then,  consistent  with  "oriental 
inscrutability,"  silence  probably  speaks  with  better  eloquence 
than  words. 

Y.  ly.  Chin. 
New  York  City,  September,  1920. 


r 


^ 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Introduction    9 

CHAPTER  I 
Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background 21 

1.  Freedom  in  Intelligence. 

2.  Freedom  of  Will. 

3.  Common  Good. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Theory  of  Natural  Rights 

1.  In  General. 

2.  Personal  Rights  or  the  Rights  of  Free  Life. 

3.  Rights  of  Property. 

4.  Rights  in  Private  Relations  or  Family  Rights. 


44 


CHAPTER  III 

Green  i 

md  His  Pred 
Spinoza. 

ecessors 

I. 

1. 

Hobbes. 

3. 

L6cke. 

4. 

Rousseau. 

5. 

Austin. 

55 


8 


Contents 
CHAPTER  IV 


PAGE 
69 


85 


95 


The  Basis  of  the  State 

1.  Sovereign  de  jure  and  Sovereign  de  facto. 

2.  The  True  Basis  of  the  State. 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Principle  of  State  Interference 

1.  In  General. 

2.  Resistance  to  the  State. 

CHAPTER  VI 
Applications  of  the  Principle  of  State  Interference. . 

1.  Freedom. 

2.  Freedom  of  Contract. 

3.  Capital. 

4.  Labor. 

5.  Land. 

CHAPTER  VII 
Applications  of   the   Principle   of   State   Interference 

(Continued)    1^7 

L    War. 

2.  Punishment. 

3.  Education. 

4.  Temperance. 

CHAPTER  VIII 
Green's  Influence  ^^^ 

CHAPTER  IX 
Conclusion    ^'+^ 


t 


.^, 


INTRODUCTION 

*Tor  thirty  years  and  more,"  said  Prof.  Hobhouse  in 
his  Democracy  and  Reaction,  ''English  thought  has  been 
subject,  not  for  the  first  time  in  its  modern  history,  to  pow- 
erful influences  from  abroad.  The  Rhine  has  flowed  into 
the  Thames,  at  any  rate  into  those  upper  reaches  of  the 
Thames,  known  locally  as  the  Isis,  and  from  the  Isis  the 
stream  of  German  Idealism  has  been  diffused  over  the 
academical  world  of  Great  Britain."  ^ 

Briefly  stated,  the  German  political  philosophy,  accord-   / 
ing  to  Prof.  Hobhouse,  consists  of  three  fundamental  con- 
ceptions.*   The  first  is  that  will  is  free ;  that  it  is  self  deter-    ^  - 
mined;  and  that  individuality  or  true  freedom  lies  in  con- 
formity  with   our   real  will,   which  is   different   from  the 
will  we  manifest  as   private  individuals.     The   second   is  ^/ 
that  our  real  will  is  identical  with  the  general  will,  which 
is  best,  if  not  completely,  expressed  in  the  social  fabric. 
The  third  is  that  the  state  is  the  embodiment  of  the  general  s/^ 
will,   giving   it   "vitality,"   "expression"   and   "coherence." 
The  state  is  the  common  self  in  which  the  individual  self   »/ 
is  absorbed.     It  is  the  fountain  of  authority.     It  is  the     \^ 
realization  of  our  moral  ideal.    It  is  an  end  in  itself.    Thus      y 
German  ideaUsm  becomes  political  absolutism. 

One  of  the  scholars  formerly  credited  with  and  now 
blamed  for  the  introduction  of  German  political  thought 
into  England  is  Thomas  Hill  Green.  He  was  born  April 
7,  1836,  at  Birkin  in  the  West  Riding  of  Yorkshire,  the  son 

^  Hobhouse,  Democracy  and  Reaction.     P.  77. 

*  Hobhouse,  The  Metaphysical  Theory  of  the  State. 


lO 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


of  a  local  rector.  He  went  to  school  at  Rugby  and  in 
October,  1855,  he  entered  Balhol  College,  Oxford.  In 
1860,  he  was  employed  to  lecture  on  history,  "and  in  No- 
vember of  that  year  he  achieved  his  youthful  ambition  by 
being  elected  a  fellow  of  the  College."  ^  From  1860  till  his 
death  in  1882,  he  taught  at  Oxford  and  was  active  in  local 
politics,  being  elected  in  1876  to  the  Oxford  town  council. 
He  was  the  first  college  tutor  to  enter  public  service  of  that 
sort.*  He  was  interested  in  education  and  temperance.  In 
1878  he  was  appointed  to  the  Whyte's  professorship  of 
moral  philosophy,  a  position  which  many  had  long  consid- 
ered his  Hue.    He  died  March  26,  1882. 

We  are  indebted  to  Mr.  R.  L.  Nettleship  for  the  publica- 
tion of  Green's  works,  which  are  contained  in  three  vol- 
umes. The  first  and  second  volumes  are  philosophical  and 
the  third  miscellaneous-  Green's  political  theory  is  practi- 
cally embodied  in  his  Lectures  on  the  Principles  of  Political 
Obligation  delivered  in  1879  and  1880.  They  are  reprinted 
from  the  second  volume  of  the  Works  and  now  appear 
in  a  separate  volume  for  the  convenience  of  the  readers. 
His  Prolegomena  to  Ethics  contains  the  substance  of  a  series 
of  lectures  on  philosophy,  embodying  the  metaphysical  and 
ethical  background  of  his  poHtical  thought.  It  was  pub- 
lished posthumously  and  not  included  in  The  Works.  His 
lectures  on  Good  Will,  on  The  English  Commonwealth 
and  on  Liberal  Legislation  and  Freedom  of  Contract  con- 
tribute directly  to  the  understanding  of  his  political  theory. 

In  order,  however,  to  give  a  clear  view  of  his  theory,  it 
is  necessary  to  present  a  general  review  of  the  intellectual 
tendencies  of  his  time.  A  man  of  Green's  type  could  not 
be  easily  satisfied  with  the  traditional  and  the  then  existing 

«  Works,  Vol.  III.     Memoir  XVII. 
*  Works,  Vol.  III.     Memoir  CXIX. 


Introduction 


II 


English  political  and  social  philosophy.  To  him  at  least 
that  philosophy  lacked  an  adequate  notion  of  the  individual 
man.  It  more  often  considered  man  as  a  passive  recipient 
of  external  stimuli  than  as  an  originator  of  various  phases 
of  human  activities.  To  appreciate  this  let  us  trace  the 
course  of  English  speculation  from  Thomas  Hobbes  to  the 
present  time. 

Hobbes  (1588-1679),  it  will  be  remembered,  was  frankly 
materialistic.'^  He  explained  the  acquisition  of  knowledge 
by  the  operation  of  the  senses  and  attributed  human  pas- 
sions and  emotions  to  the  antithesis  of  appetite  and  aver- 
bion.'  In  political  theory,  his  conception  of  sovereign 
power  was  somewhat  too  absolute  and  his  picture  of  the 
Stat*  of  nature  was  altogether  too  gloomy.  In  this  respect, 
Locke  (1632-1704)  was  happier.  His  state  of  nature  was 
by  no  means  lawless.  Intensely  sympathetic  with  the  revo- 
lution, he  argued  for  popular  sovereignty.  Governmental 
power  was  to  him  always  in  the  nature  of  fiduciary  trust, 
hence  he  made  it  ultimately  responsible  to  the  people.^  In 
his  theory  of  knowledge  he  was  essentially  a  sensationalist. 
His  enthusiasm  in  combatting  the  theory  of  innate  ideas 
carried  him  far  into  the  precarious  position  of  champion- 
ing the  doctrine  of  Tabula  Rasa.*  Baldly  stated,  mind  was 
to  him  but  a  blank  and  ideas  were  merely  sensations  "con- 
tinued to  the  brain"  That  the  doctrine  was  futile  to  the 
theologians  need  not  be  dwelt  on  at  any  length.  Berkeley 
(1685-1753)  inspired  by  theological  idealism,  struggled  hard 
to  overturn  the  Lockian  premise,  but  his  efforts  seemed  to 
have  only  resulted  in  the  more  cogent  empiricism  of  David 


»  Dunning,  A  History  of  Political  Theories.  Vol.  2,  p.  266. 

•  Hobbes,  Leviathan,  chap.  6. 

^  Locke,  Two  Treatises  of  Government. 

•  Locke,  Essays  on  Human  Understanding. 


/ 


12  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

Hume  (1711-1776).  While  in  political  theory  the  latter 
inflicted  a  fatal  blow  to  the  conception  of  social  contract,^ 
in  ethics  he  prepared  the  way  for  Jeremy  Bentham.  His 
belief  that  utility  was  the  determining  motive  in  all  phases 
of  human  conduct  was  strictly  utilitarian  and  his  concep- 
tion of  human  nature  as  essentially  knavish  ^'  was  not  dif- 
ferent from  that  of  Thomas  Hobbes. 

In  the  meantime  the  political  doctrines  promulgated  by 
Locke  were  spread  broadcast.     In  America  the  conception 
of  natural  rights  and  the  idea  of  popular  sovereignty  found 
their  way  into  legal  documents."    While  party  differences 
soon  appeared  there  was  really  no  disagreement  as  to  the 
fundamental    principle.      In    France    rightly    or    wrongly 
Montesquieu    (1689-1755)    admired   the   English   pohtical 
system  of  his  time.     Through  him  the  doctrine  of  checks 
and  balances  became  a  political  dogma  for  it  was  believed 
that  only  through  that  system  could  liberty  be  made  se- 
cure.^2     At  the  same  time  Physiocrats  were  formulating 
their  dogma  of  laisser-faire,  and  Jean  Jacques  Rousseau 
(1712-1778)  paved  the  way  for  the  principles  of  1789.    It 
was  the  former  who  started  the  study  of  economics,  it  was 
the  latter  who  popularized  the  social  contract.^^     His  state 
of  nature  was  one  of  isolation.     His  conception  of  a  gen- 
eral will  as  the  principle  of  sovereign  action  was  revolu- 
tionary to  the  traditional  line  of  thought,  but  his  insistence 
that  government  should  be  based  on  the  strict  consent  of 
the  governed  contained  the  same  difficulty  inherent  in  that 

•Hume,  Essays,  Moral,  Political  and  Literary.  Vol.  I,  p.  443. 

10  Dunning,  Vol.  2,  p.  383. 

"Virginia  Constitution  of  1776  and  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence. 

12  Montesquieu,  Spirit  of  the  Laws.    Book  XI,  Sec.  5. 

i»  Rousseau's  influence  on  French  Revolution,  claimed  by 
Janet,  denied  by  Jellinek. 


^f 


n 


♦ 


'  p 


Introduction 


13 


theory.     Though  they— Rousseau  and   the  Physiocrats- 
ran  into  different  lines  of  thought,  it  may  be  safely  said 
that  they  started  from  the  same  principle.     In  England 
Adam  Smith  (1723-1790),  with  a  full  load  of  physiocratic 
tendencies,   came  forth  with  a  comprehensive  system  of 
political  economy.    At  a  time  when  the  Industrial  Revolu- 
tion was  making  its  initial  progress,  the  Scotch  moral  phil- 
osopher could  not  be  deprived  of  a  large  following.  Where, 
however,  the  master  was  cautious,   the  disciples  became 
positive  and  certain.    Precepts  became  dogmas.    Social  re- 
lationships became  economic  laws.     There  soon  came  into 
prominence  a  group  of  men  known  as  Classical  Econo- 
mists-   Whatever  their  differences,  whether  the  pessimism 
of  Malthus  (1766-1834),  or  the  hardheadedness  of  Ricardo 
(1772-1823)    or  the  rigidity  of   Senior    (1790-1864)    and 
M'CuUoch  (1789-1864),  they  were  all  worshippers  of  what 
was  tlien  believed  to  be  nature  and  natural  laws.    Human 
beings  were  primarily  economic  and  economic  laws  were 
generally  conceded  as  immutable. 

In  the  field  of  law  Blackstone   (1723-1780)   came  out 
with  his  Commentaries.     With  an  interest  in  history  as 
intense  as  his,  he  could  not  regard  with  favor  the  concep- 
tion of  social  contract.     In  fact,  according  to  him,  people 
kept  together  because  of  their  sense  of  fear  and  helpless- 
ness.    It  was,  however,   in  the  rigid  conception  of  sov- 
ereignty that   he   exercised  the  greatest   influence.     His 
analysis  of  law  presupposed  a  political  superior  and  sov- 
ereignty came  to  be  known  as  "supreme,  irresistible,  abso- 
lute and  uncontrolled  power."     His  Commentaries  called 
Bentham's     genius     into     play.       With     Bentham     (1748- 
1832)    and  his  disciples  Utilitarianism  came  into  promi- 
nence.    Human  motives  and  activities  were  according  to 
them  reducible  into  pleasure.    That  which  produced  pleas- 
ure was  considered  good  and  desirable,   and  that  which 


I 


14 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


"vl^ 


Introduction 


15 


produced  pain,  bad  and  to  be  avoided.  Carried  to  the 
political  field  the  slogan  became  "the  greatest  happiness 
for  the  greatest  number."  Government  existed  because 
people  on  the  whole  were  happier  than  without  it."  JUaw 
to  Bentham  was  an  expression  of  will  in  the  form  of  a 
command.  The  conception  of  rights  was  unmeaning  if 
not  accompanied  by  a  conception  of  duty.  Rights  and 
duties  were  interdependent.  Legal  rights  and  duties  were 
not  predicable  of  the  sovereign,  but  moral  rights  and  duties 
were.  The  power  of  the  sovereign  was  finally  based  on 
the  ability  to  cause  the  greatest  happiness  to  the  greatest 
number.  The  influence  of  the  Utilitarians  was  readily 
felt,  for  even  if  nobody  knew  exactly  what  happiness  was, 
every  one  could  figure  out  for  himself  as  to  who  really 
constituted  the  greatest  number. 

From  the  above  review,  it  is  easy  to  understand  why 
Green  is  not  in  sympathy  with  the  traditional  poHtical  and 
social  philosophy.  Basically  it  is  either  materialistic  or 
at  best  empirical,  but  Green  is  an  idealist.  Both  Hobbes 
and  Locke  believed  in  the  conception  of  a  social  contract, 
but  to  Green  such  a  contract  is  both  historically  and  log- 
ically impossible.  The  Utilitarians  characterized  human 
effort  as  pleasure  seeking,  but  to  Green  pleasure  is  never 
the  propelling  force.  The  Economists  created  the  fiction 
of  an  economic  man,  but  to  Green  to  believe  in  an  eco- 
nomic man  is  to  subject  freedom  to  necessity. 

John  Stuart  Mill  (1806-1873)  was  somewhat  of  a  puzzle. 
Indeed,  it  could  be  said  of  him  as  of  the  Bible,  that  saints 
and  devils  would  make  use  of  him  alike.  Known  as  a 
bourgeois  economist,  he  was  claimed  by  some  to  have  died 
a  socialist."     Starting  as  a  Benthamite,  he  ended  merely 

**  Bentham,  Fragment  on  Government. 

«  Barker,  Political  Thought  from  Spencer  to  To-day.  P.  213. 
Pease,  History  of  the  Fabian  Society.    P.  259. 


^4 


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f 


^   I  ♦ 


I 


a  nominal  Utilitarian.  Arguing  for  individuaUsm,  he  was 
yet  free  from  anarchistic  tendencies.  His  Essay  on  Lib- 
erty was  a  departure  from  the  traditional  point  of  view. 
In  the  words  of  Mr.  Barker,  it  "gave  a  deeper  and  a  more 
spiritual  interpretation  to  the  conception  of  liberty.  From 
a  conception  of  liberty  as  external  freedom  of  action  neces- 
sary for  the  discovery  and  pursuit  of  bis  material  interests 
by  each  individual,  Mill  rose  to  the  conception  of  liberty 
as  free  play  for  that  spiritual  originaUty  with  all  its  results 
in  individual  vigour  and  manifold  diversity.  ...  In  a  simi- 
lar way,  in  his  Essay  on  Representative  Government  he 
spiritualized  the  Benthamite  defense  of  democracy."  *• 

The  period  starting  from  1848  to  the  late  seventies  was 
as  diverse  as  Mill's  intellectual  personaUty.  Enormous 
progress  was  made  in  all  aspects  of  social  science.  Let  us 
note  the  tendencies  in  PoHtical  Economy,  Jurisprudence, 
History,  Sociology  and  even  in  Biology  in  so  far  as  they 
bear  on  poUtical  theory. 

In  Political  Economy  the  theories  of  the  Classical  Econ- 
omists still  dominated  the  field.  In  their  interpretation 
and  formulation  of  economic  laws,  they  in  effect  became 
the  defenders  of  the  then  existing  order.  While  foreign 
influence,  whether  the  NationaUst  Protectionism  of  Fred- 
erick List,  or  the  International  Socialism  of  Karl  Marx 
(1818-1883),  or  the  Communistic  Utopianism  of  the  early 
French  writers,  was  not  yet  much  felt  in  England,  a  some- 
what disconcerting  doctrine  appeared  on  the  horizon.  Rob- 
ert Owen's  schemes  failed  in  practise  but  his  ideas  suc- 
ceeded in  directing  thought  to  a  new  direction.  In  the 
sphere  of  theory  the  Ricardian  Socialist"  failed  to  see 
any  particular  glory  in  the  existing  system  of  distribution 

i«  Barker,  Political  Thought  from  Spencer  to  To-day. 
IT  Lowenthal,  Ricardian  Socialists. 


\ 


i6 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


V  Iv 


Introduction 


17 


of  wealth-  In  the  sphere  of  practical  politics  while  there 
were  no  national  workshops  in  London  as  there  were  in 
Paris  in  1848,  different  attempts  at  economic  and  social 
reform  were  not  totally  lacking.  While  Ccbden  (1804- 
1865)  and  Bright  (1811-1889),  specifically  aiming  at  the 
com  laws,  preached  for  laisser-faire,  Maurice  (1805-1872) 
and  Kingsley  (1819-1875),  moved  by  the  prevailing  mis- 
ery, prayed  for  a  more  genuine  cooperative  effort.^®  When 
Henry  George  (1839-1897)  pubhshed  his  Progress  and 
Poverty  in  1879  economic  thought  had  already  entered  a 
new  era. 

In  Jurisprudence  the  analytical  school  had  its  exponent 
in  the  person  of  John  Austin  (1790-1859).  To  him  state 
was  chiefly  based  upon  force,  and  obedience  was  essen- 
tially a  matter  of  fear.  His  theory  of  sovereignty,  no  mat- 
ter how  concisely  stated,  would  involve  a  description  rather 
than  a  definition.  It  involved  firstly  a  determinate  su- 
perior not  in  the  habit  of  rendering  obedience  to  a  like 
superior,  and  secondly  it  involved  a  given  society  with  its 
bulk  of  people  habitually  obedient  to  that  determinate 
superior.  "Positive  law"  was  distinguished  from  '^positive 
morality."  Since  "positive  law"  was  primarily  considered 
as  a  command  from  a  superior,  it  followed  that  the  sov- 
ereign was  above  legal  rights  and  duties.     On  the  other 

hand,  Su-  Henry  Maine  (1822-1888),  dissatisfied  with  the 
analytical  school,  traveled  far  into  antiquity  and  on  his 
return  trip  sought  to  stem  the  rising  tide  of  popular  gov- 
ernment.^® The  doctrines  of  Rousseau  as  well  as  those  of 
the  Benthamites  were  equally  distasteful  to  him.  With 
his  immense  intellectual  power  he  sought  to  destroy  both 
by  a  single  blow,  but  in  doing  so  he  probably  became  more 

*•  Woodworth,  Christian  Socialism  in  England. 
"  Maine,  Popular  Government. 


lit 


'1  if 


aII 


.1 


pessimistic  than  intended.  Mr.  Barker  thinks  that  being  a 
ZZ  Maine  shared  the  conservatism  of  h.s  profession," 
S  Professor  Giddings  suggests  that  -  his  thorough- 
going study  of  early  institutions  he  neglected  the  psychol- 

ogy  of  modern  men."  .  

The  historical  method  in  the  study  of  law  m  Germany 
as  well  as  in  England  necessarily  affected  history  proper, 
especially  so  when  the  idea  of  evolution  began  to  be  popu- 
Lr  among  the  intellectual  luminaries.    The  .dea  of  evolu- 
tion was  claimed  to  be  historical  method  applied  to  the 
facts  of  nature,  and  historical  method  was  regarded  as  the 
idea  of  evolution  applied  to  the  development  o    human 
institutions.     The  roots  of  the  present  were  beUeved  to 
have  been  planted  deep  in  the  past.     Hence  ant.quanan 
spirits  of  all  sorts  began  their  mental  excursions  into  the 
back  Torests  of  Germany  in   order  to  explam  the  then 
existing  political  and  social  facts.    Nor  in  historical  mter^ 
pretation  was  innovation  lacking.     The  traditional  method 
of  a  chronological  enumeration  of  events  was  not  entirely 
satisfactory.  Neither  was  a  teleological  interpretation  quite 
in  keeping  with  the  spirit  of  the  times.    Though  the  doc- 
trine oTfconomic  determinism "  of  Karl  Marx  was  not 
yet  in  vogue.  Henry  Thomas  Buckle  had  already  made  an 
ambitious  attempt "  in  a  similar  direction  in  1857.    mile 
his  particular  work  was  not  as  successful  as  expected,  it 
did  stimulate  further  attempt  by  the  younger  generation. 
From  across  the  channel  came  the  gospel  of  positivism 
and  the  worship  of  Humanity.     A  priori  or  metaphysical 
speculation  was  not  believed  to  be  capable  of  leading  us 
any^^•here.  hence  knowledge  must  be  generated  from  the 

to  Barker,  Political  Thought  From  Spencer  To-day.    P.  168. 
21  Giddings,  Democracy  and  Empire.    P.  181  Footnote. 
2«  Communist  Manifesto,  1848. 
"  Buckle,  History  of  Civilization  in  England. 


j 


1 8  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

accumulated  data  of  experience.     From  the  conception  of 
man  as  an  independent  atomic  unit,  there  seemed  to  be 
an  attempt  to  return  to  the  Aristotelian  dictum  that  man 
is  by  nature  social.    But  in  general  outline,  it  looked  as  if 
traditional  empiricism  acquired   a  new  garb  and  with   it 
attracted    wide   attention.      It   made    immense    appeal    to 
J.  S.  Mill  and  spurred  Frederic  Harrison  (1831-         )  to 
a  consideration   of   "Order  and   Progress."     Comte   was 
further  regarded  as  the  forerunner  of  the  science  of  so- 
ciology.    While  America  was  and  probably  is  the  fertile 
home  for  this  particular  branch  of  science,  England  should 
see  no  cause  for  envy.    Walter  Bagehot  (1826-1877)  may 
not  be  classed  as  a  formal  Sociologist,  but  he  cherished 
genume  hope  for  political  regeneration  in  the  sociological 
process  of  imitation.     His  "English  Constitution"  was  for 
quite  a   period   the   last  word  on  that   subject,   and   his 
"Physics  and  Politics"  broke  away  at  least  in  method  from 
the  more  formal  and  legalistic  writers.     Herbert  Spencer 
mcorporated  Sociology  into  his  Synthetic  Philosophy  and 
produced  the  belated  argument  for  laisser-faire  embodied 
m  his  "Man  versus  State." 

There  was  enormous  progress  in  the  study  of  natural 
sciences  after  Darwin  (1809-1882)  came  out  with  the  re- 
suhs  of  his  observation.  It  stimulated  the  study  of  animal 
organism  and  its  adaptation.  By  analogy  the  study  was 
gradually  extended  to  the  so-called  social  organism.  Just 
as  animal  organisms  have  blood  vessels  and  arteries,  so 
also  social  organisms  were  believed  to  have  the  same.  Just 
as  animal  organisms  struggle  for  existence,  so  also  social 
organisms  were  believed  to  be  engaged  in  a  similar  strug- 
glc.  The  fit  was  believed  to  survive,  but,  as  Prof.  Huxley 
has  pointed  out,^*  the  fit  was  not  necessarily  the  better, 

^^  H"xley    "The  Struggle  for  Existence"  in  Nineteenth   Cen^ 
tury,  for  Feb.,  1888.    P.  165. 


Introduction 


19 


much  less  the  best.  This  theory  of  social  organism  was 
not  new  but  it  was  very  much  enriched  in  content,  and 
received  a  different  interpretation.  In  the  hands  of  Plato 
it  had  served  one  purpose.  In  the  hands  of  the  Germans 
it  served  another.  But  under  the  leadership  of  Herbert 
Spencer  it  has  become  somewhat  fatalistic,  for  while  on 
the  one  hand  it  has  led  to  a  declaration  of  independence 
for  matter  in  philosophy,^^  on  the  other  it  has  turned  to 
be  an  argument  for  individualistic  anarchism  in  politics. 

In  spite  of  previous  statements,  it  may  still  be  asked 
what  is  the  exact  connection  between  these  sciences  and 
political  theory.  We  need  bear  in  mind  that  political  the- 
ory is  not  confined  to  articles  and  sections  of  this  or  that 
law.  Nor  is  it  limited  to  constitutions  and  governments, 
nor  yet  to  conventions  and  customs.  If  it  deals  with  men 
in  society,  it  also  has  to  deal  with  men  as  individuals.  If 
it  deals  with  the  aims  of  political  societies  it  also  has  to 
ascertain  the  vocation  of  the  individual  man.  What,  then, 
is  the  conception  of  man  back  of  these  sciences  just  enu- 
merated? According  to  the  classical  economists  man  is  an 
economic  being.  According  to  the  Utilitarians  he  is  a 
pleasure  seeker.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the  naturalist 
he  is  primarily  an  animal  organism,  and  from  the  point 
of  view  of  economic  interpretation  of  history  he  is  essen- 
tially a  passive  recipient  of  external  forces.  Historians 
tell  him  how  he  has  come  to  be  and  the  lawyers  describe 
his  legal  status.  In  fact  every  writer  as  well  as  every 
school  of  political  thought,  as  Mr.  Wallas  has  pointed 
out,2®  has  his  or  its  own  conception  of  human  nature,  and 
that  conception  is  generally  based  on  an  abstract  being 
who  does  not  exist.     Probably  there  is  truth  in  every  one 

25  Works  of  T.  H.  Green.     Vol.  T. 

26  Wallas,  Human  Nature  in  Politics.     P.  12. 


,  i'l 


20 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


of  them.  More  likely  there  is  exaggeration  in  all.  Any- 
way, they  seemed  to  Gi;een  to  be  one-sided  and  therefore 
inadequate  conceptions  upon  which  to  build  a  compre- 
hensive political  philosophy.  Political  philosophy  can  not 
be  satisfactory  when  it  is  built  on  inadequate  conceptions- 
If  it  is  unsatisfactory,  it  needs  revision,  but  it  can  not  be 
thoroughly  revised  unless  for  that  purpose  you  also  build 
a  solid  foundation.  This,  then,  Is  the  problem  which 
Green  took  for  himself  to  solve  in  his  Ethics.  His  political 
theory  built  upon  his  ethics  was  embodied  in  his  Principles 
of  Political  Obligation.  With  him  ethics  and  politics  can 
not  be  studied  apart.  Being  a  thorough-going  idealist  he 
revolted  against  empiricism.  Believing  in  the  moral  voca- 
tion of  man  as  differentiating  him  from  mere  animal  or- 
ganisms, he  assumed  the  responsibility  to  emancipate  Eng- 
lish political  theories  from  the  domination  of  their  nat- 
uralistic tendencies. 


CHAPTER  I 

THE  METAPHYSICAL  AND  ETHICAL 

BACKGROUND 

Green  argues  from  the  existence  of  nature  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  knowledge  and  finally  to  the  existence  of  an 
Eternal  Consciousness.  For  our  present  purpose,  since 
we  are  primarily  concerned  with  the  results  of  his  specu- 
lation, we  might  as  well  start  with  his  Eternal  Conscious- 
ness without  repeating  the  elaborate  process  of  deduction. 

According  to  him,  there  is  for  us  and  this  world  a  su- 
preme being  or  existence  or  Gk)d  or  whatever  name  you 
may  give  it,  which  is  an  Eternal,  Unifying  and  Uncondi- 
tioned Consciousness.  It  is  not  in  time  because  it  is  the 
condition  of  there  being  time.^  Neither  is  it  in  space 
because  it  is  the  condition  of  there  being  space.  It  never 
began  nor  will  it  ever  end,  because  it  is  that  by  virtue  of 
which  there  can  be  either  a  beginning  or  an  end.  There 
is  no  doubt  that,  according  to  Green,  it  is  Gk)d ;  but  whether 
or  not  it  assumes  the  form  of  human  personality  he  does 
not  expressly  affirm.  We  are  told,  however,  that  being 
divine  it  has  the  attributes  of  divinity.  It  is  complete  and 
perfect.  That  which  pertains  to  others  gradually  becomes, 
but  it  eternally  is.  It  reveals  itself  in  two  different  ways.* 
On  the  one  hand,  it  reproduces  itself  in  the  subjective 
units  which  we  call  men,  and  on  the  other  it  is  responsible 
for  the  single  unalterable  system  of  relations  which  we 

*  Prolegomena  to  Ethics.    P.  59. 

*  Prolegomena  to  Ethics.     P.  37. 


m 


22  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

understand  to  be  nature.     In  the  one  direction,   because 
man  is  a  subjective  unit  of  consciousness,  a  reproduction 
of  the  Eternal  Consciousness,  he  is  also  divine;  and  in  the 
other  because  nature  is  thus  constituted  as  a  single  unalter- 
able system  of  relations  which  implies  spirituality,  it  is  on 
that  account  not  merely  natural.     The  Eternal  Conscious- 
ness,  while  branching  into  these  two   directions,   is  none 
the  less  the  source  of  both  and  therefore  transcends  them- 
It  is  at  once  responsible  for  what  is  called  the  spiritual 
principle  in  nature  as  well  as   the  spiritual  principle  in 
knowledge — spiritual  not  in  the  sense  of  being  mysterious 
but  as  opposed  to  phenomenal,  that  is,  opposed  to  natural. 
It  has  been  shown  in  the  introduction  that  the  predomi- 
nant influence  in  the  intellectual  world  of  Green's  time  was 
naturalism.     Naturalism  implies  a  study  and  knowledge  of 
nature  and  its  application  to  man.     Green  has  no  quarrel 
with  the  content  or  the  usefulness  of  that  knowledge,  but 
he  denies  that  that  knowledge  explains  its  own  possibility. 
To  state  it  baldly,  a  knowledge  of  nature  does  not  explain 
the  nature  of  knowledge.     Probably  the  phrase  "nature  of 
knowledge"  is  one  which  Green  would  not  employ  himself, 
but  for  our  present  purpose  it  serves  our  convenience  with- 
out getting  us  into  trouble.     To  Green,  then,  the  funda- 
mental question  is :  How  is  knowledge  possible  ?    The  an- 
swer to  this  question  is  supplied  by  what  he  calls  the  spirit- 
ual principle  in  knowledge. 

Let  us  first  find  out  what  nature  means.  To  Green  it 
means  objects  of  possible  experience,  related  events,  the 
connected  order  of  knowable  facts  or  phenomena.'  Knowl- 
edge implies  that  which  knows  and  that  which  is  known. 

*  Prolegomena.  P.  58.  Hereafter  the  word  "nature"  or  "nat- 
ural" will  be  used  only  in  this  sense,  and  the  word  "phenomena" 
not  hmited  to  the  Kantian  sense. 


vL 


'iU 


•4  If 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background  23 

The  fact  that  nature  in  its  manifoldness  is  or  can  be 
known  implies  a  synthetic  unifying  principle  that  knows 
or  is  capable  of  knowing  In  Green's  words :  "Nature  im- 
plies something  other  than  itself  as  the  condition  of  its 
being  what  it  is."  *  Since  that  something  is  other  than 
nature,  it  does  not  exist  as  a  part  of  nature.  It  is  neither 
in  time  nor  in  space.    It  is  a  self -distinguishing  Conscious- 

"^TQiis  consciousness  is  the  agency  through  which  there 
is  for  us  a  possible  objective  world.  But  it  may  be  argued 
that  mental  actions  are  materially  conditioned.  That, 
however,  may  very  well  be  so  without  making  conscious- 
ness the  result  of  material  conditions,  since  those  very  con- 
ditions imply  a  consciousness  which  renders  them  in  any- 
way comprehensible.  It  is  also  necessary  to  avoid  a  dual- 
istic  conception  from  which  even  Kant  was  not  free. 

"Macht  zwar  der  Verstand  die  Natur,  aber  er  schafft 
sie  nicht."    By  this  Kant  means  that  understanding  makes 
nature,  but  out  of  material  which  it  does  not  make-     It 
implies  a  duaUstic  existence  of  a  single  reaUty.     With 
Locke  there  is  in  existence  an  objective  world  side  by  side 
with  what  is  called  the  work  of  our  mind.     The  former 
is  real,  the  latter  is  denied  reality.     Reality  is  attained 
only  when  what  is  concaved  in  the  mind  corresponds  to 
the  objective  world.    To  Green  this  is  entirely  unmeaning, 
since  it  is  only  through  our  consciousness  that  it  is  pos- 
sible for  us  to  have  an  objective  world  at  all.     Reality  is 
therefore  not  apart  from  consciousness.     Since  nature  is 
an  order  of  related  objects  or  facts  or  events,  reaUty  is 
but   the  unalterableness »  of  a   certain   relationship  pre- 
sented to  consciousness.     Since  relating  is  a  matter  of 

*  Prolegomena.     P.  S8. 
» Same.    P.  17. 


24 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


consciousness  and  therefore  not  merely  natural,  reality  in 
the  sense  already  defined  can  not  be  merely  objective. 

There  is  always  the  tendency,  Green  asserts,  to  treat  the 
knowledge  of  nature  as  itself  the  result  of  natural  proc- 
esses.   It  is  said  that  knowledge  can  not  but  proceed  from 
experience  and  experience  can  only  be  deduced  from  ob- 
jective reality.    That  in  a  sense  there  is  truth  in  this  state- 
ment Green  does  not  deny;  but  he  holds  that  we  must  ac- 
cept it  with  reserve,  for  much,  of  course,  depends  upon 
the  meaning  of  the  word  experience.    If  it  means  chemical 
or  physical   effects   upon   our   physical   organism,   it  may 
continue  for  any  length  of  time  without  our  knowledge 
of  it ;  but  the  kind  of  experience  we  are  supposed  to  derive 
knowledge  from  is  -n  altogether  different  thing.     The  lat- 
ter is  the  experience  of  matters  of  fact  "recognised  as 
such." «    Therefore  there  must  be  something  that  does  the 
recognising.     In  other  words,  there  must  be  consciousness, 
and  a  consciousness  of  matters  of  fact  thus  experienced 
can  not  be  itself  the  result  of  those  facts.    Neither  can  a 
consciousness  of  experience  be  the  result  of  that  experi- 
ence; for  that  experience  can  not  be  such  if  not  recognized 
as  such  by  consciousness.     Then  there  is  again  the  argu- 
ment that  consciousness  is  derived  from  previous  events. 
This  contention  involves  the  supposition  that  "the  primary 
consciousness  of  events  results  from  a  series  of  events  of 
which   there   is   no   consciousness." '     This   saemg   to   be 
merely  an  attempt  to  postpone  the  difficulty,  and  as  such 
is  quite  unmeaning;  for  events  of  which  there  is  no  con- 
sciousness can  not  be  events  within  our  experience  and 
therefore  can  not  be  the  source  of  our  knowledge.    From 
the  argument  above  presented  it  appears  to  Green  that 
knowledge  is  not  a  result  of  nature.    Neither  is  it  merely 

•  Same.    P.  20. 
^  Same.    P.  22. 


'I 


tU 


.^B-» 


aI« 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background  25 

a  result  of  experience.     It  implies  a  ^yn^^^tk jnrfying 

principle  which  is  the  spiritual  pnnaple  ^-^^^^^  ^^^ 

But  if  it  is  by  virtue  of  a  consciousness  t^at  there  is  tor 

us  an  ibjective'world.  does  it  not  follow  that  the  ^3ectiv 

world  is  dependent  upon  our  ^«"^-«\!    .°°„"  ^^  ^3. 
further  lead  to  the  untenable  conception  that  conscious 
further  leaa  ^o  ^  .     .    •        human  beings 

ness  can  create  objects  at  will?    And  since  n 
differ  and  thinking  becomes  divergent,  what  is  die  has  s 
o    reality  which,  though  it  is  an  unalterableness  of  a  sys 
tem  of  relations,  may  be  so  to  one  without  being  so  to 
another?    In  order  that  we  may  ^e  able  to  answ  daese 
questions,  let  us  first  examine  roughly  with  Green  the  na 

"  Natrras  has  been  pointed  out.  the  -ne.^^^^^^^^^^^ 
of  knowable  facts,  or  related  events,  or  0^1-^°^?°^. 
sible  experience  or  phenomena.  Objects  ^'1^^^^'^^^^ 
lated  They  are  related  in  identity  and  probably  in  half 
laieo.     ii    .y  otherwise  related, 

a  dozen  other  ways.     If  they  are  noi  uu 
they  are  related  in  difference.     An  unrelated  object  does 
noTexist.    Reality  from  our  definition  solves  a  sy^em 
of  relations.     But  when  we  speak  of  a  ^y^^^fj"^''^ 
we  ought  to  be  aware  of  its  implication.    It    is  to  us  such 
rfSiar  fact  that  we  are  apt  to  forget  that  it  mvoWe 
all  the  mystery,  if  it  be  a  mystery,  of  many  ,n  one.  Whether 
we  say  Lt  a  related  thing  is  one  m  itself,  -^-f^^  m 
Respect  of  its  relations,  or  that  there  is  one  relation  be- 
X  manifold  things,  we  are  equally  affirming  the  umty 
of  the  manifold.     Abstract  the  many  relations  from  the 
one  thing  and  there  is  nothing.    They  being  the  ma.y  d  ^ 
termine  or  constitute  its  definite  unity.     It  .s  not  the  case 
hat  it  first  exists  in  its  unity  and  then  is  brought  under 
various   relations.      Without    the   relations    it   would   not 
exist  at  all.    In  like  manner  the  one  relation  is  a  unity  of 
the  many  things.    They,  in  their  manifold  being,  make  the 


/ 


26  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

one  relation.  If  these  relations  really  exist,  there  is  a  real 
unity  of  the  manifold,  a  real  multiplicity  of  that  which  is 
one.  But  a  plurality  of  things  cannot  of  themselves  unite 
in  one  relation,  nor  can  a  single  thing  of  itself  bring  itself 
into  a  multitude  of  relations."  «  There  must,  therefore,  be 
something,  other  than  the  manifold  objects,  which  does 
the  relating  and  combining  without  effacing  their  indi- 
viduality. 

This  unifying  and  combining  principle  on  behalf  of  our 
intelligence  we  have  already  identified  in  our  considera- 
tion of  knowledge.    In  that  case  it  is  the  spiritual  principle 
in  knowledge.    According  to  Green,  "the  same  or  an  analo- 
gous action  is  necessary  to  account  for  any  relation  what- 
ever. .   .   .  Either,  then,  we  must  deny  the  reality  of  rela- 
tions altogether  and  treat  them  as  fictions  of  our  combin- 
ing intelligence,  or  we  must  hold  that,  being  the  product 
of  our  combining  intelligence,   they  are  yet  'empirically 
real'  on  the  ground  that  our  intelligence  is  a  factor  in  the 
reality  of  experience;  or  if  we  suppose  them  to  be  real 
otherwise  than  merely  for  us,  otherwise  than  in  the  'cos- 
mos of  our  experience,'  we  must  recognise  as  the  condi- 
tion of  this  reality  the  action  of  some  unifying  principle 
analogous  to  that  of  our  understanding."  » 

It  is  evident  that  there  must  be  not  only  a  synthetic 
unifymg  principle  in  our  knowledge  of  uniform  relations 
between  phenomena,  but  also  a  similar  principle  that  ac- 
counts for  there  being  such  uniform  relations  at  all.  There 
are  two  principles,  and  the  question  that  naturally  arises 
is:  How  are  they  to  be  harmonized  in  order  that  there 
may  be  a  single  reality?  From  our  conception  of  Eternal 
Consciousness,  it  can  be  easily  seen  that  the  source  of  the 
system  of  relations  in  nature  and  the  source  of  our  knowl- 

«  Same.     P.  33, 
•Same.     P.  34. 


'-vJ 


%'w4 


1^  If 


^l# 


^  li 


l< 


fi 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background         27 

edge  of  it  are  one  and  the  same.  The  question,  how  does 
the  order  of  nature  harmonize  with  our  conception  of  it, 
is  answered  by  our  recognition  of  the  fact  that  our  under- 
standing of  an  order  of  nature  and  the  relations  that  con- 
stitute that  order  have  a  common  spiritual  source,  namely. 
Eternal  Consciousness. 

Fully  convinced  of  the  futility  of  a  dualistic  conception 
of  nature  and  knowledge.  Green  concludes  that  the  true 
account  to  be  given  is  that  "the  concrete  whole,  which 
may  be  described  indifferently  as  eternal  inteUigence  real- 
ised in  the  related  facts  of  the  world,  or  as  a  system  of 
related  facts  rendered  possible  by  such  an  inteUigence,  par- 
tially and  gradually  reproduces  itself  in  us,  communicating 
piece-meal,  but  in  inseparable  correlation,  understanding 
and  the  facts  understood,  experience  and  the  experienced 
world."  ^°  There  is,  in  other  words,  a  unity  of  nature  and 
knowledge  in  Eternal  Consciousness.  In  such  a  conception, 
there  can  not  be  any  antagonism  between  appearance  and 
reaUty,  or  between  the  work  of  ixdnd  and  the  facts  of  na- 
ture.    The  difficult  problem  of  reality  is  for  Green  thus 

solved. 

We  have  considered  nature  and  knowledge  as  each  hav- 
ing a  spiritual  principle  and  both  having  unity  in  Eternal 
Consciousness.  We  have  yet  to  examine  the  bridge  be- 
tween the  two  in  the  actual  process  of  acquiring  knowl- 
edge. We  need  not  go  into  the  details  of  the  philosophical 
commonplaces,  such  as  sensation,  conception  and  percep- 
tion. Being  an  idealist.  Green  necessarily  discards  the 
sensationalist  point  of  view.  Though  he  believes  in  the 
possibility  of  a  priori  conceptions,  he  concedes  that  knowl- 
edge may  and  generally  does  involve  sensation.  But  it 
must  be  understood  that  mere  sensation  does  not  consti- 

10  Same.    P.  41. 


28 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


tute  knowledge.  Knowledge,  if  it  involves  sensation,  in- 
volves it  as  comprehended  by  consciousness.  Only  when 
consciousness  is  called  into  play  can  there  be  perception  or 
knowledge. 

It   may   be   objected   that   under   this   doctrine   we   can 
make  objects  at  will.    But  Green  says  that  we  can  not  make 
objects   at  will  just   as   we  can  not   make  consciousness 
at  will."     Again  it  may  be  said  that  our  perceiving  con- 
sciousness varies  from  time  to  time.     It  seems  to  be  so 
in  the  process  of  our  knowing,  and  our  learning  to  know, 
this   world.      That   is    explained    by   Green   as    a   process 
through  which  our  animal  organism,  which  has  a  history 
in  time,  is  gradually  being  made  a  vehicle  of  the  Eternal 
Consciousness,  which  has  no  history  and  is  not  in  time. 
Our  consciousness  may  be  viewed  in  two  ways.     It  may 
"be  either  a   function  of   the   animal  organism,   which   is 
being  gradually  and  with  interruptions  made  a  vehicle  of 
Eternal  Consciousness;  or  that  Eternal  Consciousness  it- 
self, as  making  the  animal  organism  its  vehicle  and  subject 
to  certain  limitations  in  doing  so,  but  retaining  its  essen- 
tial characteristics  as  independent  of  time,  as  determinent 
of  becoming,  which  has  not  and  does  not  itself  become.*' " 
The  consciousness  that  varies   from  time  to  time  is  the 
consciousness  in  the  fonner  sense.     The  consciousness  in 
virtue  of  which  there  can  be  either  nature  or  knowledge 
is  the  consciousness  in  the  latter  sense.     The  above  con- 
ception does  not  mean  that  there  is  double  consciousness 
in  men,  but  it  does  mean  that  the  one  individual  reality  of 
our  consciousness  can  not  be  comprehended  in  a  single 
conception.^^ 


11  Same.  P.  74. 
»  Same.  P.  78. 
"  Same.     P.  78. 


'^'f 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background  29 

We  may  profitably  illustrate  the  whole  process  of  our 
knowledge  by  the  example  Green  furnishes  out  of  our 
reading.     "In  reading  the  sentence  we  see  the  words  suc- 
cessively,  we   attend  them  -successively,    we    recall   their 
meaning   successively.     But   throughout   their  ^succession 
there  must  be  present  continuously  the  consciousness  that 
the  sentence  has  a  meaning  as  a  whole :  otherwise  the  suc- 
cessive vision,  attention  and  recollection  would  not  end 
in  a  comprehension  of  what  the  meaning  is.     This  con- 
sciousness operates  in  them,  rendering  them  what  they  are 
as  organic  to  the  intelligent  reading  of  the  sentence.    And 
when  the  reading  is  over,  the  consciousness  that  the  sen- 
tence has  a  meaning  has  become  a  consciousness  of  what  in 
particular  the  meaning  is,— a  consciousness  in  which  the 
successive  results  of  the  mental  operations  involved  in  the 
reading  are  held  together,  without  succession,  as  a  con- 
nected whole.     The  reader  has,  then,  so  far  as  that  sen- 
tence is  concerned,  made  the  mind  of  the  writer  his  own. 
The  thought  which  was  the  writer's  when  he  composed 
the  sentence,  has  so  determined,  has  so  used  as  organs, 
the   successive   operations   of   the  sense  and  soul  of   the 
reader,  as  to  reproduce  in  him  through  them :  and  the  first 
stage  in  this  reproduction,  the  condition  under  which  alone 
the  processes  mentioned  contribute  to  it,  is  the  conviction 
on  the  reader's  part  that  the  sentence  is  a  connected  whole, 
that  it  has  a  meaning  which  may  be  understood."  ^*    The 
world  has  its  author,  nature  is  his  book,  man  is  the  reader 
and  reading  is  knowing.    The  above  may  be  a  crude  illus- 
tration in  philosophy,  but  it  is  one  that  renders  clear  the 
acquisition  of  human  knowledge. 

That  knowledge  is  empirically  conditioned  is  not  open 
to  doubt  in  Green's  mind.  He  says  in  one  place  that  the 
fact  that  there  is  a  real  external  world  of  which  through 

1*  Same.     P.  81. 


30  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

feeling  we  have  a  determinate  experience,  and  that  in  this 
experience  all  our  knowledge  of  nature  is  implicit,  is  one 
which  no  philosophy  disputes."    That  is  to  say,  conscious- 
ness would  not  be  what  at  any  time  it  is  but  for  a  series 
of  events  sensible  or  related  to  sensibility.     On  the  other 
hand,  man  would  not  be  the  same  subject  of  intelligent 
experience  if  not  for  the  self-realization  or  reproduction 
in  himself  of  an  Eternal  Consciousness  which  is  the  con- 
dition of  there  being  experience.     In  virtue  of  his  know- 
ing character  in  the  latter  sense,  man  may  be  said  to  enjoy 
freedom  in  intelligence.     In  Green's  words  he  is  a  "free 
cause."    The  word  "cause"  is  not  used  in  the  ordinary  sense 
of  a  necessary  antecedent  to  a  given  effect;   for  then  it 
also  implies  conditions  precedent  to  that  antecedent.   Cause 
and  effect  in  the  world  of  phenomena  represent  a  kind  of 
relationship,   with    onei  determining  the  other   and   itself 
determined  by  still  other  causes.     Freedom  is  not  involved 
in  the  determination  of  one  natural  event  by  another  or 
of  one  phenomenon  by  another  phenomenon."     Such  de- 
termination is  in  two  senses  unrelated  to  freedom:  first, 
it  does  not  imply  in  either  the  cause  or  the  caused  a  con-' 
sciousness  of  self  both  as  a  subject  and  as  an  object ;  and 
second,  it  is  a  determination  in  which  things  external  to 
each  other  form  that  particular  relationship  which  we  call 
cause  and  effect. 

If  we  transfer  the  term  "cause"  from  the  above  sense 
to  apply  to  the  relation  between  the  world  and  the  agent 
implied  in  its  existence,  we  shall  find  that  "free  cause" 
means  the  determination  of  man  to  action  by  himself.  Man 
IS  really  only  free  when  he  acts  under  the  idea  that  he 
himself  determines  himself  or  his  action.  The  man  whom 
we  contemplate  from  the  point  of  view  in  which  he  ap- 

"  Works  of  T.  H.  Green.    Vol.  I,  p.  Z76 
"  Works  of  T  H.  Green.    Vol.  II,  p.  109. 


1^ 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background  3^ 

pears  as  subject  to  the  laws  of  nature,  as  part  and  parcel 
of  nature,  is  not  a  real  man."     Real  or  not,  it  may  be 
objected   that  man's   attainment   of   knowledge   is   condi- 
tioned on  processes  in  time  and  on  the  performance  of 
strictly  natural  functions.     If  these  processes  and  func- 
tions are  so  essential  to  him,  how  can  it  be  said  that  a  man 
thus  conditioned  is  not  a  part  of  nature  but  is  himself  free  ? 
The  fact  that  consciousness  realizes  and  reproduces  itself 
in  an   animal  organism   does  not  render  a   man   a  mere 
animal,  any  more  than  the  fact  that  animals  employ  me- 
chanical structures  for  their  movements  make  the  animals 
mere  machines.'^     Man  is  conscious  of  himself.     He  con- 
sciously distinguishes  himself  from  his  relations.     He  is 
conscious  of  his  being  a  unit,  a  subject  and  an  object  at 
the  same  time.     Now  this  self  distinction  of  himself  as  a 
manifestation  of  consciousness  is  not  a  process  in  time, 
for  it  is  that  by  virtue  of  which  there  can  be  time.     By 
virtue  of  his  self  distinction,  he  exerts  himself  freely  in 
activities  which  are  not  in  time  and  are  not  linked  in  the 
chain  of  natural  events.    His  activities  are  self  originated. 
There   is   no   incompatibility  between   this   principle   and 
the  physical  processes  of  brain  and  nerve  which  are  neces- 
sary to  human  activity.    These  processes  do  not  make  up 
the  knowing  and  self  distinguishing  man,  and  it  is,  after 
all,  the  knowing  and  self  distinguishing  man  who  is  a  "free 
cause"  in  intelligence. 

The  above  paragraphs  aim  to  show  that  according  to 
Green  there  is  an  Eternal  Consciousness  and  that  Con- 
sciousness reveals  itself  in  two  ways:  first,  in  what  is 
called  the  spiritual  principle  in  nature;  and  second,  in 
what  is  similarly  styled  the  spiritual  principle  in  knowledge- 

17  Works  of  T.  H.  Green.    Vol.  II,  p.  108. 

18  Prolegomena.     P.  89. 


32 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


^^(] 


The  former  becomes  the  knowable  nature.     The  latter  be- 
comes the  knowing  man.     His  freedom,  as  we  have  seen, 
is  established  and  his  spirituality  proven.    But  we  have  not 
yet  dealt  with  man  other  than  as  a  knowing  being.     Wc 
do  not  yet  know  his  moral  capacities.     Morality  consists 
in  the  disinterested  performance  of  self-imposed  duties.** 
Moral  actions  involve  willing  and  the  objects  willed.     It  is 
therefore  necessary  in  the  following  paragraphs  to  dwell 
on  the  nature  of  will  and  the  considerations  it  involves. 
It  is  also  necessary  to  examine  into  the  character  of  the 
objects  willed  and  its  bearing  to  the  persons  other  than 
those  who  do  the  willing.     In  the  previous  paragraphs  we 
were  speculating  in  the  world  of  knowledge,  but  in  the 
following  paragraphs  we  shall  be  speculating  in  the  sphere 
of  morality.     In  the  former  the  purpose  is  to  explain  the 
human  effort  to  know  that  which  is  knowable  and  in  the 
latter  the  purpose  will  be  to  account  for  the  attempt  to 
achieve  that  which  is  desired.     In  other  words,  to  make 
the  contrast  more  striking  even  at  the  risk  of  being  mis- 
understood, the  former  is  to  reduce  that  which  is  real  to 
ideal  and  the  latter  will  be  to  render  that  which  is  ideal 
also  real. 

Leaving  the  world  of  knowledge  we  now  proceed  to  the 
vsrorld  of  practise,  bearing  in  mind  that  by  practise  is  meant 
giving  reality  to  conceived  object.^^  We  have  shown  that 
the  process  of  knowledge  is  not  natural,  we  shall  now  try 
to  demonstrate  that  moral  action  is  not  natural  either. 
Since  all  actions  involve  willing  it  is  only  logical  for  us 
first  to  define  its  character  and  then  to  find  out  what  it 
invariably  involves.  "Will  is  the  capacity  in  a  man  of 
being  determined  to  action  by  the  idea  of  a  possible  sat- 
isfaction of  himself.     An  act  of  will  is  an  action  so  deter- 

i»  Principles  of  Political   Obligation.     F.  40. 
20  Works  of  T.  H.  Green.    Vol.  II,  p.  117. 


t^^ 


w 


t 


% 


^ 


y 


/ 


y 


• 


^ 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background  33 

mined.""     Will  always  involves  motive,  for  there  is  no 
unmotivated  will."    And  motive  involves  wants  and  desires 
which  may  be,  and  often  are,  of  animal  origin.     But  on 
the  other  hand,  it  involves  not  only  those  wants  and  de- 
sires but  also  a  presentation  of  them  to  a  self-distinguish- 
ing consciousness.     A  desire  is  not  a  motive  unless  it  is 
presented  to  consciousness  and  recognised  as  such  and  also 
as  a  possible  source  of  satisfaction  of  one's  self.    Further- 
more, it  always  involves  an  idea  of  good— whatever  that 
may  be— in  that  satisfaction.     This  idea  of  good  is  what 
gives  rise  to  moral  action.    It  involves  a  self-reflection  and  >^ 
it  also  involves  a  judgment.     Such  reflection  and  judg- 
ment may  require  constant  reference  to  "customary  ex-    ^ 
pressions  of  moral  consciousness"  and  to  "institutions  em- 
bodying ideals  of  permanent  good."     But  in  the  interpre- 
tation  of  these  expressions  and  institutions,  reflection  and  / 
judgment  are  after  all  the  ultimate  determining   factors. 
Motive  thus  considered  involves  animal  objects,  desires  or 
sensible  phenomena,  but  is  not  itself  animal  or  phenomenal.    . 
Just  as  understanding  involves  nature  that  is  in  time  but 
is  itself  not  in  time,  so  also  motive  involves  objects  that 
are  animal  and  therefore  in  time  but  is  itself  neither  ani- 
mal nor  in  time.     Just  as  there  is  freedom  in  intelligence 
so  also  there  is  freedom  in  will.     In  both  cases  the  self- 
determining    and    self-distinguishing    consciousness    is    at 
work. 

Will  is  necessarily  influenced  by  our  desire  and  intellect. 
In  order  therefore  to  understand  the  character  of  our  will, 
we  have  to  examine  it  in  relation  to  both  desire  and  in- 
tellect and  their  inter-relation.  Ordinarily  when  we  speak 
of  desire  we  do  not  differentiate  mere  animal  desire  from 

21  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  31. 
^  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    F.  13. 


34  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

the  desire  that  is  identified  by  a  self-detemiining  conscious- 
ness.    The  former  has  no  moral  character  because,  itself 
apart  from  and  unidentified  by  consciousness,  it  is  merely 
physically  determined.    Mere  animal  desires  are,  however, 
of  a  very  limited  range.     Most  desires  are  not  dependent 
upon  animal  susceptibility,"  and  even  if  so  dependent  are 
themselves  transformed  by  a  new  element  derived  from 
the  action  of  a  self-determining  consciousness.     There  is 
sometimes  a  state  of  mind  in  which  many  desires  conflict 
and  It  is  said  that  the  strongest  desire  emerges  victorious 
and  hence   becomes   our  will.     This,   however,   does  not 
^meet  Green's  approval.    To  him  will  is  not  desire,  whether 
strong  or  not.     If  the  word  desire  is  to  be  persistently 
used  to  cover  the  meaning  of  both  will  and  animal  wants 
we  need  bear  in  mind  that  it  does  not  mean  the  same 
thmg.    The  desires  that  are  yet  conflicting  are  desires  that 
/    are  not  identified  by  self-consciousness  as  possible  sources 
of  satisfaction  out  of  which  good  may  be  derived,  while 
the  desire  that  is  so  identified  by  a  self-consciousness  is 
already  different  from,  those  that  are  conflicting,  that  is. 
•t  is  already  a  motive.    In  the  one  case  man  is  acting  him- 
^  self  in  acting  upon  a  desire  that  is  identified  by  himself, 
but  m  the  odier  the  desires  exert  an  influence  on  him 
y  when  he  IS  yet  undecided.    There  is  no  moral  significance 
in  the  latter  but  there  is  in  the  former. 

Let  us  next  turn  to  the  relation  between  desire  and  in- 
tellect     Is  there  any  unity  between  the  two  or  are  they 
diametncally  opposed  to  each  other?    Unity  is  easily  seen 
at  the  source,  for  "the  real  agent  called  Desire  is  the  man 
or  subject  or  self  as  desiring:  the  real  agent  called  Intellect 
L        TIL  ^'  ""'^^'•^tanding,  as  perceiving  and  conceiv- 
ng    and  the  man  that  desires  is  identical  with  the  man 
that  understands." "     The  problem  is,  however,  that  to 
"  Prolegomena.    P.  141. 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background  35 

desire  Is  plainly  not  the  same  as  to  understand,  and  the 
two  things  can  not  be  satisfactorily  explained  merely  by 
their   relation  to  the  identical  source.     Green's  explana- 
tion"  is  that  both  desire  and  intellect  involve  the  con- 
sciousness of  s^lf  and  of  a  world  as  opposed  to  it  and  the 
effort  to  overcome  this  opposition.    Desire  strives  to  over- 
come this  opposition  by  giving  or  trying  to  give  reality  to 
an  object  which  when  first  desired  is  only  ideal.     Intellect 
strives  to  overcome  the  opposition  by  rendering  or  trying 
to  render  ideality  or  intelligibility  to  an  object  which  when 
first  presented  is  only  sensible.     Furthermore,  "the  exer- 
cise of  the  one  is  always  a  necessary  accompaniment  of  the 
other.      In    all    exercise    of    understanding    desire    is    at    v^ 
work."  26    And  vice  versa.     "No  man  learns  to  know  any- 
thing without  desiring  to  know  it/' "     Conversely  no  one    y" 
really  desires  anything  without  intelligently  calculating  the 
possibilities  of  its  reahsation.     Thus  it  will  be  seen  that 
desire  and  intellect  are  interwoven,  and  after  all  they  are    ^^ 
different   manifestations   of   the   same   self -consciousness. 
They  are  not  separate  powers  of  which  one  can  be  exer-  >/ 
cised  without  the  other.     The  act  of  thinking  involves  the 
act  of  desiring  and  the  act  of  desiring  involves  the  act  of 
thinking.    Therefore  there  is  a  unity  inherent  in  the  actions 
of  both  besides  the  identity  of  source  from  which  these 
actions  necessarily  spring. 

It  remains  necessary  for  us  to  examine  the  relationship 
between  will  and  intellect.  It  has  sometimes  been  urged 
that  willing  and  thinking  are  opposite  to  each  other.  It 
has  also  been  said  that  mere  thinking  is  not  willing  or  that 


2*  Prolegomena.  P.  146. 

25  Prolegomena.  P.  147. 

"Prolegomena.  P.  151. 

«T  Prolegomena.  P.  151. 


36 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


willing  is  more  than  thinking.  The  latter  implies  that  a 
complementary  element  needs  be  added  in  order  to  make 
thinking  equal  to  willing-  That  is,  "if  we  say,  for  example, 
that  the  act  of  willing  to  pay  a  debt  is  more  than  mere 
thinking"  of  paying  it:  what  we  mean  is  that  "the  mere 
thinking  about  paying  the  debt  falls  short  of  willing  to 
pay  it."  This  depends  upon  the  meaning  of  the  term 
thinking.  Evidently  it  is  not  the  kind  of  thinking  that 
involves  a  consciousness  of  "self  and  the  world  as  mu- 
tually determined,  of  an  object  present  to  the  self  in  a 
desire  feh  by  it,  but  awaiting  realisation  in  the  world."  *• 
Such  thinking  is  always  present  in  willing.  A  thoughtless 
will  in  the  above  sense  is  not  a  will  at  all.  Furthermore, 
the  object  willed  is  the  realisation  of  an  idea.  It  may  be 
an  idea  of  good,  or  of  self-satisfaction  or  of  a  dozen  other 
things,  but  it  is  none  the  less  an  idea.  The  object  of  will 
is  also  an  object  of  thought.^®  In  this  sense,  therefore, 
thinking  is  willing.  It  is  not  merely  a  part  of  us.  It  is 
not  merely  an  element  in  willing.  Nor  is  there  any  ele- 
ment or  factor  in  willing  that  is  separate  and  separable 
from  thought.  That  is,  will  does  not  consist  of  different 
elements  of  which  thinking  is  one  and  has  a  compartment 
of  its  own  altogether  separate  from  that  of  the  others. 
Such  a  conclusion  is  inevitable,  as  will  be  seen  from  our 
discussion  of  desire  and  intellect,  knowledge  and  nature 
and  the  synthetic  unifying  principle  of  human  conscious- 
ness. 

However,  this  separate  discussion  of  desire,  intellect  and 
will  may  leave  the  impression  that  they  are  independent 
elements  that  make  up  a  given  action  by  man.    This  is,  of 


28  Prolegomena.    P.  170. 
2»  Prolegomena.    P.  171. 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background 


37 


course,  far  from  being  the  opinion  of  the  author  himself. 
He  does  not,  for  a  moment,  think  of  will  as  consisting  of  / 
desire  in  addition  to,  and  therefore  apart  from,  intellect;  ^ 
for  "desire  of  the  kind  that  enters  into  willing  involves 
thought:  and  thought  of  the  kind  that  enters  into  willing 
involves  desire."  ^^  Each  is  not  without  the  other.  In 
fact,  there  is  unity  in  all.  According  to  Green,  "will  is 
equally  and  indistinguishably  desire  and  thought.  ...  If 
so,  it  must  be  a  mistake  to  regard  will  as  a  faculty  which 
a  man  possesses  along  with  other  faculties  and  which  has 
the  singular  privilege  of  acting  independently  of  other 
faculties,  so  that,  given  a  man's  character  as  it  at  any  time 
results  from  the  direction  taken  by  those  other  faculties, 
the  will  remains  something  apart  which  may  issue  in  action 
different  from  that  prompted  by  the  character-  The  will  *^ 
is  the  man.  Any  act  of  the  will  is  the  expression  of  the  >/ 
man  as  he  at  the  time  is."  **  All  the  time  that  he  so  wills, 
he  may  feel,  think  and  desire  one  hundred  and  one  things, 
but  after  all,  "it  is  only  the  feeling,  thought  and  desire 
represented  by  the  act  of  the  will  that  the  man  recognises 
as  for  the  time  himself."  . 

When  Green  speaks  of  self,  he  means  by  it  the  unit  in  > 
which  the  Eternal  Consciousness  reproduces  itself.  It  is 
"the  only  thing  or  a  form  of  the  only  thing  that  is  real  in 
its  own  right:  the  only  thing  of  which  the  reality  is  not 
relative  or  derived."  '^  That  thus  conceived  the  so-called 
self  becomes  somewhat  mysterious,  Green  concedes,  if  by 
saying  mysterious  is  meant  the  inability  to  explain  the 
question  why.  But  then  it  is  no  more  so  than  the  very 
existence  of  the  world.    Nor  is  it  in  any  way  abstract ;  for 

^^  Prolegomena.    P.  171. 

31  Prolegomena.    P.  173. 

32  Prolegomena.    P.  113. 


\ 


i 


^ 


38 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


just  as  desires,  feelings  and  thoughts  would  not  be  what 
they  are  if  not  related  to  a  subject  which  distinguishes 
itself  from  each  and  all  of  them,  so  this  subject  would 
not  be  what  it  is,  if  it  were  not  related  to  the  particular 
desires,  feelings  and  thoughts  which  it  thus  distinguishes 
from  and  presents  to  itself."  In  other  words,  this  con- 
ception of  self  as  uniting  these  desires,  feelings  and 
thoughts  can  not  be  regarded  as  too  abstract.  It  expresses 
itself  through  them  when  at  any  particular  time  it  identifies 
itself  with  any  of  them. 

Human  will  may  be  either  good  or  bad.     Since  good 
and  bad  are  relative  terms,  a  discussion  of  the  one  will 
reveal  the  nature  of  the  other.     What,  we  may  ask,  does 
good  will  consist  of?    According  to  Green,  who  agrees  in 
the  main  with  Kant,  good  will  consists  chiefly  of  deter- 
mination by  "practical  reason"  to  an  action  involving  an 
object  which  is  capable  of  an  unity  in  one's  self  and  others. 
What  is  "practical  reason"?     Practical  means  that  which 
pertains  to  giving  reality  to  conceived  objects.    And  "prac- 
tical reason"  Green  defines  as  "a  consciousness  of  a  pos- 
sibility of  a  perfection  to  be  reaUsed  in  and  by  the  subject 
of  consciousness."'*     Willing  involves  a   subject,   as  has 
been  explained  at  length,  but  in  this  case,  in  the  case  of 
good  will,  it  involves  also  an  object  that  originates  in  rea- 
son."    This  object  does  not  originate  in  desire,  for  it  is 
"desirable  before  it  is  desired  and  it  is  coming  to  be  de- 
sired because  it  has  been  previously  recognised  as  desir- 
\     able."  ^«     There  is,  then,  a  quality  of  unconditionalness  of 
this  object.     Green  is  careful  to  point  out  that  the  object 
^     of  will  is  not  ordinarily,  and  to  use  his  own  w 

"Prolegomena.    P.  113. 
8*  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  20. 
55  Works  of  T.  H.  Green.    Vol.  U,  p.  110. 
"Works  of  T.  H.    Green.    Vol.  H,  p.  111. 


words,  does 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background 


39 


u^ 


not  generally  coincide  with,  the  object  of  reason.    But  like  y/ 
a  good  philosopher  he  is  far  from  being  hopeless,  for  the 
object  of  will  is  "intrinsically  or  potentially  and  tends  to 
be  actually  the  same  as  that  of  reason."  ^^ 

Good  will,  in  order  to  be  directed  to  a  common  object,  / 
also  involves  an  idea  of  an  unity  of  one's  self  and  others-  "^ 
This  point  can  be  made  clear  by  Green's  discussion  of  com- 
mon good  and  pleasure  seeking.  His  writings  are  so  full 
of  attacks  on  Hedonism  and  Utilitarianism  that  it  is  hard 
to  single  out  any  particular  one  for  quotation.  In  the 
following  passage  his  expressions  are  quite  emphatic  and 
almost  vehement.  To  seek  pleasure  is  to  direct  one's 
"dominant  interest  to  an  object  private  to  himself,  a  good 
in  which  others  can  not  share.  The  character  of  a  pleas- 
ure seeker  is  necessarily  selfish  in  this  sense.  .  .  .  That 
the  pleasure  seeker  lives  for  an  object  private  to  himself 
may  seem  inconsistent  with  the  fact  that  we  share  each 
other's  pleasure,  but  it  is  not  so.  When  a  man  is  said 
to  share  another's  pleasure,  what  is  meant  is  that  having 
desired  the  same  object  with  the  other,  he  is  equally  pleased 
with  its  attainment :  or  that,  the  pleasure  of  the  other  hav- 
ing been  his  object,  he  is  satisfied  when  that  object  is 
obtained  when  the  other  is  pleased.  In  each  case  the 
pleasure  is  private  to  the  person  enjoying  it,  and  so  it 
must  be  even  when  it  is  incidental  to  the  attainment  of 
an  object  which  is  really  common.  It  is  only  because  we 
confuse  fhe  pursuit  of  a  common  object,  that  is,  of  a  good 
by  which  others  than  the  pursuer  will  be  the  better,  with 
the  pursuit  of  pleasure  which  will  ensue  when  the  object 
is  attained,  and  thus  regard  those  as  pleasure  seekers  who 
are  not  really  so,  that  we  come  to  imagine  there  can  be 
pleasure  seekers   who  are  not  selfish,   not  living  for  an 

«^  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  21. 


40 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background 


41 


object  purely  private  to  themselves." ''  Pleasure,  then,  is 
not  necessarily  good.  It  may  be  incidental  to  the  realisa- 
tion  of  an  object  considered  good,  but  it  is  not  itself  the 
The  above  account  serves  to  point  out  that  pleasure  seek- 
ing is  not  willing  a  common  good,  but  it  does  not  exactly 
tell  what  that  common  good  is.  In  order  to  know  what 
common  good  is,  we  have  to  know  what  good  is.     Good, 

/if  it  is  to  be  true  at  all,  is  that  which  satisfies  the  desire 
of  the  moral  agent ;  and  a  moral  agent  is  defined  as  one 

^  who  is  disinterestedly  performing  self-imposed  duties.  But 

""   according  to  Green,  just  what  is  the  nature  of  good  can 
not  be  exactly  ascertained.     We  may,  however,   form  a 

/  general  idea  about  it.    As  has  been  pointed  out  earlier,  The 
^   Eternal  Consciousness  reproduces  itself  in  human  beings. 
"In  virtue  of  this  principle  in  him,  man  has  definite  capa- 
bilities, the  realisation  of  which,  since  in  it  alone  he  can 
satisfy  himself,  forms  his  true  good.     They  are  not  real- 
ised, however,  in  any  life  that  can  be  observed,  in  any  life 
that  has  been  or  is  or  that  can  be  lived  by  man  as  we  know 
him ;  and  for  this  reason  we  cannot  say  with  any  adequacy 
what   the   capabilities   are.     Yet   because   man's    spiritual 
endowment  is  the  consciousness  of  having  it,  the  idea  of 
his  having  such  capabilities  and  of  a  possible  better  state 
of  himself   consisting  of   their   further  realisation   is   the 
moving  influenceiahini^^  .   .  As  his  true  good  is  or  would 
be  their~compTete  realisation,  so  his  goodness  is  propor- 

/  tionate  to  his  habitual  responsiveness  to  the  idea  of  there 
being  such  a  true  good  in  the  various  forms  of  recognized 
duty  and  beneficent  work  in  which  that  idea  has  so  far 
taken  shape  among  men      In  other  words,  it  consists  in 

y  the  direction  of  the  will  to  the  objects  determined  for  it 
by  this  idea,   as   operative  in  the  person  willing,   which 

««  Works  of  T.  H.  Green.    Vol.  II,  p.  144. 


v/' 


^ 


v^ 


direction  of  the  will  we  may,  upon  the  ground  stated,  fitly 
call  its  determination  by  reason."  ^®  And  reason  is  defined 
as  the  capacity  on  the  part  of  the  self-conscious  subject  to 
conceive  a  possibility  of  perfection  of  himself  as  an  end 
to  be  attained  by  action. 

The  above,  then,  is  the  conception  of  a  true  good.  That 
it  is  somewhat  dogmatic,  Green  expressly  admits.*^  That 
it  fails  to  offer  a  sure  guide  seems  to  be  unavoidable;  for 
if  we  know  definitely  what  those  capacities  are  we  shall 
be  more  than  human  beings,  we  shall  be  God.  But  it  is 
this  idea  of  a  true  good  that  makes  possible  the  idea  of 
a  common  good.  In  fact  the  latter  is  inherent  in  the 
former.  The  idea  of  the  absolutely  desirable  arises  out  y 
of  man's  consciousness  of  himself  as  an  end  to  himself.  ^ 
Now  this  self  is  neither  abstract  nor  empty.  He  is  bound 
up  with  interests  in  common  with  others.  One  can  not 
contemplate  himself  in  a  better  state  without  contemplating 
others,  not  merely  as  a  means  to  that  better  state  but  as 
sharing  it  with  him.  In  other  words  there  is  a  conscious- 
ness of  kind.  Satisfaction  of  one's  self  should  include 
satis^faction  of  others.  Well  being,  in  order  to  be  perma- 
nent, must  be  one  in  which  self  and  others  are  included. 
In  fact  individuals  and  society  are  mutually  interdepend- 
ent. While  "the  life  of  the  nation  has  no  real  existence 
except  as  the  Hfe  of  the  individuals  composing  the  na- 
tion," *^  individuals  could  not  be  what  they  are  independent 
of  their  existence  in  a  nation. 

Green's  discussion  of  the  development  of  personality 
reveals  further  the  interdependence  of  individuals  and  so- 
ciety.    Human  society  to  him  presupposes  persons  in  ca-v^ 

89  Prolegomena.     Pp.  206-207. 
*o  Prolegomena.     P.  206. 
*i  Prolegomena.     P.  211. 


^ 


r-.. 


H 


y 


J 


J 


42  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

pacity— the  capacity  to  conceive  himself  and  the  bettering 
of  his  life  as  in  end  in  himself— and  it  is  only  in  the  inter- 
course of  men  each  recognized  by  each  as  an  end,  not 
merely  as  a  means,  that  the  capacity  is  actualized  and  that 
we  really  live  as  persons.    Later  on  Green  says :    "Without 
society,  no  person."  ^^     "This  is  as  true  as  that  without 
persons,  without  self -objectifying  agents,  there  could  be 
no  such  society  as  we  know.     Such  society  is  founded  on 
the  recognition  by  persons  of  each  other,  and  their  inter- 
ests in  each  other,  as  persons,  that  is  as  beings  who  are 
ends   to   themselves,   who   are   consciously   determined   to 
action  by  the  conception  of  themselves  as  that  for  the  sake 
of  which  they  act     They  are  interested  in  each  other  in 
so  far  as  each,  being  aware  that  another  presents  his  own 
satisfaction  to  himself  as  an  object,  finds  satisfaction  for 
himself   in   procuring   the   self-satisfaction   of   the;  other. 
Society  is  founded  on  such  mutual  interest  in  the  sense 
that  unless  it  is  operative,  .   .    .  there  would  be  nothing  to 
lead  to  that  treatment  of  one  human  being  by  another,  as 
an  end  not  merely  as  a  means,  on  which  society  even  in 
its    narrowest   and   most    primitive    forms    must    rest"** 
While  on  the  one  hand  there  can  not  be  society  except  as 
between  persons  each  recognising  the  other  as  an  end  in 
himself  and  having  the  will  to  treat  him  as  such,  on  the 
other,  it  is  only  through  society  that  individuality  can  seek 
actualisation.     It  will  be  seen,  then,  that  Green  is  neither 
y   a  Blind  worshipper  of  society,  nor  an  advocate  of  anar- 
chistic individualism. 

This  sketch  of  Green's  metaphysical  and  ethical  doc- 
trines, however  short,  serves  a  definite  purpose.  It  points 
out  that  according  to  Green,  man  is  not  natural.  In  in- 
telligence he  is  a  "free  cause."    In  willing  he  is  a  free  man. 

*2  Prolegomena.     P.  218. 
"  Frolcgomena.     P.  218. 


Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Background 


43 


He  is  free  in  the  sense  that  he  is  not  subject  to  the  deter- 
mination by  external  forces.  He  is  self-determined;  and  in 
that  determination  in  which  he  is  himself  both  the  subject 
and  the  object,  there  is  no  "necessity,"  but  freedom.  With 
a  free  will  he  is  capable  of  moral  action,  and  with  his 
freedom  in  intelligence  he  is  capable  of  creative  effort. 
With  his  faculty  of  reason  he  conceives  the  idea  of  good,  v^ 
With  his  consciousness  of  an  unity  of  himself  with  the 
others,  what  Prof.  Giddings  broadly  calls  the  conscious-  \/ 
ness  of  kind,  he  is  capable  of  good  will  and  the  idea  of 
common  good.  Such,  then,  is  the  metaphysical  and  ethical 
conception  of  men. 

In  order  to  understand  Green's  political  theory,  we  need 
Bear  this  conception  in  mind.  In  other  words,  it  is  neces- 
sary to  understand!  the  broad  metaphysical  and  ethical 
foundation  upon  which  his  political  theory  is  built,  before 
we  can  proceed  to  discuss  that  theory  proper.  It  may  be 
objected  that  nowhere  is  attention  paid  to  what  is  em- 
bodied in  conventional  morality,  such  things  as  virtue, 
courage,  truthfulness,  etc.  The  answer  is  that  they  form 
the  content  of  morality.  While  they  are  related  to  Green's 
ideas  of  laws.  Institutions  and  customs — which  will  be 
dealt  with  later  on — they  are  not  strictly  within  the  sphere 
of  political  action.  Moral  duties  are  not  capable  of  legal 
enforcement.  In  Green's  own  words,  "There  is  moral 
duty  in  regard  to  obligations,  but  there  can  be  no  obliga- 
tions as  to  moral  duty."  **  Since  political  action  is  chiefly 
directed  towards  maintaining  conditions  under  which  mor- 
ality becomes  possible,  it  is  not  within  the  sphere  of  this 
treatise  to  elaborate  on  that  which  properly  belongs  to 
moral  content. 

**  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  34. 


The  Theory  of  Natural  Rights 


45 


V 


CHAPTER  II 
THE  THEORY  OF  NATURAL  RIGHTS 

Green's  political  theory  may  be  divided  into  two  parts, , 
namely,  the  principle  of  political  obligation  and  the  prin- 
ciple of  state  interference.     The  first  includes  the  theory 
of  ngitural  rights  and  the  theory  of  the  true  basis  of  the 
state.    We  will  begin  with  the  theory  of  natural  rights. 

It  is  easily  seen  that  Green  agrees  with  Aristotle  that 
man  is  by  nature  a  social  being.  There  is,  therefore,  no 
such  separate  and  isolated  man  as  that  described  by  Rous- 
seau. Even  if  there  is  such  an  animal,  it  can  not  be  the 
possessor  of  rights  ;Qfor  every  right  involves  always  two 
elements,*  a  claim  on  the  part  of  the  individual  and  a 
recognition  of  that  claim  by  other  individuals.)  There- 
y  fore,  if  there  are  any  such  rights  worth  speaking  of,  there 
is  already  a  society.  The  idea  of  men's  possessing  rights 
y  in  the  sense  of  rights  prior  to  the  formation  of  society  is 
entirely  unfounded. 

The  theory  that  society  came  into  existence  by  contract 
implies  that  prior  to  the  institution  of  the  contract,  the 
contracting  parties  were  separate  and  isolated  individuals. 
According  to  Green,  there  were  no  such  individuals.  The 
same  theory  implies  that  these  isolated  individuals  had 
fundamental  natural  rights.  According  to  Green,  there 
were  no  such  rights.  Furthermore,  social  contract  assumes 
that  in  forming  such  a  contract  men  were  free  and  equa!. 
"But  if  freedom  is  understood  in  the  sense  in  which  most 

1  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  45. 


of  these  writers  seemed  to  understand  it  as  a  power  of 
executing,  of  giving  effect  to  one's  will,  the  amount  of 
freedom  possessed  m  a  state  ot  nature,  if  that  state  was 
one  of  detachment  and  collisioi^  between  individuals,  must 
have  been  very  small.     Men  must  have  been  constantly 
thwarting  each  other  and  thwarted  by  the  powers  of  na- 
ture     In  such  a  state,  those  only  could  be  free,  in  the 
senses  supposed,  who  were  not  equal  to  the  rest,  who  in 
virtue  of  superior  power  could  use  the  rest.    But  whether 
we  suppose  an  even  balance  of  weakness  in  subjection  to 
the  crushing  force  of  nature,  or  a  domination  of  a  few 
over  many  by  means  of  a  superior  strength,  in  such  a  state 
of  nature  no  general  pact  is  possible."  ^    It  is  clear,  then, 
that  social  contract  is  not  only  historically  nou-existent 
but  also  logically  impossible. 

That  does  not  mean,  however,  that  there  are  no  such 
things  as  natural  rights  if  rightly  understood    Let  us  first 
of   all   state  the   traditional   conception   of   natural   rights 
more  fully.     Human  beings  are  supposed  to  be  born  into 
this  worid  with  such  rights  as  of  Ufe,  liberty  and  prop- 
erty «    These  rights  are  natural  because  they  existed  for 
man  prior  to  his  forming  and  joining  the  social  contract 
and  are  retained  by  him  after  he  entered  into  it.     Social 
contract  made  political  action  possible  and  pohtical  action 
gave  rise  to  legal  and  civil  systems  of  duties  and  rights. 
It  Is  only  easy  to  conclude  that  these  legal  or  civil  rights, 
being   dependent   upon  natural   rights,    should  base  their 
justification  upon   their  compatibility  with   those   natural 
rights.    Hence  the  question  whether  a  given  civil  duty  is 
justifiable  or  not  is  determined  according  as  it  is  or  is  not 

2  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  70. 
•The   French   and   American   Declarations   differ  in  specific 
rights. 


y 


46  Political  Theory  or  Thomas  Hill  Green 

compatible  with  natural  rights.     But  Green  asks :  If  civil 
or  legal  rights  are  justihed  in  accordance  with  their  com- 
patibility with  natural  rights,  how  are  these  natural  rights 
to  be  justified?     There  is  ^the  same  necessity  of  reducmg 
natural   rights   to   something   more   fundamental,    for   the 
question  why  should  these  rights  be  maintained  at  all  has 
not  been  answered.    They  certainly  can  not  exist  by  them- 
selves.    They  can  not  exist  without  a  society,  that  is,  they 
exist  in  virtue  of  there  being  a  society.    If  their  existence 
is  relative  to   society,   their  existence  is   dependent  upon 
something  other  than  themselves.     As  to  what  that  some- 
thing is,  the  traditional  conception  of  natural  rights  is  un- 
able to  give  us  a  satisfactory  answer.  (  The   Utilitarians 
indeed  have  made  an   improvement   in   that   they   regard 
rights  and  duties  as  relative  to  pleasure  and  pain.     To 
them  rights  and  duties  should  be  enforced  according  to 
their  consequences ;  that  is,  if  their  enforcement  results  in 
more  pleasure  enjoyed  and  less  pain  sustained,  then  that 
enforcement    is    commendable.      This    theory    avoids    the 
necessity  of  reducing  secondary  rights  to  primary  rights 
which  are   logically  non-existent.     To  Green,   of   course, 
this  theory  is  not  acceptable  since  he  does  not  accept  the 
Utilitarian  premise.     Pleasure  and  pain  are  not  that  to 
which  rights  and  duties  should  be  considered  relative. 

In  order  to  understand  Green's  own  theory,  we  have  to 
refer  back  to  his  Ethics.  We  learn  from  the  previous 
chapter  that  there  are  such  things  as  good  will,  common 
good  and  moral  ideal.  Moral  ideal  is  the  one  factor  to 
which  others  are  relative,  to  which  rights  and  duties  are 
relative.  The  word  "natural"  may  be  used  to  qualify  certain 
rights,  but  in  the  sense  in  which  alone  it  can  be  used,  it 
does  not  mean  "primary,"  or  "previous  to  the  formation 
of  society"  or  "pertaining  to  a  state  of  nature."  "NaturaP 
as  employed  h^  Green  means  necessary  and  necessary  for 


The  Theory  of  Natural  Rights 


47 


utes  to  the  realisation  of  a  certain  end.    That,  end  is  tne    y 

„«  Scussed>  ior  if  .he  «d  i,  no.  held  m  v,.«.  *e 

mpnn^  has  no  excuse  for  existence. 

Tim  be  seen  from  the  above  that  there  are  two  nece. 
sary  conditions^  under  which  alone  we  can  Pos-Wy  speak 
of  rights.    No  one  could  begin  to  think  of  "ghtyf.  fir^t 
he  is  not  a  member  of  a  society,  and,  .^-«>f  ^^/J^' 
in  which  some  common  good  is  -^^"f  ^^^^  */ "^^^^^^^ 
nf  the  society  as  their  own  ideal  good.    The  capacity  01 
^b^^i  gVe^Led  by  the  idea  of  good  so  recognised  .  wha 
constitutes  a  moral  being.^Since  rights  exist  for^the  real 
ization  of  a  moral  ideal,  only  men  of  -J^l  ^^^^^^^ 
entitled  to  right^  Not  only  are  they  -"fl^l^\^.^?.^^^^^^^ 
„.ust  also  actually  possess  them     Moral  capaaty    imph^ 

a  consciousness  on  the  part  of  the  ^^^'..''If^^.'^S. 
that  its  realisation  is  an  end  desirable  in  itself^  Rights 
are  the  conditions  of  realising  that  end.  On  y  througn 
P^ssssing  rights  could  a  man  realise  that  which  is  recog- 
S  as  good  for  himself  and  society.    That  does  not  mean 

4  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  ^. 

5  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  ^■ 
»  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  45. 


v/ 


^ 


i^ 


y 


y 


• 


48 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


The  Theory  of  Natural  Rights 


49 


y/ 


that  rights  make  any  positive  contribution  to  one's  real- 
isation in  the  sense  that  they  actively  and  actually  help 
him  to  realize.  But  it  does  mean  that  they  are  the  condi- 
tions under  which  the  positive  realization  of  moral  capacity 
is  made  possible. 

The  question  as  to  why  it  is  necessary  that  a  person  in 
order  to  have  rights  must  be  a  member  of  a  society,  is  ans- 
wered by  the  inherent  qualities  of  both  the  persons  and 
rights.    The  chapter  on  the  Metaphysical  and  Ethical  Back- 
ground reveals  the  necessary  relationships  between  persons 
and  society.    Though  society  can  not  exist  apart  from  per- 
sons, a  person  in  the  sense  in  which  Green  designates  him 
to  be  can  not  exist  apart  from  society.     Persons  and  the 
society  are  mutually  dependent.     Rights  just  as  much  as 
persons  must  also  be  copsidered  from  the  individual  as  well 
as  the  social  sideViliey  involve  a  claim  on  the  part  of  the 
individual  and  the  recognition  of  that  claim  on  the  part 
of  the  rest  constituting  the  society,  y  The  individual  claims 
the  capacity  to  conceive  a  common  good  as  his  own  and  di- 
rect his  energies  in  the  light  of  that  common  good.     The 
society   recognizes  his   claim  as   necessary   for  each   and 
every  one  of  the  society  for  the  purpose  of  furthering  that 
common  good.     Without  either  this  claim  or  this  recogni- 
tion there  can  be  no  right.    With  these  two  considerations 
as  necessary  ingredients,  rights  can  not  belong  to  any  iso- 
lated being,  any  being  existing  apart  from  society.  Natural 
rights  are  therefore  necessary  conditions  for  the  realization 
of  the  moral  ideal,  the  fulfilment  of  the  moral  capacity.    In 
this  sense  and  in  this  sense  alone  therefore  there  are  such 
things  as  natural  rights,  always  bearing  in  mind  that  by 
natural  is  not  meant  "primary"  or  "previous  to  the  forma- 
tion of  society"  or  "pertaining  to  the  state  of  nature." 

What  are,  then,  some  of  the  conditions  for  moral  Hfe, 
or  rather  conditions  under  which  moral  life  may  be  possi- 


ble?   What  are  some  of  these  rights?    There  are  two  great  • 
divisions,  the  private  and  the  public.     Private  rights  are 
those  that  exist  for  a  man  as  one  in  society  and  public 
rights  are  those  that  come  to  be  attached  to  a  man  as  a 
citizen  of  a  state.^     Of  the  private  rights  there  are  three 
classes,  namely,  the  personal  rights,  the  rights  of  property 
and  the  rights  of  private  relations.    The  first  term  may  be 
somewhat  misleading,  since  all  rights  are  personal,  since  it 
is  only  by  virtue  of  a  person  that  they  are  rights  at  all.    By 
personal  rights  are  meant  the  rights  of  life  and  liberty,  that 
is,  "of  preserving  one's  body  from  the  violence  of  other 
men  and  of  using  it  as  an  instrument  of  only  one's  own 
will."  ®     In  other  words,  the  right  to  free  life,  including 
both  the  right  to  liberty  and  life,  is  essential  to  the  fulfil- 
ment of  the  moral  capacity  of  man  and  it  is  only  duly 
claimed  and  recognized  that  it  becomes  a  right  in  the  sense 
in  which  we  have  already  defined  it. 

Let  us  next  consider  the  rights  of  property.  Since  prop- 
erty is  the  center  of  our  modem  controversy,  we  are  prob- 
ably entitled  to  go  more  into  detail  than  is  warranted  in  our 
consideration  of  personal  rights.  The  fundamental  action 
involved  in  the  acquisition  of  property  is  appropriation,  and 
appropriation  according  to  Green  is  an  expression  of  will, 
of  the  individual's  effort  to  give  reality  to  a  conception  of 
his  own  good.  Whether  it  is  an  instinctive  act  or  not  as 
applied  to  ants  or  bees,  we  do  not  know,  but  as  it  is  applied 
to  men  it  certainly  is  not  an  instinctive  act.  The  act  of 
appropriation,  like  every  other  act  of  that  sort,  reflects  a 
self  consciousness  capable  of  distinguishing  itself  from  its 
wants-  This  self  consciousness  says  in  effect,  according  to 
Green,  "this  [or  that]  shall  be  mine  to  do  as  I  like  with,  to 

^  For  definition  of  State  see  pp.  82-83. 

»  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  155. 


.  ^ 


/ 


s^ 


^ 


/. 


.50 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


The  Theory  of  Natural  Rights 


51 


>/ 


v/ 


satisfy  my  wants  and  express  my  emotions  as  they  arise."-* 
Property  thus  appropriated,  instead  of  remaining  a  mere 
external  material  necessary  for  bodily  sustenance,  has  be- 
come interwoven  with  the  personality  of  the  man  who  ap- 
propriates it.  Appropriation  can  not  therefore  be  merelj 
instinctive. 

.      But  appropriation  as  described  above  is  only  a  claim  and 
a  claim  alone  does  not  constitute  a  right.    It  has  to  be  rec- 
ognized before  it  acquires  validity.    Of  the  various  expla- 
nations urged  for  the  validity  of  property  rights,  none  is 
entirely  satisfactory.     Grotius  attributed  the  right  of  prop- 
erty to  a  contract,  but  according  to  Green  ^^  contract  pre- 
supposes property.    Hobbes  regards  the  right  of  property  as 
dependent  upon  the  existence  of  a  sovereign  power  of  com- 
pulsion who  grants  such  a  right."  But  the  sovereign  power, 
if  merely  a  strong  force  of  compulsion,  can  not  be  the  source 
of  rights,  and,  if  a  representative  maintainer  of  rights,  im- 
plies or  presupposes  rights.     Locke  returns  to  the  law  of 
nature  and  law  of  reason  in  his  consideration  of  the  right 
of  property.^2    j^^g^  ^^  ^  ^^^  j^  entitled  to  his  body,  so  he 
is  entitled  to  the  results  of  the  work  of  his  body  and  the 
labor  of  his  hand.     Property  is  the  result  of  labor  and 
necessary    for   the   maintenance   and    expression    of    life. 
Locke  has  the  merit  of  pointing  out  the  intricate  relation- 
ship between  personal  rights  and  the  rights  of  property, 
but  he  does  not  explain  the  exact  grounds  upon  which  the 
rights  can  be  rights  in  any  sense.    According  to  Green,  the 
basis  of  the  recognition  of  the  claim  to  property  is'  the 
same  as  that  of  the  other  claims  to  rights.    Just  as  society 
recognizes  the  claims  of  a  free  life  as  themselves  necessary 

»  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  213. 

»«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  214. 

"  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  214. 

"  Principles  of  Political  Obligaion.  P.  216. 


conditions  for  moral  realization  and  for  the  common  good 
of  the  whole,  so  also  it  recognizes  the  claim  to  property  as 
necessary  for  that  common  good.    Just  as  the  foundation    y 
of  the  rights  of  free  Hfe  lies  in  the  human  will,  so  also  the 
foundation  of  the  right  of  property.^^ 

Green  is  fully  alive  to  the  results  of  the  historical  de- 
velopment of  the  institution  of  property.  He  recognizes 
the  divergence  between  the  rational  justification  and  the 
actual  consequences  of  the  right  to  property-  Theoretically, 
indeed,  all  may  have  property,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  he 
sees  that  great  numbers  do  not  get  it.  At  least  they  do  not 
get  it  in  the  measure  in  which  alone  it  is  of  any  value ;  that 
is,  they  fail  to  get  a  sufficient  amount  of  it  to  enable  them  to 
give  expression  to  their  moral  life  and  to  facilitate  the  rea- 
lization of  their  moral  ideal.  He  recognizes  that  a  man 
who  has  nothing^*  but  his  labor  to  sell  for  a  bare  subsist- 
ence is  factually  denied  the  right  of  property  in  the  ethical 
sense,  the  only  sense  in  which  property  is  at  all  desirable. 
According  to  Green,  however,  this  miserable  condition  is 
only  incidental  to  and  not  inherent  in  the  right  of  property. 
That  right  itself  is  necessary  for  a  moral  purpose.  The 
fact  that  many  who  have  property  do  not  use  it  for  that 
purpose  is  no  ground  for  believing  that  it  can  not  be  used 
for  that  purpose  and  therefore  should  be  abolished.  Only 
is  it  condemnable  when  the  possession  of  it  by  one  inter- 
feres with  like  possession  by  another.  Only  when  property 
of  one  is  used  to  prevent  the  acquisition  by  another  does 
Green  subscribe  to  the  Proudhonian  declaration  that  prop- 
erty is  theft."  (jThe  right  of  property  should  accordingly 
carry  with  it  two  conditions,"  first,  labor,  and,  second,  the 


^ 


y 


"  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  217. 

"  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  219. 

i«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  220. 

"  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  220. 


\^ 


52 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


The  Theory  of  Natural  Rights 


53 


respect  for  the  same  right  of  the  others,  in  order  that  it 
may  not  defeat  its  own  purposeJ 

How  shall  the  right  of  property  thus  considered  be  recon- 
ciled with  the  freedom  of  trade  and  the  freedom  of  bequest 
with  all  their  consequences  ?  Freedom  of  trade  involves  the 
^.  game  of  buying  in  the  cheapest  and  selling  in  the  dearest 
market  and  in  so  buying  and  selling,  the  merchant  often 
absorbs  the  legitimate  share  of  labor.  Freedom  of  bequest 
permits  wealth  to  be  transmitted  from  its  creator  to  his  off- 
spring  who  may  not  have  labored  at  all  towards  creating 
and  possessing  that  wealth.    On  the  whole,  however,  Green 

/  is  not  antagonistic  towards  these  policies  merely  because 
they  give  rise  to  inequality  of  wealth;  for  he  argues  that 
wealth,  given  the  purpose  for  which  it  alone  can  be  claimed 
and  recognized  as  a  right,  will  be  just  as  unequal  as  men 
are  unequal.  Green,  to  be  sure,  is  not  the  kind  of  hero 
worshipper  as,  for  instance,  Carlyle,  though  he  is  quite 
given  to  admiration  for  great  men.  Neither  does  he  be- 
lieve in  the  doctrine  that  "all  men  are  created  equal."  Fur- 
thermore, inequality  of  wealth  is  not  necessarily  the  cause 

x/  of  misery ;  for  wealth  is  not  a  fixed  stock  "  of  which  more 
for  one  means  necessarily  less  for  the  other.    On  the  con- 

^  trary,  production  can  be  increased  and  distribution  im- 
proved. Though  he  deplores  the  condition  of  a  large  num- 
ber of  men  in  England  at  his  time,  he  has  pointed  out  that 

•^  many,  while  working  at  factories,  are  the  owners  of  shares 
of  stock.  It  is  evident  that  what  he  hopes  to  see  is  an 
eventual  diffiusion  of  income,  a  result  which  many  econo- 
mists confidently  expect.  Green  has  very  decided  opinions 
on  property  in  land,  but  that  can  better  be  discussed  in 
connection  with  the  principle  of  state  interference. 

Lastly  let  us  consider  briefly  the  rights  of  private  rela- 
tions.   These  rights  are  logically  based  on  the  same  ground 

"  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  224. 


as  are  the  other  rights-  But  there  is  an  important  differ- 
ence. The  rights  of  life  and  liberty  ^re  primarily  related  to 
the  person  himself.  The  right  of  property  is  a  right  over 
things.  But  the  rights  of  private  relations  are  rights  over  ^ 
persons  other  than  the  claimer  and  possessor  of  these  rights. 
Husbands  and  wives  have  mutual  rights  over  each  other.  "^ 
Without  going  into  all  the  details  we  may  profitably  ex- 
amine two  or  three  points.  What,  for  instance,  is  it  in 
men  that  makes  them  capable  of  family  life?  How  has 
there  come  to  be  recognition  of  mutual  rights  and  duties? 
Is  monogamy  justifiable?  The  answer  to  the  first  question 
can  be  guessed  from  Green's  ideas  in  other  connections. 
The  formation  of  family  supposes  a  like  effort  on  the  part 
of  the  parties  concerned  to  give  reality  to  a  conception  of 
their  own  good.  It  also  supposes  that  this  conception  of  a 
good  is  shared  by  others  in  the  society  whose  well  being  is 
interwoven  with  their  own.  The  claim  of  husband  over 
wife  and  of  wife  over  husband  is  recognized  as  conducive 
to  the  realization  of  a  common  good.  Whatever  the  his- 
torical development  may  be,  the  rational  justification  oT^e 
ri^its  of  private"relations  is  the  same  as  that  urged  for 
other  rights. 

According  to  Green,  all  men  and  all  women  are  entitled 
to  marry  and  form  households  and  within  the  households 
the  claims  of  husband  and  wife  are  throughout  reciprocal. 
Polygamy  is  therefore  incapable  of  justification  for  several 
reasons.  "It  is  a  violation  of  the  rights  first  of  those  who 
through  it  are  indirectly  excluded  from  regular  marriage 
and  therefore  from  the  moral  education  which  results  from 
it,  second,  of  the  wife  who  is  morally  lowered  by  exclu- 
sion from  her  proper  position  in  the  household  and  by  being 
used,  more  or  less,  as  a  mere  instrument  for  the  husband's 
pleasure,  third,  of  the  children  who  lose  the  chance  of  that 
full  moral  training  which  depends  on  the  concerted  action 


•^ 


v^ 


I 


54 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


of  mother  and  father."  ^«  The  first  stipulation  is  evidently 
based  on  the  supposition  that  the  number  of  women  and 
men  is  about  equal.  Just  as  polygamy  is  properly  con- 
demnable,  so  also  are  all  the  subterfuges  that  unhappily 
exist  in  some  countries  where  monogamy  is  legally  re- 
quired. Green  goes  into  a  somewhat  detailed  consideration 
of  the  historical  process  through  which  family  has  come 
to  be  what  it  actually  at  present  is,  and  of  the  problems  of 
divorce,  but  since  the  former  is  purely  historical  and  the 
latter  a  matter  of  poUcy,  either  of  the  two  will  be  out  of 
place  for  the  specihc  topic  with  which  we  are  deaUng. 

The  above  is  both  the  theory  and  substance  of  natural 
rights.  It  may  be  asked  as  to  just  what  is  the  connection 
between  this  theory  and  the  principle  of  political  obligation. 
It  will  be  observed  that  the  theory  of  natural  rights  centers 
around  our  moral  ideal.  It  is  indeed  because  of  our  moral 
ideal  that  they  exist-  And  when  we  speak  of  the  principle 
of  political  obligation,  what  we  are  getting  at  is  really  a 
principle  by  whi'di  we  justify  our  obedience  to  political  au- 
thorities. If  we  obey,  we  obey  by  virtue  of  our  moral  ideal. 
.  Now ;  political  authority  as  represented  by  the  state  exists 

^  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  our  rights  and  giving  fuller 
reality  to  them.^^  In  other  words,  it  exists  for  the  purpose 
of  maintaining  the  conditions  under  which  moral  life  may 

^  be  possible,  bearing  always  in  mind  our  definition  of  natural 
rights.  The  existence  of  the  state  is  therefore  relative  to 
our  moral  ideal,  and  it  is  in  connection  with  that  ideal 

"  that  the  relation  between  the  theory  of  natural  rights  and 
the  principle  of  political  obligation  becomes  evident. 


V 


^i» 


\Vk 


"  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  237. 
«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  138. 


CHAPTER  III 
GREEN  AND  HIS  PREDECESSORS 

According  to  Green,  the  principle  of  political  obligation 
has  never  been  satisfactorily  formulated,  although  many 
have  tried  it.  The  contract  theory  is  ingenious  but  it  is 
fallacious.  Green  saw  clearly,  however,  that  that  theory 
can  not  be  overturned  on  merely  historical  ground;  for  it 
is  intended  to  explain  the  logical  and  philosophical  presup* 
position  of  political  authority.  In  order  to  demolish  it  to 
the  satisfaction  of  its  advocates,  objections  must  be  based 
not  only  on  historical  but  also  on  logical  and  philosophical 
grounds.  Furthermore,  the  contract  theory  and  the  tradi- 
tional theory  of  natural  rights  are  inseparable.  Green  has 
to  attack  both  in  order  that  his  own  theory  of  natural  rights 
may  prevail.  It  is  with  these  two  reasons  in  view  that  he 
elects  for  criticism  Spinoza,  Hobbes,  Locke  and  Rousseau. 
Austin  is  chosen  because  Green's  conception  of  sovereignty 
is  a  combination  of  Austin's  with  that  of  Rousseau. 

1.  Spinoza.  According  to  Spinoza,  natural  rights  are 
merely  natural  powers.  "Whatever  the  individual  does  by 
the  laws  of  his  nature,  that  he  does  by  the  highest  right 
and  his  right  toward  nature  goes  just  as  far  as  his  power 
holds  out."  ^  Human  beings  are  subjects  of  passions  and  as 
such  are  natural  enemies,  each  struggling  for  his  self  inter- 
est and  preservation.  This  condition  is  of  course  far  from 
being  satisfactory;  hence  society  is  formed  as  an  arrange- 

1  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  49. 


56 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


ment  whereby  peace  and  order  are  made  secure.  Since  the 
power  of  the  rest  put  together  is  greater  than  that  of  the  in- 
dividual the  right  of  the  individual  is  lessened  in  the  state. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  right  of  the  state  depends  upon  the 
power  to  effect  the  hopes  and  fears  of  the  individual. 
Whatever  can  not  be  achieved  by  threats  or  rewards  is  be- 
yond the  power  and  therefore  the  right  of  the  state-* 

Green  consfders  erroneous  Spinoza's  conception  of  nat- 
ural rights  as  being  enjoyed  by  an  individual  apart  from 
the  society.  It  is  evident  from  what  has  been  presented 
before  that,  according  to  Green,  natural  rights  can  only 
exist  for  man  as  a  member  of  a  society.  If  one  is  isolated 
and  apart  from  society  he  is  incapable  of  having  any  right 
whatsoever.  He  may  indeed  have  power,  as  Spinoza  says, 
but  power  can  not  be  considered  as  right  in  any  sense.  This 
error  is  made  worse  by  Spinoza's  rejection  of  final  causes. 
He  regards  man  as  determined  by  material  and  efficient 
causes  and  as  himself  a  material  and  an  efficient  cause 
Thus  considered,  according  to  Green,  man  is  only  capable 
of  power.  He  is  not  capable  of  right;  for  rights  are  not 
material  attributes  of  a  man.  They  are  ideal  attributes 
which  the  individual  possesses  as  means  for  the  realization 
of  an  end.  "It  is  not  in  so  far  as  I  can  do  this  or  that,  that 
J  I  have  a  right  to  do  this  or  that,  but  in  so  far  as  I  recognize 
myself  and  am  recognized  by  others  as  able  to  do  this  or 
that  for  the  sake  of  a  common  good."  *  If  there  is  no  such 
an  end  in  view,  natural  rights,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  are 
quite  meaningless. 

2.  Hobbes.  Since  Hobbes  is  a  materialist  and  Green  is 
an  idealist,  they  can  be  expected  to  disagree.  Let  us  state 
Hobbes'  idea  in  the  fewest  words  possible.    Human  actions 


«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  53. 
»  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  56. 


Green  and  His  Predecessors 


57 


can  be  reduced  to  the  antithesis  of  appetite  and  aversion. 
Before  there  is  society  men  are  isolated  and  solitary;  they 
live  in  a  state  of  nature.  There  is  constant,  actual  or  po- 
tential warfare,  since  every  one  is  seeking  for  his  own 
interest ;  there  is  competition,  distrust  and  love  for  personal 
glory.  Under  such  circumstances,  there  is  neither  right  nor 
wrong,  neither  justice  nor  injustice.  Man  has  natural 
rights,  that  is,  the  liberty  or  power  to  do  anything  he  deems 
necessary  for  his  preservation.  This  constant  warfare  is 
evidently  not  the  kind  that  affords  much  comfort,  neither 
is  it  conducive  to  the  success  of  preservation.  Therefore 
men  come  together  to  form  a  social  contract  by  which  the 
right  to  govern  is  vested  in  a  man  or  a  group  of  men-  So- 
ciety is  thus  formed  and  with  it  men  surrender  their  natural 
rights.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  ruler,  the  sovereign,  is 
not  a  party  to  the  contract  but  that  his  designation  by  the 
voice  of  majority  is  a  stipulation  of  the  contract.  Since 
contract  is  binding  and  since  it  calls  for  obedience,  the  mi- 
nority has  no  right  to  resist  the  power  of  the  sovereign. 
Thus  Hobbes  has  reached  his  goal,  that  is,  the  absolutism  of 
the  sovereign  power.  It  can  not  justly  be  resisted,  for 
to  resist  it  amounts  to  a  violation  of  the  contract.  It  can 
not  be  accused  of  a  similar  violation  because  it  is  not  a  party 
to  the  contract. 

Green's  criticism  can  be  fore-told.  He  can  not  accept 
the  Hobbesian  theory  of  human  conduct.  His  criticism 
of  the  theory  of  natural  rights  is  about  the  same  as  that 
on  Spinoza.  There  is  no  right  in  the  proper  sense  prior 
to  the  act  by  which  sovereign  power  is  established.  There 
is  only  power.  If  there  is  no  right  before,  there  can  be  no 
right  after,  the  establishment  of  the  sovereign  power;  for 
a  power  can  not  create  a  right.  Nor  is  the  power  of  the 
sovereign  a  natural  right ;  for  **if  natural  right  means 
natural   power,   then  upon   successful   rebellion   it   disap 


58 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


pears."  *  But  if  there  are  rights  other  than  mere  power, 
there  must  be  the  possibility  of  a  conflict  between  the  power 
of  the  sovereign  and  the  natural  rights  that  may  justify 
resistance. 

Green,  of  course,  does  not  believe  in  a  social  contract, 
but  his  objection  is  not  so  much  based  on  historical  grounds 
as  on  the  others.  In  fact,  even  if  the  contract  were  his- 
torically non-existent,  it  would  be  defendable,  if  only  it 
served  to  formulate  a  true  conception  of  the  moral  rela- 
tions of  men.  Not  only  it  fails  in  this,  but  it  positively  con- 
fuses the  theory  of  natural  rights  in  permitting  these  rights 
to  be  considered  as  capable  of  existing  apart  from  the  so- 
ciety. Those  who  contract  must  have  rights.  If  there  is  a 
social  contract,  it  implies  that  a  system  of  rights  has  already 
existed,  and  rights  that  are  not  merely  power. 

There  is  one  point  in  Green's  criticism  to  which  his  fol- 
lowers will  probably  welcome  a  modification-  Hobbes 
draws  a  distinction  between  jus  naturale  and  lex  naturalis 
with  one  as  the  propelling  and  the  other  as  the  restraining 
force.^  If  Green  had  sufficiently  distinguished  these  two, 
he  probably  would  have  been  appreciated  to  a  greater 
extent.  T 

3.  Locke.  While  Hobbes  wrote  to  condemn  the  rebel- 
lion, Locke  wrote  to  justify  the  revolution.  It  is  no  wonder 
that  they  diflfer  so  radically,  though  both  believed  in  a  social 
contract.  Locke's  state  of  nature  has  none  of  the  horrors 
of  that  of  Hobbes.  In  it  people  live  to  try  to  live  accord- 
ing to  the  laws  of  nature.  That  does  not  mean  that  there 
is  no  dispute  whatsoever ;  for  if  so  the  contract  would  not 
be  formed  at  all.     The  purpose  of  forming  a  political  so- 

*  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  66. 

^  Hobbes.  Philosophical  Rudiments  concerning  Government 
and  Society.  Chap.  14.  Sec.  III.  Dunning,  History  of  Political 
Theories,  Vol.  II.    P.  272. 


Green  and  His  Predecessors 


59 


ciety  is  threefold.  First,  it  is  to  formulate  a  settled  law 
instituted  by  common  consent;  second,  to  recognize  a 
known  and  disinterested  judge;  third,  to  grant  powers  to 
some  persons  to  enforce  the  decisions  of  such  a  judge. 
The  powers  thus  granted  can  be  withdrawn  and  thus  the 
government  established  can  be  overturned.  Social  contract 
establishes  a  civil  society  but  does  not  have  to  have  the 
same  government.  In  fact  the  powers  delegated  to  the 
government  are  in  the  nature  of  a  fiduciary  trust.  They 
can  be  revoked  by  the  grantor  whenever  the  trust  is  vio- 
lated. After  all,  then  the  people  themselves  are  the  final 
source  of  authority.  In  other  words,  they  are  the  sov- 
ereign. If  there  is  a  collision  between  the  people  and  the 
government,  it  is  the  will  of  the  former  that  ought  to  pre- 
vail.   The  right  of  revolution  is  justified. 

To  Green,  as  has  been  pointed  out,  state  of  nature  and 
social  contract  are  a  logical  contradiction  in  terms.    These 
terms  imply  a  transition  from  a  non-poUtical  society  to  a 
political  society.    The  state  of  nature  must  be  purely  nega- 
tive; it  must  be  non-political  or  else  it  need  not  be  differ- 
entiated as  such.     But  if  it  is  a  state  of  war,  as  Hobbes  ^ 
has  supposed  it  to  be,  then  there  can  be  very  little  freedom,      ^> 
for  if   freedom  means  the  power  to  do  as  one  wills,  it^* 
must  be  necessarily  diminished  through  constant  warfare. 
Human  beings  are  not  equal,  and  if  they  are  not,  there  is  w^ 
very  httle  equality  in  freedom.®    The  strongest  will  subdue  ^/^ 
the  rest.     Such  being  the  case,  a  social  contract  is  impos-  ^/ 
sible;  for  it  implies  both  equality  and  freedom. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  may  also  be  said,  though  Green 
does  not  say  it,  that  if  human  beings  are  exactly  equal  there 
will  not  be  war,  for  there  is  nothing  to  gain  but  everything 
to  lose;  hence  there  is  no  necessity  for  social  contract.    In 

«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  70. 


,^ 


6o 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


Green  and  His  Predecessors 


6i 


^ 


\y 


the  former  case,  contract  is  impossible  and  in  the  latter 
case,  it  is  unnecessary.  If,  however,  the  state  of  nature  is 
one  of  peace  and  human  beings  are  unequal,  according  to 
Green  it  presupposes  a  guiding  influence  which  prevents 
them  from  constant  warfare.  That  guiding  influence,  ac- 
cording to  Locke,  is  the  law  of  nature.  Now  the  law  of 
nature  involves  no  imponent.  If  it  exists  at  all,  it  exists 
in  the  consciousness  of  men,  not  by  command  of  a  su- 
perior. If  it  exists  in  human  consciousness  ^  and  to  the 
extent  of  exerting  a  constraining  force,  it  must  exist  along 
side  a  conception  of  natural  rights,  or  rather  mutual  rights 
and  obligations.  If  so,  they  are  already  members  of  a 
political  society.  There  is  then  already  a  political  society. 
Social  contract  can  not  create  a  pohtical  society  out  of  a 
state  of  nature,  for  contract  presupposes  a  political  society. 
Therefore  the  whole  doctrine  of  the  state  of  nature  and 
social  contract  is  logically  unsound. 

Green  is  a  democrat,  hence  Locke's  doctrine  of  popular 
government  is  more  acceptable  to  him  than  Hobbes'  de- 
fense of  absolute  monarchy.  But  he  does  not  permit  his 
feelings  to  get  the  better  of  his  intellect;  for  he  sees  that 
Locke's  theory  carried  to  its  logical  conclusion  involves 
difficulties.  In  the  matter  of  revolution,  if  it  is  to  be  justi- 
fied at  all,  it  must  be  justified  in  Green's  opinion  on  the 
groimd  that  the  will  of  the  people  demands  resistance  to 
the  government.  But  the  question  is,  how  can  any  one 
Know  exactly  or  even  roughly  whether  or  not  a  particular 
revolution  really  represents  the  will  of  the  people.  On  this 
point  Locke  offers  no  guide.  The  easiest  way  to  find  out 
IS,  according  to  Green,  some  sort  of  a  national  referendum, 
but  revolutions  are  never  carried  on  with  that  as  a  basis- 
Furthermore,  they  do  not  succeed  merely  because  they  rep- 

"^  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  71. 


resent  the  people's  will,  nor  do  they  necessarily  fail  if  they 
do  not  represent  that  will.  If  referendum  is  legally  pos- 
sible, then  an  overturn  of  the  existing  government  is  no 
longer  revolutionary.  Even  referendum  does  not  tell  much. 
Government  based  strictly  on  the  consent  of  the  governed 
has  some  inherent  defects.® 

These  criticisms  do  not  seem  to  be  exactly  to  the  point. 
What  we  are  getting  at  is  evidently  the  principle  of  politi- 
cal obligation  and  these  criticisms  do  not  seem  to  touch 
that  principle.  To  formulate  the  principle  of  political  obli- 
gation is  really  to  rationalize  political  obedience.  It  is  to 
seek  for  a  moral  duty  for  political  submission.  As  far  as 
that  goes,  the  writers  criticized  above  are  equally  eager  for 
a  solution.  All  this  talk  of  natural  rights,  of  the  state  of 
nature  and  of  social  contract,  however  different  the  con- 
clusions may  be  at  the  hands  of  the  different  philosophers, 
reveals  a  definite  aim  to  offer  a  rational  justification  for 
political  obedience,  or,  if  necessary,  for  political  disobedi- 
ence. And  it  is  also  with  this  purpose  in  view  that  Green 
offers  his  criticisms,  however  disconnected  they  may  seem 
to  be  from  the  main  theme.  Since  those  writers  just  now 
dealt  with  are  on  the  whole  materialistic  or  at  best  empiri- 
cal, their  doctrines  can  not  be  particularly  congenial  to  that 
of  a  man  as  idealistic  as  Green.  Their  theories  of  political 
obligation  seem  to  Green  to  be  hopelessly  inadequate. 

In  Rousseau,  however,  a  different  element  is  found.  Gen- 
erally when  one  thinks  of  social  contract,  the  three  men 
most  often  thought  of  are  Hobbes,  Locke  and  RousseaU. 
To  be  sure,  all  propound  the  theory  of  social  contract,  but 
each  does  it  in  a  different  way,  and  what  is  more  important 
for  us  in  this  connection,  also  for  a  different  purpose.  With 
Hobbes,  the  contract  creates  an  absolute  sovereign;  with 

•  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     Pp.  78,  90. 


% 

\ 


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Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


Green  and  His  Predecessors 


63 


Locke,  it  renders  possible  the  establishment  of  a  govern- 
ment revocable  by  the  sovereign  people,  but  otherwise  de- 
tached from  them;  and  with  Rousseau,  it  becomes  an  in- 
strument through  which  people  become  sovereign  not  as  a 
final  source  of  authority  ordinarily  held  in  reserve,  but  as 
an  active  spring  of  political  power,  necessitating  the  con- 
ception of  a  general  will  as  perpetually  functioning. 

4.  Rousseau.  According  to  Rousseau,  some  pact  takes 
place  when  men  realize  that  the  hindrance  to  their  preser- 
vation is  too  strong  for  the  isolated  individuals  to  combat 
with.  Hence  "each  of  us  throws  into  the  common  stock 
his  personal  and  family  relations  under  the  supreme  direc- 
tion of  the  general  will,  and  we  accept  each  member  as 
individual  part  of  the  whole.  .  .  .  There  results  from 
this  association,  in  place  of  the  several  persons  and  several 
contracting  parties,  a  collective  moral  body  composed  of  as 
many  members  as  there  are  voices  in  the  assembly,  which 
body  receives  from  this  act  of  association  its  unity,  its  com- 
mon self,  its  life  and  its  will  ...  It  is  called  by  its 
members  a  state  when  it  is  passive,  a  sovereign  when  active 
and  a  power  when  compared  with  other  bodies.  The  asso- 
ciates are  called  collectively  people,  severally  citizens  as 
sharing  in  the  sovereign  authority  and  subjects  as  submit- 
ting to  the  laws  of  the  state."  ®  Such  a  man  becomes  also 
a  moral  agent.  He  attains  moral  freedom  which  consists 
of  obedience  to  a  self  imposed  law.  Since  law  of  the  state 
is  but  the  expression  of  the  general  will  to  which  he  con- 
tributes, he  is  merely  obeying  himself  when  he  obeys  law. 
Sovengnty  thus  considered  is  totally  different  from  a  su- 
preme coercive  force.  It  has  the  attributes  of  pure  disin- 
terestedness, of  reason,  of  a  common  ego  which  wills  noth- 

»  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  81,  as  quoted  by  Green 
from  Rousseau. 


ing  but  what  is  for  the  common  good.  But  Rousseau  does 
not  consistently  speak  in  this  manner,  thus  lapsing,  accord- 
ing to  Green,  into  dangerous  grounds. 

Let  us  examine  further  Rousseau's  conception  of  sov- 
ereignty and  government.  Sovereignty  is  not  power  but 
will.  Power  can  be  delegated,  but  will  can  not  be  dele- 
gated. Being  the  exercise  of  general  will,  sovereignty  can  not 
be  alienated  since  it  can  not  be  delegated.  Will  by  definition 
is  indivisible,  so  must  also  be  sovereign  will  and  sover- 
eignty. The  only  exercise  of  sovereign  power,  properly 
so-called,  is  in  legislation,  and  there  is  no  proper  act  of 
legislation  except  when  the  whole  people  comes  to  a  de- 
cision with  reference  to  the  whole  people.  The  question 
decided  is  as  general  as  the  will  which  decides  it,  and 
that  is  how  there  has  come  to  be  law.  Law,  being  the  ex- 
pression to  which  every  one  ccTntributes,  can  not  be  unjust; 
for  no  one  can  be  unjust  to  himself,  and  therefore  the 
whole  people  can  not  be  unjust  to  the  whole  people.  Since 
laws  are  the  expressions  of  their  own  will,  people  can  sub- 
mit to  them  and  yet  be  free.  A  mere  decree  from  the  gov- 
ernment is  not  law ;  for  government  is  not  sovereign  at 
all.  The  function  of  the  sovereign  is  legislative,  that  of 
the  government  is  executive;  the  effect  of  the  former  is 
general,  that  of  the  latter  is  particular. 

We  need  not  present  Rousseau's  views  in  regard  to  the 
different  forms  of  government.  The  important  point  to 
remember  is  that  whatever  its  form,  it  is  not  instituted  by 
contract,  and  therefore  it  is  revocable  by  the  sovereign 
without  incurring  the  charge  of  a  violation  of  the  contract- 
In  fact,  according  to  Rousseau,  in  order  that  authority 
may  not  fall  in  abeyance,  it  rtiust  be  constantly  exercised 
even  though  it  can  not  be  exercised  except  in  assemblies 
of  the  whole  people.  Such  assemblies  must  periodically 
meet  to  decide  whether  or  not  the  present  form  of  govern- 


64 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


It 


ment  shall  be  maintained,  whether  or  not  authority  shall  be 
left  in  the  hands  of  those  now  charged  with  it.  At  such 
meetings  laws  can  be  revised  and  repealed.  General  will 
can  make  itself  felt  only  in  such  a  way. 

There,  according  to  Green,  comes  the  trouble.  What  is 
the  general  will  and  how  are  we  to  ascertain  it?  Greneral 
will  is  not  the  will  of  all,  Rousseau  says,  but  the  will 
common  to  all.  The  will  of  all  is  the  totality  of  wills,  the 
will  common  to  all  is  the  general  will.  This  general  will, 
according  to  Green's  interpretation  of  Rousseau,  may  be 
tainted  by  special  interests,  it  may  lack  enlightenment,  but 
it  is  none  the  less  right  and  pure.  How  can  it  be  ascer- 
tained? Does  unanimity  of  the  votes  in  the  assembly  of 
the  whole  people  alone  represent  the  general  will?  The 
social  contract  in  order  to  be  valid  requires  unanimous  con- 
sent and  the  ones  who  refuse  to  join  it  are  not  citizens.  If 
they  are  not  citizens,  how  can  the  state  exact  their  obedi- 
ence? And  after  the  passing  of  those  who  are  parties  to 
the  contract,  how  is  it  to  be  ascertained  whether  anyone 
coming  later  on  is  a  party  to  it  or  not  ?  Rousseau  says  resi- 
dence proves  him  willing  to  submit  to  sovereignty.  That, 
Green  points  out,  hardly  answers  the  question,  for  residence 
is  no  indication  of  consent,  and  if  by  residence  in  a  given 
area  one  is  morally  bound  to  obey  the  sovereign,  then  his 
obedience  is  not  necessarily  based  on  consent.  Rousseau 
does  not  require  unanimity  in  the  assembly  of  the  whole 
people  for  expressing  the  general  will  after  the  contract  is 
formed.  But  if  he  does  not,  how  can  the  minority  be  bound 
to  obey  the  rulings  of  the  majority?  Rousseau  says  that 
if  anyone  finds  himself  in  the  minority,  he  is  bound  to  sup- 
pose that  he  is  mistaken  in  his  views  of  the  general  will, 
therefore"  he  is  bound  to  obey.  There  is  no  explanation  of 
the  rule  of  the  majority  if  the  minority  sincerely  doubts 
the  wisdom  and  integrity  of  the  majority.    Rousseau  is  prob- 


Green  and  His  Predecessors 


65 


ably  more  consistent  than  others  in  basing  political  obliga- 
tion on  consent,  but  it  seems  to  Green,  his  efforts  are  none 
the  less  futile.  The  contribution  that  is  really  valuable  is 
the  conception  of  sovereignty  as  representing  a  general 
will. 

5.  Austin.  But  the  general  idea  of  sovereignty,  accord- 
ing to  Green,  has  come  to  be  more  or  less  Austinian.  It 
is  conceived  as  a  supreme  law-giving  and  enforcing  power, 
and  if  necessary,  it  also  implies  coercive  force.  Accord- 
ing to  Austin,  "the  notions  of  sovereignty  and  independent 
poUtical  society  may  be  expressed  concisely  thus:  If  a  de- 
terminate human  superior,  not  in  the  habit  of  obedience  to 
a  like  superior,  receive  the  Tiabitual  obedience  of  the  bulk 
of  a  given  society,  that  determinate  superior  is  sovereign  in 
that  society  and  the  society  including  the  superior  is  a  so- 
ciety political  and  independent."  ^®  "In  order  that  a  given 
society  may  form  a  society  political  and  independent,  the 
two  distinguishing  marks  which  I  have  mentioned  above 
must  unite.  The  generality  of  the  given  society  must  be 
in  the  habit  of  obedience  to  a  determinate  and  common 
superior ;  whilst  that  determinate  person  or  body  of  persons 
must  not  be  habitually  obedient  to  a  determinate  person  or 
body.  It  is  this  union  of  that  positive  with  this  negative 
mark  which  renders  that  certain  superior  sovereign  or  su- 
preme and  which  renders  that  given  society  political  and 
independent."  "  Green  notes  that,  according  to  Austin,  law 
is  a  rule  laid  down  by  one  intelligent  being  having  power 
over  other  intelligent  beings  for  the  purpose  of  guiding 
them.  Laws  are  divfded  into  two  kinds,  those  set  by  God 
to  men  or  the  law  of  nature,  those  set  by  men  to  men  or 
human  laws.     Of  the  latter  there  are  again   two  kinds, 


^^  Austin.    Lectures  on  Jurisprudence. 
i^Austin.     Lectures  on  Jurisprudence. 


66 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


Green  and  His  Predecessors 


67 


firstly,  laws  established  by  the  sovereign  over  his  subjects, 
the  positive  laws,  secondly,  laws  not  established  by  sov- 
ereign but  enforced  through  custom  and  morals,  viz.,  posi- 
tive moraUty.  Laws  are  often  spoken  of  as  commands 
and  as  such  they  fit  in  with  the  conception  of  sovereignty, 
since  they  necessarily  proceed  from  determinate  persons. 

The  Austinian  theory  of  sovereignty  is,  in  Green's  opin- 
ion, different  from  that  of  Rousseau  in  two  important 
respects.  In  fact,  in  those  respects  the  two  conceptions 
are  diametrically  opposite.  First,  Austin  regards  sover- 
eignty as  residing  with  determinate  person  or  persons, 
while  Rousseau  regards  it  as  inalienable  and  solely  retained 
by  the  whole  people.  Second,  Austin  considers  the  es- 
sence of  sovereignty  as  power  of  such  determinate  person 
or  persons  over  subjects,  while  Rousseau  regards  it  as  rep- 
resenting general  will  of  the  citizens.  In  fact,  it  will 
be  recalled,  Rousseau  expressly  declared  that  sovereignty  is 
not  power  but  will.  Power  can  be  delegated  but  not  will. 
While,  however,  the  two  views  are  mutually  exclusive,  each 
really  has  its  own  merit. 

According  to  Green,  Austin  is  right  when  he  regards 
sovereignty  as  essentially  resident  with  determinate  person 
or  persons;  for  political  facts,  historical  as  well  as  con- 
temporary, bear  out  his  contention.  No  matter  how 
complicated  the  political  systems  of  the  different  countries 
may  be,  there  is  always  some  person  or  a  body  of  persons 
in  whom  the  supreme  power  is  vested.  That  is,  there  are 
some  persons  whose  authority  knows  no  legal  limitation.^' 

The  king  in  Parliament  is  the  sovereign  of  Great  Britain. 
There  is  no  legal  limit  to  the  action  of  the  king  to- 
gether with  House  of  Lords  and  Commons.  It  may,  of 
course,  be  argued  that  in  Great  Britain  common  law,  which 
is  not  any  command  of  any  determinate  person  or  persons, 

12  Principles  of  Political   Obligation.     P.   98. 


has  been  and  is  an  influential  body  of  rules  to  which  people 
may  be  said  to  render  habitual  obedience-  True,  but  com- 
mon law  may  be  overruled  by  statutory  laws,  and  if  it  is 
not  so  overruled,  it  stands  by  legislative  acquiescence.  This 
state  of  affairs  is  by  no  means  limited  to  Great  Britain. 
Supreme  legal  authority  is  also  found  in  the  United  States 
where  political  structure  is  a  complicated  system  of  fed- 
eral, state  and  local  governments.  The  federal  govern- 
ment is  indeed  not  supreme,  that  is,  it  has  legal  limitations. 
The  Constitution  is  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  and  legis- 
lation contrary  to  its  provisions  can  be  and  often  is  declared 
unconstitutional.  But  the  Constitution  can  be  amended  and 
the  amending  power  is  viewed  by  many,  including  Austin 
himself,"  as  the  sovereign  power  as  far  as  the  United 
States  is  concerned.  Therefore,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  sov- 
ereignty involves  in  most  cases  its  residence  with  determi- 
nate person  or  body  or  bodies  of  persons  who  are  thus 
vested  with  legally  unlimited  power  to  make  and  enforce 
laws.  Since  the  term  sovereignty  has  acquired  this  legalis- 
tic implication  in  general,  Rousseau,  according  to  Green, 
is  somewhat  misleading"  in  attributing  general  will  to 
it  as  its  essence. 

It  seems  to  Green  that  this  legalistic  conception  is  not 
entirely  satisfactory.  It  is  liable  to  mistake  effect  for 
cause.  The  reason  that  sovereign  power  is  supreme  and 
habitually  obeyed  is  not  that  it  is  capable  of  coercive  force. 
Force  alone  does  not  explain  the  supremacy  of  sovereignty. 
If  we  examine  more  closely  and  emancipate  ourselves  from 
this  purely  legalistic  conception,  Green  argues,  we  must  look 
for  the  source  of  power,  which  is  not  and  can  not  be  the 
power  itself.  It  is  here  that  Rousseau's  ideas  apply  to  bet- 
ter advantage.  The  real  cause  of  habitual  obedience 
is  not  found  in  any  determinate  person  or  persons,  but  in 

*' Austin.     Lectures  on  Jurisprudence. 

"  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  98. 


68  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

"that  impalpable  congeries  of  hopes  and  fears  of  a  people 
bound  together  by  common  interests  and  sympathy  which 
we  call  the  general  will."  ^»     These  influences,  which  for 
the  sake  of  brevity  we  call  the  general  will,  have  been 
operative  historically.    Sir  Henry  Maine  says  in  his  Early 
History  of  Institutions :  "The  vast  mass  of  influences  which 
we  may  call  for  shortness  moral,  habitually  shapes,  limits, 
or  forbids  the  actual  direction  of  the  forces  of  society 
by  its  sovereign."  ^«    In  other  words,  there  is  a  source  from 
which  power  is  derived    Nominally  the  power  of  the  sov- 
ereign may  be  characterized  as  supreme,  but  factually  it  is 
only  effective  when  .sanctioned  by  the  good  will  of  the  peo- 
ple.    The  determinate  person  or  body  of  persons  is  only 
able  to  exercise  their  power  in  virtue  of  an  assent  if  not 
consent  of  the  people.    This  assent  is  not  based  upon  any 
definite  expression  of  the  people ;  rather  is  it  based  upon  the 
desire,  the  common  desire  of  a  common  good  for  a  com- 
mon end  to  which  observance  of  law  and  obedience  to  the 
sovereign  may  contribute.     There  may  be  person  or  per- 
sons who  wield  greater  powers  than  the  rest,  who  exact 
habitual  obedience  and  who  probably  possess  coercive  force. 
Call  him  or  them  sovereign  if  you  will,  but  don't  explain 
their  supremacy  by  their  force.    That  force  will  come  to 
nothing  when  opposed  to   the  people's  desire.     Let   this 
desire,  which  may  be  properiy  called  the  general  will,  cease 
to  operate,  or  let  it  come  into  general  conflict  with  sov- 
ereign commands,  and  the  habitual  obedience  will  cease 
also.^^    In  other  words: 

"There's  on  earth  a  yet  auguster  thing, 

Veiled  though  it  be,  than  Parliament  and  King."  ^® 

i«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  98. 

i«  Maine.    Early  History  of  Institutions.    P.  359. 

17  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  97. 

18  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  82. 


'\-f 


CHAPTER  IV 
THE  BASIS  OF  THE  STATE 

Being  a  democrat  and  an  idealist,  Green  leans  to  Rous- 
seau more  than  he  does  to  Austin,  believing  that  political 
obedience  is  a  matter  of  will  rather  than  power  or  force. 
It  may  of  course  be  urged  that  this  view  of  general  will 
as  the  real  determinent  of  the  habitual  obedience  to  sov- 
ereign power  is  applicable  only  to  democratic  communi- 
ties, where  governors  are  elected  by  the  people  and  govern- 
ment is  based  on  the  consent  of  the  governed,  and  is  quite 
inapplicable  to  despotic  countries  where  despots  both  reign 
and  rule  supreme.  This  sounds  plausible,  but  according 
to  Green,  it  is  not  true. 

That  the  doctrine  under  consideration  applies  more  di- 
rectly to  the  democratic  communities  is  not  denied.  But 
in  a  despotic  country  in  which  there  is  a  sovereign,  under- 
stood in  the  Austinian  sense,  general  will.  Green  holds,  is 
equally  if  not  so  directly  a  potent  factor  in  the  habitual 
obedience-  There  is  always  a  body  of  customs,  conventions 
and  mores  which  the  sovereign,  in  order  to  exact  obedience, 
will  find  it  profitable  not  to  ignore.  The  Russian  Tzars, 
for  instance,  found  it  advisable  to  worship  at  Moscow  often 
contrary  to  their  will,  and  the  Chinese  Emperors  thought  it 
worth  while,  even  against  their  own  inclinations,  to  pay 
their  respects  to  the  memory  of  Confucius-    There  may  be 

r 


70  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

communities  where  coercive  force  has  been  successfully 
employed  against  the  will  of  the  people.  In  such  cases 
there  are  generally  two  conditions  worthy  of  our  notice: 
either  there  is  no  sovereign  power  in  the  sense  of  a  law- 
giving and  law-enforcing  power  and  therefore  also  no  habit- 
ual obedience;  or  the  coercive  power  of  oppression,  though 
constant  and  recurring,  touches  the  people  only  at  a  few 
points  and  the  obedience  thus  rendered,  though  habitual  in 
a  sense,  is  never  continuous  and  is  therefore  different  from 
the  rational  and  moral  obedience  to  political  authority. 

The  conditions  of  a  so-called  tax-collecting  despotism 
offer  a  fairly  satisfactory  contrast  to  the  democratic  com- 
munities. The  despots  exercise  coercive  force  over  their 
subjects,  but  exercise  it  only  for  a  certain  specific  purpose 
and  only  at  certain  times.  They  do  not  legislate  in  the  mod- 
em sense,  nor  do  they  invade  the  field  of  the  judiciary,  nor 
do  they  concern  themselves  much  about  customary  laws. 
The  subjects  render  obedience  only  in  regard  to  those  spe- 
cific things.  They  are  practically  left  free  so  far  as  the 
laws,  institutions,  customs  and  manners  are  concerned.  Life 
in  general  is  not  much  affected.  They  still  pay  their  re- 
spects to  their  patriarch,  their  priest  and  their  warrior. 
There  is  in  such  a  case  hardly  any  sovereign. 

The  same  results  can  be  found  in  the  case  of  foreign  dom- 
ination over  a  country  which  has  a  highly  organized  com- 
munity life.  The  foreign  power  is  not  a  sovereign  in  the 
sense  of  a  law  giver  or  law  maintainer.  The  subject  coun- 
try has  inherited  a  body  of  laws  and  customs  which  enable 
it  not  only  to  govern  itself  but  also  to  emancipate  itself 
from  foreign  domination.  North  Italy  under  Austria  was 
in  such  a  condition  and  the  Chinese  Empire  under  the  Mon- 
gols and  Manchus  was  even  more  to  the  point.  In  both 
cases,  the  sovereign,  if  sovereign  at  all,  is  not  so  in  the 
Austinian  sense. 


The  Basis  of  The  State 


71 


Again  there  may  be  aristocratic  rulers  who  are  real  sov- 
ereigns in  the  sense  defined,  but  in  such  cases,  the  power 
of  the  rulers  is  due  to  a  large  extent  to  the  good  will  of  the 
people.  Green  cites  the  example  of  the  early  Roman  Em- 
pire^ in  which,  he  says,  the  people  lived  under  a  system  of 
rights  and  obligations  better  than  their  own.  Although  they 
did  not  vote  or  expressly  give  their  consent  in  any  form, 
they  by  implication  assented  to  the  Roman  rule.  Even  the 
Russian  autocrat  did  not  depend  upon  absolute  coercive 
power  for  the  habitual  obedience  he  exacted  from  the  peo- 
ple; for,  it  is  contended,  he  conformed  to  a  complicated 
system  of  relations,  of  written  and  unwritten  laws,  from 
which  he  was  by  no  means  independent. 

Austin,  according  to  Green,  is  in  a  sense  right  in  his 
theory  of  sovereignty ;  so  also  is  Rousseau.  How  can  these 
views  be  harmonized?  The  trouble  with  both  of  them  is, 
he  says,  that  when  they  emphasize  one  aspect  they  forget 
the  other.  If  sovereignty  is  the  power  to  maintain  rights,  it 
has  the  elements  of  both  force  and  will.  If  it  sometimes 
exercises  coercive  or  even  tyrannical  power,  it  is  not 
because  it  is  tyrannical  or  coercive  that  it  receives  habitual 
obedience.  On  the  other  hand,  sovereignty  defined  as  power 
and  as  vested  in  determinate  person  or  persons  may  profit- 
ably be  allowed,  according  to  Green,  to  retain  its  legalistic 
meaning.  In  that  case,  it  may  be  misleading  to  speak  of 
general  will  as  the  sovereign.  It  is  however,  equally  mis- 
leading to  attribute  to  sovereignty  omnipotence;  for  if  not 
sustained  by  general  will,  it  ceases  to  exist.  It  is  better,  ac- 
cording to  Green,  "to  say  that  law,  as  the  system  of  rules  by 
which  rights  are  maintained,  is  the  expression  of  the  gen- 
eral will  than  that  the  general  will  is  the  sovereign.  The 
sovereign  being  a  person  or  persons  by  whom  in  the  last 


1  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  101. 


72  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

resort  laws  are  imposed  and  enforced,  in  the  long  run  and 
on  the  whole  is  the  agent  of  the  general  will,  contributes 
to  realize  that  will." »  In  so  far  as  the  sovereign  does  so 
contribute  to  realize  that  will  and  is  an  agent  of  it,  he  is  in 
possession  of  supreme  power.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he 
does  not  so  contribute  to  realize  that  will,  mere  power  does 
not  command  habitual  obedience. 

It  is  only  fair  to  record  that  Rousseau  recognizes  the  dif- 
ficulty of  his  theory  of  sovereignty  and  general  will  as 
applied  to  actual  poUtical  affairs.     While  in  principle  he 
sticks  to  his  conception  of  sovereignty  as  consisting  in  rep- 
resenting general  will,  he  does  not,  in  Greenes  opinion,  alto- 
gether avoid  the  notion  that  there  is  supreme  law-making 
and  law-enforcing  power  distinct  from  the  will.     Though 
Rousseau  does  not  expressly  diflFerentiate  a  sovereign  de 
jure  from  a  sovereign  de  facto,  such  a  differentiation  can 
be    justifiably    inferred    from    Contrat    Social    and    is    so 
inferred  by  Green.«     But  such  a  differentiation,  accord- 
ing to  Green,  can  not  in  any  way  be  justified;  for  strictly 
speaking,  sovereign  de  facto  can  not  be  other  than  sovereign 
de  jure.    Confusion  between  the  two  generally  comes  as  a 
result  of  a  confusion  of  meaning  in  the  conception  either 
of  the  term  sovereign  or  of  the  term  jus.*     A  sovereign 
is  often  described  as  such  without  being  actually  such  in 
the  real  sense.     Thus  an  English  King  who  is  called  sov- 
ereign, but  who  is  not  the  determinate  person  or  persons 
entrusted  with  the  supreme  law-making  and  law-enforcing 
power,  may  be  said  to  exercise  sovereign  power  de  facto 
when  he  raises  money  without  the  consent  of  the  Parlia- 
ment.    He  may  be  said  to  be  sovereign  de  facto  and  not 

«  Same.    P.  104. 
8  Same.     F.  91. 
*  Same.    P.  1€5. 


The  Basis  of  The  State 


73 


de  jure,  since  his  conduct  is  contrary  to  the  will  of  the  peo- 
ple as  embodied  in  the  laws,  customs  and  conventions.  But 
that  is  only  true  as  far  as  the  King  is  only  a  nominal  sov- 
ereign, one  entirely  different  from  sovereign  in  the  real 
sense.  A  real  sovereign  de  facto'  is  always  a  sovereign 
de  jure.  Given  the  definitions,  the  conclusion  is  inevitable; 
you  can  not  change  it  without  changing  the  definitions. 

If  the  sovereign  is  a  real  one  in  the  strict  sense.  Green 
argues,  the  terms  de  jure  and  not  de  jure  are  not  applicable.^ 
When  one  speaks  of  de  jure  or  not  de  jure,  one  necessarily 
has  a  definite  idea  of  jus  in  mind.  Now  what  is  meant  by 
jus?  If  by  jus  is  meant  ordinary  statutory  law,  then  sov- 
ereign de  jure  is  a  meaningless  expression,  for  such  law 
proceeds  only  from  the  sovereign.  If  by  jus  is  meant  nat- 
ural law  or  natural  rights  or  claims  inherent  in  human  be- 
ings as  members  of  a  society,  then  indeed  a  sovereign  may 
not  be  de  jure,  but  then  he  is  not,  in  Green's  opinion,  at  the 
same  time  a  sovereign  in  the  real  sense,  i.  e.,  the  supreme 
law-making  and  law-enforcing  authority.  In  other  words, 
sovereign  de  jure  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  A  supreme 
imponent  of  law  is  not  limited  by  the  law  he  imposes.  He 
may  formulate  rules  to  limit  himself  but  then  he  is  always 
at  liberty  to  change  them- 

This  process  of  reasoning  facilitates  the  understanding 
of  the  different  points  of  view.  When  Hobbes  says  that 
laws  can  not  be  unjust  we  have  to  go  back  to  the  definition 
of  injustice.  If  by  injustice  is  meant  the  violation  of  con- 
tract, and  the  sovereign  is  not  a  party  to  the  contract  and 
therefore  can  not  break  it,  it  necessarily  follows  that  a 
sovereign  can  not  be  unjust.  If  the  sovereign  can  not  be 
unjust,  laws  which  are  laws  by  reason  of  their  being  en- 

»  Same.    P.  105. 
•  Same.    P.  106. 


74 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


The  Basis  of  The  State 


75 


acted  by  him  can  not  be  unjust.  But,  according  to  Hobbcs, 
laws  can  be  inequitable  and  pernicious;  for  by  "inequi- 
table" he  means  that  which  conflicts  with  the  law  of  nature, 
and  by  "pernicious"  that  which  tends  to  weaken  the  indi- 
viduals and  the  community.'' 

Rousseau's  argument,  Green  shows,  is  similar  but  on  dif- 
ferent grounds.  His  sovereignty  is  general  will,  his  general 
will,  the  will  common  to  the  whole  people.  Since,  then,  the 
whole  people  can  not  be  unjust  to  the  whole  people,  the 
sovereign  can  not  be  unjust  to  its  subjects. 

Green  sees  that  Hobbes  thinks  of  sovereignty  as 
essentially  power,  and  Rousseau  thinks  of  it  as  essentially 
will  But  whether  power  or  will,  sovereignty  can  not  be 
said  to  be  either  de  jure  or  not  de  jure.  If  it  is  power, 
as  we  have  seen,  these  terms  de  jure  and  not  de  jure  are 
not  applicable  to  it.  If  it  is  will,  they  are  equally  inappli- 
cable. "A  certain  desire  either  is  or  is  not  the  general 
will.  A  certain  interest  either  is  or  is  not  an  interest 
in  the  common  good.  There  is  no  sense  in  saying  that 
such  desire  or  interest  is  general  will  de  jure  but  not  de 
facto  or^ice  versa."  * 

Confusion  comes,  according  to  Green,  when  sovereignty  is 
made  to  combine  the  notions  of  general  will  and  the  supreme 
law-making  and  law-enforcing  power.  It  is  through  this  con- 
fusion that  there  is  the  necessity  of  making  the  law-making 
and  law-enforcing  power  dependent  upon  the  vote  of  a  ma- 
jority of  the  citizens  and  identifying  that  vote  with  the 
general  will.  It  must  be  understood  that  general  will, 
though  called  general,  is  yet  will;  and  will,  being  itself 
unnatural,  that  is,  pertaining  to  consciousness  rather  than 
to  the  physical  world,  can  not  be  so  mechanically  ascer- 

»  Same.     P.  107. 
»  Same.     P.  108. 


v^ 


tained  by  the  "natural"  process  of  a  majority  vote.®  While 
Rousseau's  conception  of  a  general  will  is  a  valuable  con- 
tribution, his  identification  of  that  will  with  the  vote  of  a 
certain  number  of  persons  can  not  be  accepted. 

The  defect  of  Rousseau's  theory,  as  Green  sees  it,  is  ba- 
sically one  of  his  theory  of  natural  rights.     If  natural 
rights  meant  fundamental  rights,  rights  that  existed  prior 
to  the  formation  of  the  society  and  were  retained  by  in- 
dividuals after  it,  then  they  are  above  all  political  inter- 
ference whatsoever,  and  the  only  way  to  justify  political 
obligation  is  by  the  theory  of  consent.    As  long  as  consent 
is  the  sole  source  of  authority,  the  difficulty  of  the  justi- 
fication  of   the   submission  of   the  minority   can  not  be 
escaped.  /'According  to  Green,  there  is  in  truth  no  natural 
right  apart  from  the  society,  much  less  the  right  to  do  as 
one  likes  irrespective  of  the  society.//  A  right,  it  may  be 
repeated,  is  a  condition  claimed  and  recognized  as  neces- 
sary for  the  reaUzation  of  the  moral  ideal  and  common 
good  of  men  as  members  of  a  society.     It  can  not  exist 
in  one  individual  without  relation  to  society,  just  as  force 
of  gravity  of  one  body  can  not  exist  in  that  body  without 
relation  to  other  bodies.     Therefore,  no  one  has  the  right 
to  resist  law  or  government  merely  because  it  requires  him 
to  do  that  which  he  does  not  himself  approve,  or  not  to 
do  that  which  he  desires.     The  only  question,  according 
to  Green,  is  as  Rousseau  has  put  it :  Is  a  given  measure  in   "^ 
accordance  with  the  general  will?    In  other  words,  whether 
that  given  measure  is  in  accordance  with  the  general  will 
or  not,  is  the  real  problem.     That  is  a  very  big  problem, 
and  it  seems  that  Green  has  offered  no  practical  solution. 
After  all,  he  says,  an  interest  in  the  common  good  is  the    ^ 
ground  for  political  society,  for  without  that  interest  "no 

»  Same.    P.  109. 


^ 


76 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


The  Basis  of  The  State 


77 


y 


<v 


body  of  people  will  recognize  any  authority  as  having  any 
claim  on  their  common  obedience.  It  is  so  far  as  a  gov- 
ernment represents  to  them  a  common  good  that  the  sub- 
jects are  conscious  that  they  ought  to  obey  it,  that  is,  that 
obedience  to  it  is  a  means  to  an  end  desirable  in  itself  or 
absolutely."  ^^ 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  his  Metaphysics  and  Ethics 
Green  believes  in  the  interdependence  of  men  and  society 
V  so  that  each  in  fact  does  not  exist  without  the  other. 
.^  f5^/TRights  and  duties  must  be  considered  with  this  view  in 
mind.y  "It  is  only  as  members  of  a  society,  as  recognizing 
common  interests  and  objects,  that  individuals  come  to 
have  these  attributes  and  rights,  and  the  power  which  in 
the  political  society  they  have  to  obey  is  derived  from 
the  development  and  systematization  of  those  institutions 
for  the  regulation  of  a  common  life  without  which  they 
would  have  no  rights  at  all."  "a,  Or  again,  the  demand  for 
a  justification  of  any  submission  to  authority  presupposes 
/  some  standard  of  rights  recognized  as  equally  valid  for 
and  by  the  person  making  the  demand,  and  others  who 
form  a  society  with  him.  Such  a  standard  of  rights  would 
be  quite  meaningless,  if  it  does  not  possess  institutions 
through  which  dealings  with  each  other  are  regulated. 
These  institutions  are  to  the  consciousness  of  right  just 
as  language  is  to  thought.  They  are  the  expressions  with 
^il^5^_*^^*  consciousness  becomes  real.**  Theyembody 
the  system  of  rights  and  obligations  through  which  men 
restrain  themselves.  Primitive  or  conventional  morality, 
which  is  essentially  the  observance  of  rules  and  obligations, 
can  not  exist  without  these  institutions.    In  a  certain  sense, 

10  Same.     P.  109. 
"  Same.    P.  122. 

"  Same.    F.  123. 


then,  the  body  of  laws,  institutions  and  customs  embody 
what  Rousseau  calls  the  general  will. 

Rousseau  speaks  of  social  contract  as  the  foundation 
not  only  of  society  and  sovereignty  but  also  of  morality. 
Through  it  men  become  moral  beings.  By  it,  submission 
to  power  and  to  the  forces  of  nature,  to  greed  and  appe- 
tite  is  transformed  into  the  moral  freedom  of  subjection 
to  the  self-imposed  law.  If  such  is  the  case,  he  should 
have  seen  that  natural  rights  can  have  no  pre-social  exist- 
ence, since  they  can  only  exist  for  the  purpose  of  reahzmg 
our  moral  ideal.  Had  he  seen  that,  he  would  have  avoided 
a  grave  error. 

According  to  Green,  moraUty  in  the  conventional  sense 
and  political  subjection  in  the  sense  of  having  nghts  thus 
secured  proceed  from  the  same  source.  /"That  common  ^ 
source  is  the  rational  recognition  by  certain  human  bemgs 
of  a  common  well  being  which  is  their  well  bemg,  and 
which  they  conceive  as  their  well  being,  whether  at  any 
moment  any  one  of  them  is  incUned  to  it  or  no   and  the 
embodiment  of  that  recognition  in  rules  by  which  the  m- 
clinations  of  the  individuals  are  restrained  and  a  corre- 
sponding freedom  of  action  for  the  attainment  of  well 
being  on  the  whole  is  secured."  "/  There  proceeds  from 
this  source,  according  to  Green,  an  antagomsm  to  some 
inclinations  and  a  consciousness  that  such  antagomsm  is 
founded  on  reason  and  on  the  conception  of  some  adequate 
good     This  antagonism  to  or  constraint  of  an  mcUnation, 
whether  in  relation  to  an  exteral  law  or  to  a  self-imposed 
law,  is  generally  expressed  in  the  term  "must."  "    I  must 
register  for  the  army.    Or  I  must  volunteer  for  the  army. 

"Same.  P.  124. 
"  Same.  P.  125. 
i»  Same.    P.  12S. 


"I 


78 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


y 


v/ 


The  former  may  have  the  element  of  compulsion  in  view, 
if  the  law  is  not  comphed  with,  but  the  latter  certainly 
represents  nothing  of  the  kind  if  there  is  no  law  for  con- 
scription whatsoever.  But  in  both  cases  there  is  a  certain 
element  of  consciousness  of  a  common  good  which  is  at 
the  bottom  the  driving  force.  Simple  fear  does  not  con- 
stitute pohtical  obhgation,  neither  does  force  compel  it. 

It  may  be  objected  that  such  an  idea,  however  pleasing 
it  may  sound,  is  far  from  representing  the  fact.    In  place 
of  good  will,  some  thinkers  will  say,  there  is  often  hatred, 
and  in  place  of  a  common  good  there  is  class  interest; 
where  cooperation  alone  will  ever  produce  desirable  re- 
sults, competition  holds  sway.    Instead  of  happiness  being 
the  rule,  it  becomes  the  exception,  and  instead  of  misery 
the  exception,  it  becomes  the  rule.     People  vote,  but  they 
do  not  necessarily  elect  their  governors  or  decide  issues. 
Representative  government  governs  but  it  does  not  neces- 
sarily represent.     Law  is  instituted  for  the  good  of  all, 
but  it  is  often  twisted  for  the  benefit  of  the  few.    Judges 
are  appointed  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  justice,  but 
often  they  become  mere  guardians  of  legality.    Under  such 
circumstances,  is  it  not  a  waste  of  words  to  indulge  in  the 
high-sounding  phrases  of  common  good  and  moral  ideal? 
If  the  idea  of  common  good  prevails  to  the  extent  to  which 
it  is  claimed  as  prevailing,  there  should  not  and  there  can 
not  be  such  misery,  such  poverty,  such  conflict  of  interests 
and  such  violence.     These  undesirable  conditions  can  not 
be  conducive  to  the  realization  of  die  so-called  moral  ideal, 
neither  do  they  lead  to  the  observance  of  rights  and  duties 
upon  which  political  obligations  are  based.    If  people  obey 
political  authorities  in  spite  of  this  conspicuous  absence  of 
the  idea  of  a  common  good,   they  must  obey  on  other 
grounds.    It  may  be  more  correct  to  say  that  they  obey  by 
force  of  habit,  or  necessity,  or  for  fear  of  consequences 


The  Basis  of  The  State 


79 


rather  than  by  reason  of  a  mutual  recogmtion  of  rights 

and  obligations. 

That  the  actual  is  far  from  being  the  ideal  is  readily 
admitted  by  Green.^«    But  it  is  easy,  on  the  other  hand,  he 
points  out,  to  exaggerate  the  difference,  and  those  who 
exaggerate  it  are  probably  unnecessarily  loaded  with  pes- 
simism.   We  should  bear  in  mind  that  every  action  on  the 
part  of  the  citizen  involves  more  or  less  the  idea  of  a  com- 
mon good.     Some  have  more  of  that  idea  in  view,  others 
have  less,  but  none  is  entirely  without  it  and  none.  Green 
admits,  has  it  in  all  its  fullness  and  completeness.    For  an 
ordinary  citizen,  that  idea  has  probably  very  little  abstract 
significance,  but  it  is  invariably  present  in  his  concrete  in- 
terests-    ''He  has,"  according  to  Green,  "a  clear  under- 
standing of  certain  interests  and  rights  common  to  himself 
and  his  neighbors,  if  only  such  as  consist  in  getting  his 
wages  paid  at  the  end  of  the  week,  in  getting  his  money  s 
worth  at  the  shop,  in  the  inviolability  of  his  own  person 
and  that  of  his  wife.    Habitually  and  instinctively,  that  is, 
without  asking  the  reason  why,  he  regards  the  claim  which 
in  these  respects  he  makes  for  himself  as  conditioned  upon 
his  recognizing  a  like  claim  in  others,  and  thus  as  in  a 
proper  sense  a  right-a  claim  of  which  the  essence  lies  in 
its  being  common  to  himself  with  others."  ''     The  reason 
that  this  manifestation  of  the  idea  of  a  common  good  is 
not  so  easily  discerned  is,  not  that  it  is  not  discernible,  but 
that  the  supreme  coercive  power  has  been  and  is  the  out- 
ward visible  sign.    Just  as  a  man  is  often  taken  to  be  what 
he  seems,  so  a  state  is  only  too  generally  identified  with 
its  outward  visible  sign.     But  if  we  go  deeper  than  mere 
appearances  we  shall  find  that  the  unifying  principle  of 

i«  Same.     P.  128. 
"Same.    P.  129. 


^ 


y 


y 


8o 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


The  Basis  of  The  State 


8i 


the  state  is  really  the  promotion  of  a  common  good.     In 
/other  words,  will  and  not  force  is  the  true  basis  of  tht 
state. 

But  institutions  grow  and  are  not  made,  many  will  say. 
Whatever  our  conceptions  of  them  may  be  at  this  present 
moment,  their  origin  and  development  involve  natural  con- 
ditions and  tendencies  and  therefore  also  inevitable  re- 
sults. Rationalize  and  idealize  as  much  as  you  please,  you 
can  not  escape  the  fact  that  our  political  and  social  insti- 
tutions are  materially  conditioned.  Given  certain  condi- 
tions, and  there  wifi  be  certain  results.  In  order  to  under- 
stand these  results  you  have  to  consider  all  the  material 
conditions — the  climate,  geographical  position,  sea  coasts, 
bays,  rivers,  mountains  and  the  like. 

That  these  influences  are  instrumental  in  the  develop- 
ment of  particular  institutions  is  not  denied  by  Green. 
But  what  would  these  influences  be,  were  it  not  for  the 
synthetic  unifying  consciousness?  Material  conditions 
may  and  do  condition  human  efforts,  but  they  do  not  point 
V  to  the  particular  direction  in  which  human  development 
has  come  to  be  what  it  is  at  present.  In  other  words,  the 
J  creative  capacity  of  human  beings  should  not  be  mini- 
mized, since  after  all  it  is  the  driving  force  in  the  advanc- 
ing march  of  civilization.  It  is  because  men  are  moral 
beings  that  they  have  this  creative  capacity,  that  is,  they 
have  it  only  because  they  are  capable  of  being  determined 
to  action  by  the  conception  of  an  end  absolutely  desir- 
able, because  they  are  capable  of  free  will  and  are  them- 
selves free.  Right  here  it  may  be  argued  that  to  be  human 
is  not  necessarily  to  be  moral.  While  human  efforts  may 
have  been  indispensible  for  the  formation,  for  instance,  of 
modern  states,  these  efforts  are  by  no  means  moral.  In 
fact,  many  will  assert,  egotism  has  been  the  more  effective 
incentive  than  altruism.     There  are  the  Alexanders,  the 


C^sars  and  the  Napoleons.  To  attribute,  for  instance,  the 
idea  of  common  good  to  the  "blood-thirsty  Corsican  is 
to  ignore  an  indisputable  historical  fact. 

When  we  speak  of  such  a  historical  figure  as  Napoleon, 
according  to  Green,  we  must  not  judge  ^in.  purely  by  his 
selfishness,  but  also  by  the  movement  he  led  and  the  re- 
sults attained.^«    This  is  not  to  minimize  his  personal  con- 
duct.   He  was  selfish ;  but  it  was  not  his  selfishness  alone 
that  led  him  to  overrun  all  Europe.    His  egotism  was  sub- 
ject to  all  sorts  of  social  influences,  among  which  may  be 
counted  national  aspiration.     The  French  in   those  days 
were  utilizing  him  for  certain  definite  purposes    for  in- 
stance, the  aggrandizement  of  France.    The  establishment 
of  a  centralized  pohtical  order  on  the  basis  of  social  equal- 
ity, the  promulgation  of  the  civil  code  and  the  like  were 
quite  definite  purposes.    If  these  results  are  desirable,  then 
the  conduct  of  Napoleon,  though  bad,  may  be    overruled 
for  good ''  ^^     The  same  can  be  said  of  Alexander  and 
Caesar.     Citing  merely  the  selfishness  of  these  leaders  is 
no  ground  for  denying  the  idea  of  some  common  good, 
since  the  directions  in  which  these  leaders  moved  were  in- 
fluenced by  that  very  idea.     They  may  have  been  wrong 
in  their  judgment,  but  the  idea  of  a  common  good  was, 
after  all,  the  driving  force. 

According  to  Green,  there  seems  to  be  a  prevalent  con- 
fusion between  the  state  and  sovereignty.  Since  the  out- 
ward and  outstanding  characteristic  of  sovereignty  is 
power,  it  is  generally  inferred  that  the  essence  of  the  state 
is  force.  But,  as  has  been  made  clear,  the  sovereign  power  y 
in  order  that  it  may  remain  as  such,  must  be  exercised 

in  accordance  with  what  may  be  conveniently  called  gen- 

18  Same.     P.  133. 
i»  Same.     F.  134. 


■11 


'11 


82  Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

Veral  will.|  In  other  words,  it  must  be  exercised  for  the 
maintenance  of  rights.)  It  would  be  altogether  meaning- 
s/  less  if  considered  in  the  abstract,  that  is,  apart  from  the 
state.  |lt  is  the  supreme  law-making  and  law-enforcirg 
power,  to  be  sure,  but  it  is  such  a  power  only  when  exer- 
cised in  and  over  a  state.  And  it  is,  after  all,  the  state 
that  makes  sovereign  and  not  sovereign  that  makes  the 
statej  A  slave  owner  may  have  all  the  supreme  power 
over  all  his  slaves,  but  he  can  not  be  styled  a  sovereign. 
A  sovereign  may  indeed  alter  his  laws,  but  he  can  only 
alter  them  according  to  law,  that  is,  according  to  higher 
law.  If  he  fails  to  do  that,  he  can  not  remain  sovereign. 
It  seems,  then,  necessary  to  ascertain  what  a  state  is. 

According  to  Green,  ^"it  is  a  mistake,  then,  to  think  of 
the  state  as  an  aggregation  of  individuals  under  a  sov- 
ereign;   equally  so  when   we  suppose   the   individuals   as 
such,  or  apart  from  what  they  derive  from  society,  to  pos- 
sess natural  rights,  or  suppose  them  to  depend  on  the  sov- 
ereign for  tlie  possession  of  rights-     A  state  presupposes 
^  other  forms  of  community,  with  the  rights  that  arise  out 
J  of  them,  and  only  exists  as  sustaining,  securing  and  com- 
pleting them.     In  order  to  make  a  state,  there  must  have 
been  families  of  which  the  members  recognized  rights  in 
each  other;  there  must  further  have  been  intercourse  be- 
tween families,  or  tribes  that  have  grown  out  of  families, 
of  which  each  in  the  same  sense  recognized  rights  in  the 
other.    The  recognition  of  a  right  being  very  short  of  its 
I    definition,  the  admission  of  a  right  in  each  other  by  two 
V    parties,  whether  individuals,  families,  or  tribes,  being  very 
different  from  agreement  as  to  what  the  right  consists  in, 
what  it  is  a  right  to  do  or  acquire,  the  rights  recognized 
need  definition  and  reconciliation  in  a  general  law.    When 
such  a  general  law  has  been  arrived  at,  regulating  the  posi- 
tions of  members  of  a  family  towards  each  other  bd  the 


» 


The  Basis  of  The  State 


83 


dealings  of  families  or  tribes  with  each  other;  when  it  is 
voluntarily  recognized  by  a  community  of  families  or 
tribes,  and  maintained  by  a  power  strong  enough  at  once 
to  enforce  it  within  the  community  and  to  defend  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  community  against  attacks  from  without, 
then  the  elementary  state  has  been  formed."  ^ 

Force  may  have  been  a  necessary  factor  in  the  mainte-  y 
nance  of  rights,  but  it  is  only  a  factor  and  as  such  it  is 
subordinate  to  right.  "There  is  no  right  but  thinking 
makes  it  so";"  none  that  is  not  derived  from  some  idea 
that  men  have  about  each  other.  Nothing  is  more  real 
than  a  right;  yet  its  existence  is  purely  ideal,  if  by  ideal 
is  meant  that  which  is  not  dependent  on  anything  material, 
as  existing  solely  in  consciousness.  It  is  to  these  ideal 
realities  that  force  is  subordinate  in  the  creation  and  de- 
velopment of  states. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Green  is  fighting  against  two  theories 
at  the  same  time.  In  the  first  place,  he  shows  that  sov- 
ereignty can  not  create  rights,  for  it  implies  them.  Sec- 
ondly, he  painstakingly  points  out  the  futility  of  basing 
political  obligation  on  the  theory  of  consent.  In  this  con- 
nection he  denies  the  existence  of  natural  rights  prior  to 
the  formation  ol  society,  and  declares  that  the  individual 
has  no  right  against  the  state  merely  because  it  does  some- 
thing against  his  own  inclinations. 

Such  a  position  as  Green  takes  renders  him  a  good  deal 
of  an  absolutist.  And  he  may  be,  to  a  certain  extent,  but 
his  theory  is  certainly  not  so  sweeping  as  it  may  sound; 
WHien  one  speaks  of  an  individual's  right  against  the  state^ 
one  has  to  ascertain  first  what  he  means  by  right.  As  has 
been  a  number  of  times  repeated,  a  right  is,  in  Green's 
thought,  a  necessary  condition  for  an  individual  to  realize 

«o  Same.     P.  139. 
21  Same.     P.  140. 


84 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


a  moral  ideal.  It  involves  on  the  part  of  the  individual  a 
claim  of  a  capacity  to  advance  the  common  good,  to  iden- 
tify it  as  his  own,  and  it  involves  on  the  part  of  the  society 
a  recognition  of  such  a  claim.  A  right  is  therefore  essen- 
^  tially  social,  since  its  important  element  is  the  recognition 
^  by  the  society.  It  exists  only  relatively  to  a  common  good. 
If  the  state  passes  a  law  for  the  common  good,  there  is 
no  right  on  the  part  of  the  citizen  to  resist  it  merely  be- 
cause it  is  against  his  own  inclinations.  That  does  not 
mean  that  the  individual  has  no  right  to  resist  for  any 
reason  whatsoever.  The  ground  for  the  resistance  to  the 
state  must  be  the  same  as  the  ground  for  the  existence  of 
the  rights  of  the  individual,  that  is,  resistance  must  be 
on  social  grounds  and  on  the  ideal  of  common  good. 


6 


/ 


y 


y 


CHAPTER  V 
THE    PRINCIPLE   OF    STATE   INTERFERENCE 

In  the  preceding  chapters  it  has  been  shown  that  Green 
disapproved   both    the    absolutist   theory    that    rights    are 
granted  by  the  sovereign  power  and  the  prevalent  theory 
that  government  is  based  on  the  consent  of  the  governed. 
Further,  we  have  noted  his  conclusion  that,  while  coercive 
force   may  be  an   occasional  manifestation   of    sovereign 
power,  it  is,  after  all,  the  will  that  forms  the  basis  of  the 
state.     In  the  present  chapter,  it  is  the  aim  to  set  forth 
the  principles  upon  which  political  actions  are  based.     In 
other  words,  the  earlier  chapters  deal  with  the  principle 
according  to  which  the  individual  obeys,  and  the  present 
chapter  deals  with  the  principle  according  to  which  the 
state  acts.    It  may  be  said  that  they  are  different  directions 
proceeding  from  the  same  principle,  for  both  are  related 
to  the  moral  ideal  and  the  conception  of  a  common  good- 
It  is  on  moral  grounds  that  individuals  obey  and  it  is  to 
maintain  conditions  under  which  moral  Ufe  becomes  pos- 
sible that  the  state  acts.     But  while  there  is  an  identity  of 
source,  there  is  really  no  identity  in  the  intrinsic  nature  of 
the  two.    Political  obligation  on  the  part  of  the  individuals 
may  be  and  is  a  moral  duty,  but  interference  on  the  part 
of  the  state  is  not  in  itself  a  moral  act.     "There  is,"  in 
Green's  words,  "a  moral  duty  in  regard  to  obligations,  but 
there  can  be  no  obligation  in  regard  to  moral  duties."^ 
For  the  sake  of  clarity,  a  separate  treatment  seems  to  be 


1  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  34. 


86 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


The  Principle  of  State  Interference 


87 


warranted.  This  is  especially  necessary,  since  in  dealing 
with  the  different  topics,  Green  does  not  himself  distin- 
guish the  two  principles  involved. 

Before  proceeding  to  the  principle  of  state  interference, 
let  us  first  recall  to  our  minds  the  idea  of  our  moral  life. 
In  Green's  words,  "the  condition  of  a  moral  life  is  the 
possession  of  will  and  reason.  Will  is  the  capacity  in  a 
man  of  being  determined  to  action  by  the  idea  of  a  pos- 
sible satisfaction  of  himself.  An  act  of  will  is  an  act  so 
determined.  A  state  of  will  is  the  capacity  as  determined 
by  the  particular  objects  in  which  the  man  seeks  self- 
satisfaction;  and  it  becomes  a  character  in  so  far  as  the 
self-satisfaction  is  habitually  sought  in  objects  of  a  par- 
ticular kind.  Practical  reason  is  the  capacity  in  a  man 
of  conceiving  the  perfection  of  his  nature  as  an  object  to 
be  attained  by  action.  All  moral  ideas  have  their  origin 
in  reason,  i.  e.,  in  the  idea  of  a  possible  self  perfection  to 
be  attained   by  the  moral  agent."  ^ 

But  ideas  are  not  ordinarily  shaped  in  the  abstract  ex- 
pression embodied  in  the  above  statement.     That  expres- 
sion can  only  be  arrived  at  upon  analysis  of  concrete  ex- 
perience.   There  is  a  sort  of  primitive  or,  later  on,  a  sort 
of    conventional  morality    which    is    instrumental    in    the 
historical  development  of  mankind.     That  morahty  is,  in 
the  Hegelian  sense,  embodied  in  the  laws,  customs  and  in- 
stitutions ^  which  help  human  beings  in  their  struggle  for 
improvement.     Only  when  they  have  gone  through  a  pro- 
/    cess  of  actual  self-improvement  can  the  ^  idea  of  self-per- 
fection find  its  abstract  expression-     This  does  not  mean 
that  the  moral  ideal  is  derived  from  experience,  since  the 
J  possibility  of  experience  involves  an  idea  from  which  all 
J    other  ideas  of  morality  proceed.     It  does  mean  that  the 


i^ 


2  Same.     P.  31. 
«  Same.     F.  32. 


/ 


original  ideal  can  not  find  its  expression  without  having 
the  other  ideas  embodied  in  the  social  institutions.     That 
is,   higher  morality   is   only  capable  of   expression   after 
conventional  morality  attains  concrete  reality.    When  Green 
speaks  of  will  and  reason  and  perfection,  it  must  be  under- 
stood that  it  is  morality  in  the  higher  sense  that  he  means. 
Morality  in  the  higher  sense,  however,  is  incapable  of 
enforcement.*     Moral  duties  can  not  be  enforced  by  law. 
Moral  duties  are  indeed  duties  to  act,  and  actions,  to  be 
sure,  are  capable  of  legal  enforcement;  but  moral  duties 
are  duties  to  act  from  a  certain  disposition  and  for  a  cer- 
tain motive,  both  of  which  are  incapable  of  enforcement. 
In  fact,  if  moral  duties  are  actually  enforced,  they  lose 
their  moral  quality,  since  they  lack  the  necessary  disinter- 
estedness of  disposition  and  motive.    The  province  of  po-  ^' 
litical  action  is  therefore  not  morality.    It  only  covers  out-  ^ 
ward  or  external  acts.    Rights  and  obligations,  whether  as 
ideal  or  actual,  are  distinct  from  morality  in  the  proper  or 
higher  sense.     However,  political  action,  moral  ideal  and 
rights  are  really  related  to  each  other.     In  fact,  without 
moral  ideal,  rights  are  superfluities,  as  we  have  already 
seen  from  Green's  theory  of  natural  rights-    "Nothing  but 
external  acts  can  be  matter  of  'obligation'  (in  the  restricted 
sense)  ;  and  in  regard  to  that  which  can  be  made  matter 
of  obligation,  the  question  what  should  be  made  matter 
of  obligation— the  question  how  far  rights  and  obligations, 
as  actually  established  by  law,  correspond  to  the  true  jus 
naturae— must  be  considered  with  reference  to  the  moral 
end,  as  serving  which  alone  law  and  obligations  imposed 
by  law  have  their  value." ' 

Should  laws  be  strictly  limited  to  external  act?     And 
after  all,  what  is  meant  by  an  external  act?     It  must  be 

«  Same.     P.  34. 
5  Same.     Pp.  34-35. 


88 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


The  Principle  of  State  Interference 


89 


remembered  that  when  we  are  punished  we  are  not  merely 
pimished  for  our  external  behavior.  Much  else  is  involved. 
When  a  man  kills  somebody  unintentionally,  he  is  charged 
with  manslaughter,  but  if  he  kills  intentionally,  he  is 
charged  with  murder  and  is  punished  more  severely.  In 
other  words,  intention  from  within  is  just  as  much  a  sub- 
ject of  punishment  as  the  external  action.  It  may  indeed 
be  argued  that  intention  and  action  are  inseparable,  that 
without  the  former  the  latter  can  not  be.  When  we  say 
that  something  is  done  against  our  will,  according  to 
Green,  we  generally  mean  any  of  the  following  situations. 
First,  an  act  may  be  done  by  someone  using  my  body  as 
a  means  through  force.  There  is  an  act,  but  it  is  certainly 
not  mine.  Second,  an  act  may  be  caused  by  a  natural  event 
through  the  instrimientality  of  my  body  doing  damage  to 
some  one  else.  Third,  an  act  may  be  done  by  the  influence 
of  a  strong  inducement,  though  it  is  done  against  a  very 
strong  wish.  In  the  last  case,  however,  it  is  indeed  an 
act  but  it  is  no  longer  an  act  against  my  will.  It  is  there- 
fore evident  that  in  punishing  outward  acts,  intention  is 
likewise  punished,  for  without  intention  on  the  part  of 
some  one  there  can  hardly  be  an  act  that  deserves  severe 
punishment. 

But  if  action  necessarily  includes  intention,  what  is  the 
sense  in  calling  it  external  as  if  it  were  divorced  from  all 
intention?  According  to  Green,  "an  external  action  is 
a  determination  of  will  as  exhibited  in  certain  motions  of 
the  bodily  members  which  produce  certain  effects  in  the 
material  world;  not  a  determination  of  the  will  as  arising 
from  certain  motives  and  a  certain  disposition."  •  What 
the  law  does  is  to  prohibit  certain  determinations  of  will 
as  exhibiting  certain  physical  motions  affecting  the  mate- 


•  Same.    P.  36. 


/ 


rial  world.    It  may  present  a  motive  for  its  bemg  obeyed, 
for  it  is  capable  of  exciting  fear  in  the  individual.     But 
motive  in  this  connection  is  really  unimportant;  for  law 
requires  primarily  conformity  and  conformity  can  be  at- 
tained irrespective  of  motives.    If  an  act  is  performed  as 
is  required  by  law  without  inducement  of  any  sort,  the 
purpose  of  the  law  is  satisfied.     If  an  act  forbidden  by 
law  is  refrained  from  without  the  fear  of  consequences 
of  disobedience,  the  law  is  as  well  satisfied  as  if  there  were 
such  an  element  of  fear.    In  a  word,  motives  are  not  con- 
cerned; the  business  of  law  is  "to  maintain  certain  condi-^ 
tions  of  life-to  see  that  certain  actions  are  done  which 
are  necessary  to  the  maintenance  of  those  conditions,  oth- 
ers  omitted  which  would  interfere  with  them.     It  has  ^ 
nothing  to  do  with  the  motive  of  the  actions  or  omissions 
on  which,  however,  the  moral  value  of  them  depends- 
Legal  obligations  can  only  be  obligations  to  do  or  not  to 
do  a  certain  thing,  but  not  duties  of  doing  or  not  doing 
from  a  certain  motive  or  with  a  certain  disposition.    The 
question  is  not  whether  or  not  law  should  be  limited  to 
outward  acts.     It  can  not  be  otherwise;  for  with  all  the 
weapons  it  has  at  fts  command,  it  is  incapable  of  enforc- 
ing  moral  duties. 

The  problem  needs  further  consideration,  for  outward 
or  external  acts  can  not  stand  by  themselves.  What  kind 
of  external  acts  should  be  made  subjects  of  state  inter- 
ference' Green's  answer  is  that  "those  acts  only  should 
be  made  subjects  of  legal  injunction  or  prohibition  of  V 
which  the  performance  or  omission,  irrespective  of  the 
motive  from  which  it  proceeds,  is  so  necessary  to  the 
existence  of  a  society  in  which  the  moral  end  can  be  rcal- 


»  Same.    P.  37. 


90 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


ized,  that  it  is  better  for  them  to  be  done  or  omitted  from 
that  unworthy  motive  which  consists  in  fear  or  hope  of 
legal  consequences  than  not  to  be  done  at  all."  *  There 
are  actions  and  omissions  which  should  be  made  legal 
obligations,  and  when  once  made  legal  obligations  they 
serve  a  certain  moral  end.  "Since  the  end  consists  in 
action  proceeding  from  a  certain  disposition,  and  since 
J  action  done  from  apprehension  of  legal  consequences  does 
not  proceed  from  that  disposition,  no  action  should  be 
enjoined  or  prohibited  by  law  of  which  the  injunction  or 
prohibition  interferes  with  actions  proceeding  from  that 
disposition,  and  every  action  should  be  so  enjoined  of 
which  the  performance  is  found  to  produce  conditions 
favourable  to  action  proceeding  from  that  disposition,  and 
of  which  the  legal  injunction  does  not  interfere  with  such 
action."  » 

No  effort  is  made  to  paraphrase  Green's  language  here 
for  fear  of  losing  the  actual  and  the  exact  idea.  This,  then, 
is  the  principle  oT  state  interference.  Because  political 
action  is  a  complex  phenomenon,  such  a  principle  can  only 
be  stated  in  general  terms.  Specific  difficulties  there  are. 
Situations  vary  and  circumstances  differ,  but  the  principle 
is  capable  of  giving  real  guidance.  Whatever  may  have 
been  the  development  of  law  in  the  past,  this  should  be 
the  rule  for  the  future. 

We  have  stated  the  principle  according  to  which  indi- 
viduals obey  and  the  principle  according  to  which  the  state 
acts.  It  may  be  asked  whether,  after  the  state  has  acted, 
it  is  always  the  duty  of  the  individuals  to  obey. 

This  question  has  been  touched  before,  but  it  must  be 
admitted  that  it  could  only  be  answered  in  general  terms. 


«  Same.     P.  38. 
»  Same.     P.  38. 


/ 


The  Principle  of  State  Interference  91 

According  to  Green,  "so  far  as  laws  anywhere  or  at  any 
time  in  force  fulfill  the  idea  of  a  state,  there  can  be  no     ^ 
right  to  disobey  them;  or  there  can  be  no  right  to  disobey 
the  law  of  the  state  except  in  the  interest  of  the  state,  that 
is,  for  the  purpose  of  making  the  state  in  respect  of  its 
actual  laws  more  completely  to  correspond  to  what  it  is 
in  tendency  or  idea,  that  is,  a  reconciler  and  a  sustainer 
of  rights  that  arise  out  of  the  social  relations  of  men."  ^^ 
Accordingly  no  one  can  resist  the  state  merely  because  his 
freedom  of  action  has  been   obstructed,  or  because  the 
management  of  his  own  affairs  has  been  interfered  with, 
or  because  he  is  not  allowed  to  do  as  he  likes  with  his  own. 
A  prevalent  fallacy  is  that  whatever  is  permitted  is  taken 
to  be  a  right.     But  there  can  be  no  right  in  that  sense. 
Spitting  in  public  was  once  permitted  and  probably  taken 
as  a  right,  but  when  it  became  generally  recognized  as 
detrimental  to  the  health  of  the  community,  the  state  was 
perfectly  justified  in  prohibiting  it,  and  there  can  not  be 
any  justification  whatsoever  for  resisting  the  state  on  that 
account.     Drinking  alcoholic  liquors  will  probably  come 
imder  the  same  category.     Individuals  can  only  spit  and 
drink  when  the  social  judgment  permits,  but  when  the  ^ 
social  judgment  concludes  that  spitting  and  drinking  are 
positively   detrimental   to   the  common   good,   individuals 
have  no  right  to  disobey.  > 

But    the   social    judgment   may,    from   the    individual's  ^ 
point  of  view,  be  mistaken.    He  may  claim  that  a  law  en- 
acted is  based  on  a  mistaken  or  an  imperfect  view  of  the 
common  good,  and  therefore  he  may  claim  justification  for 
resistance.     Green   admits  that  one  may  differ  with  the       . 
wisdom  of  social  judgment,  but  he  denies  anyone  the  right  v/ 
to  resist  the  state  without  having  his  views  shared  by  his 


10  Same.     P.  147. 


92 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


The  Principle  of  State  Interference 


93 


fellow  citizens  and  implicitly  acknowledged  by  them  as 
conducive  to  the  common  good.  One  has  a  right  to  re- 
sistance only  when  either  some  action  or  some  forbearance 
y  is  implicitly  acknowledged  by  society  as  conducive  to  the 
common  good,  but  explicitly  denied  or  ignored  by  the 
state." 

Take,  for  instance,  the  case  of  slavery.  Suppose  that  in 
a  state  where  slavery  is  legally  permitted,  a  law  is  passed 
prohibiting  the  education  of  slaves,  has  the  citizen  no  right 
against  such  a  law?  As  a  general  rule  even  bad  laws 
ought  to  be  obeyed,  for  disobedience  is  often  more  detri- 
mental to  the  common  good  than  bad  laws.  "But  there 
may  be  cases  in  which  the  public  interest  ...  is  better 
served  by  the  violation  of  some  actual  law.  It  is  so  in 
regard  to  slavery  when  the  public  conscience  has  come  to 
recognize  a  capacity  for  right  .  .  .  in  a  body  of  men  to 
whom  legal  rights  have  been  hitherto  refused,  but  when 
some  powerful  class  in  its  own  interest  resists  the  altera- 
tion of  the  law.  In  such  a  case  the  violation  of  the  law 
on  behalf  of  the  slave  is  not  only  not  a  violation  of  the 
interest  of  the  violator;  the  general  sense  of  right  on  which 
the  general  observance  of  law  depends  being  represented 
by  it,  there  is  no  danger  of  its  making  a  breach  in  the  law- 
abiding  habits  of  the  people."  ^^ 

It  is  argued  by  some  that  a  certain  condition  is  here  as- 
sumed which  helps  to  evade  the  real  difficulty.  The  really 
difficult  question  is  what  is  to  be  done  when  no  recogni- 
tion of  the  implicit  rights  of  the  slaves  can  be  elicited  from 
the  public  conscience?  Is  there,  then,  any  justification 
for  resistance? 

This  question,  it  will  be  noticed,  can  be  answered  from 
two  different  points  of  view.    The  slaves  themselves  have 


"Same.     Pp.  148,  150. 
"Same.    F.  151. 


f 


riehts   and   obligations   arising   from   social   relationships 
rmong  hemselve's  and  with  other  men.    Hie  state  may  no^ 
admit  them  into  citizenship,  but  it  can  not  deprive  them 
of  their  social  rights.    Other  men  may  have  claim  on  them 
but  the  state  refusing  to  recognize  their  claims  has  itself 
no  claim  on  them  for  obedience.     The  obligation  to  obey 
law  does  not  exist  for  the  slaves."    But  the  men  who  are 
befriending  them  are  in  a  different  position.     Unhke  t^^ 
slaves    they   are   generally  under  the   obhgation   to   obey 
the  aw  and  if  they  want  to  resist  it  they  need  social  recog- 
nlL.    According  to  Green,  if  they  fail  to  get  r...^^ 
from  their  fellow  citizens,  they  may  get  it  from  the  slaves 
and  thus  are  enabled  to  proceed  with  their  activity^ 

However,  any  such  attempt  at  resistance  tnust  be  han- 
dled with  care,  for  the  consequences  on  the  political  and 
social  fabric  may  be  more  detrimental  to  the  puWic  wel- 
fare and  common  good  than  the  wrong  which  i  is  the  pur- 
pose of  such  resistance  to  correct  Practically  speaking 
certain  cautions  need  be  considered  and  certain  difficulties 

overcome.  .         .  ,  • 

In  a  case  where  the  legal  authority  of  a  command  is 
doul,tful   it  is   advisable,  according  to  Green    to   regard  ^ 
right  in  the  political  issue  as  not  yet  formed    and  sov- 
ereignty as  in  abeyance.    The  individual,  then,  should  jom    ^ 
the  ^de  whose  success  seems  most  likely  to  work  towards 
a  common  good.    Where  a  vicious  law  is  passed  without  ^ 
means  of  legal  amendment  or  repeal,  resistance  to  author- 
ity is  not  only  of  right  but  also  of  duty.  .    .^   „,  •^ 

Resistance  to  authority  is  not  a  matter  of  majority  of 
minority.  Majority  has  no  right  to  resistance  merely  be- 
cause it  is  a  majority  not  in  power,  neither  ,s  minonty 
prevented  from  resisting  merely  because  it  happens  to  be 

"  Same.    P.  15i 
»*  Same.    P.  IS3. 


94 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


a  minority  represented  or  unrepresented  in  the  govern- 
ment. There  are  distinct  cases  in  which  minorities  are 
justified  in  their  revolt  even  if  their  chances  of  success 
are  rather  slim.  The  claim  to  disobey  any  particular  law 
needs  the  general  recognition  of  others  in  order  to  render 
it  a  rTght,  but  it  does  not  necessarily  become  a  right  by 
mere  decision  of  a  majority. 

It  must  be  said,  however,  that  there  are  no  precise  rules 

to  be  laid  down  as  a  guiding  principle  for  the  resistance 

to  despotic  governments.     Green  suggests  three  questions 

V  which  may  be  serviceable  in  that  connection.     "A,  What 

prospect  is  there  of  resistance  to  the  sovereign  power  lead- 

^/  ing  to  the  modification  of  its  character  or  the  improvement 
m  its  exercise  without  its  subversion?  B,  If  it  is  over- 
thrown,  is  the  temper  of  the  people  such,  are  the  influences 

^  on  which  the  general  maintenance  of  social  order  and  the 
fabric  of  recognized  rights  depend  so  far  separable  from 
it,  that  its  overthrow  will  not  mean  anarchy?  C,  If  its 
overthrow  does  lead  to  anarchy,  is  the  whole  system  of 
law  and  government  so  perverted  by  private  interests  hos- 

/  tile  to  the  public,  that  there  has  ceased  to  be  any  common 
interest  in  maintaining  it  ?"  "  ' 


"Same.     P.  118. 


\ 


^y 


CHAPTER  VI 

APPLICATIONS  OF  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  STATE 

INTERFERENCE 

After  having  stated  the  principle  of  state  interference 
in  theory,  it  remains  necessary  to  inquire  into  its  appU- 
cation  in  practise.    One  of  the  hardest  problems  in  political 
philosophy  is  the  reconciliation  between  the  individual  and 
the  state,  between  liberty  on  the  one  hand  and  law  on  the 
other.     This  problem  is  the  result  of  the  traditional  con- 
ception of  both  liberty  and  state  interference.     If  liberty 
is  considered  as  the  absence  of  restraint  and  state  mter- 
ference  is  considered  as  a  restraint,  then  they  are  neces- 
sarily opposed  to  each  other.     Green's  idea  is  totally  dif- 
ferent.    Having  discussed  at  length  his  principle  of  state 
interference,  we  shall  present  his  conception  of  freedom 
so  as  to  ascertain  the  way  in  which  the  two  are  reconciled. 
Green  prefers  the  term  freedom  to  liberty;  probably  the 
word  freedom  is  more  adequate  in  ethics  and  his  concep- 
tion of  freedom  is  essentially  ethical. 

It  has  been  shown  in  the  chapter  on  Metaphysical^  and 
Ethical  Background  that  in  intelligence  man  is  a  "free 
cause."  In  willing  he  is  a  free  man.  jUe  is  free  in  the 
sense  that  he  is  not  subject  to  the  determination  by  the 
external  forces.  He  is  self-determined;  and  in  that  de- 
termination in  which  he  is  himself  both  the  subject  and 
object,  there  is  no  "necessity"  but  freedom.  \  With  a  free 


*■ 


96 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


will  he  is  capable  of  moral  action;  and  with  his  freedom 
in  intelligence  he  is  capable  of  creative  effort.  With  his 
faculty  of  reason  he  conceives  the  idea  of  good.  With  his 
consciousness  of  a  unity  of  himself  and  others  he  is  ca- 
pable of  good  will  and  the  idea  of  common  good. 
The  above,  then,  is  the  basis  of  freedom.     It  contains 

all  the  elements  contrary  to  the  traditional  conception  of 
liberty.     That  conception  is  merely  a  negative  one;  that 
is,  liberty  means  absence  of  restraint,  of  compulsion  and 
^  obstruction.     Green's   conception   of   freedom   is  positive. 
^  It  is  not  the  absence  of  restraint.     It  is  not  to  do  as  one 
>/  likes,  irrespective  of  what  others  like.     It  is  not  an  instru- 
>/  ment  used  by  one  man  or  one  class  of  men  at  the  expense 
of  the  others.    It  is  "a  positive  power  or  capacity  of  doing 
or  enjoying  something  worth  doing  or  enjoying,  and  that, 
y/  too,    something    that    we    do    or    enjoy    in    common    with 
others."  *    The  whole  passage  following  is  worth  quoting. 
"When  we  measure  the  progress  of  society  by  its  growth  in 
freedom,  we  measure  it  by  the  increasing  development  and 
exercise  of  those  powers  of  contributing  to  social  good  with 
which  we  believe  the  members  of  the  society  to  be  en- 
dowed ;  in  short,  by  the  greater  power  on  the  part  of  the 
citizens  as  a  body  to  make  the  most  and  the  best  of  them- 
.  selves.     Thus,  though  of  course  there  can  be  no  freedom 
^  among  men  who  act  not  willingly  but  under  compulsion, 
yet  on  the  other  hand,  the  mere  removal  of  compulsion,  the 
mere  enabling  a  man  to  do  as  he  likes,  is  in  itself  no  true 
contribution  to  true  freedom."* 

,       If  the  above  is  a  true  account  of  freedom,  then  freedom 

V    in  all  forms  of  doing  as  one  wills  is  only  as  a  means  to  an 

end,   and  that  end  is   freedom  in   the  positive  sense,   the 


Pi 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


97 


y 


1  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  371. 
^  Works,  Vol  III.     P.  37L 


^ 


liberation  of  all  powers  of  all  men  for  the  social  good. 
No  one  has  any  right  to  do  as  he  likes,  if  what  he  likes  ^ 
and  does  is  detrimental  to  this  end.    With  such  a  concep- 
tion of  freedom,  Green  can  not  be  expected  to  remain  an  ^ 
individualist  as  far  as  pohtical  action,  that  is,  as  far  as 
state  interference,  is  concerned. 

Let  us  take  freedom  of  contract  and  discuss  in  turn  the 
different  topics  involved.     It  should  be  remembered  that 
Green  was  writing  in  a  period  the  legislation  of  which  was 
characterized  by   Professor  Dicey  as   collectivist       The 
spirit  of  the  age  must  not  be  ignored.     There  has  been 
much  legislation  interfering  with  the  freedom  of  contract 
and  yet  meeting  the  approval  of  the  liberals  who  in  days 
gone  by  stood  for  freedom  of  contract  against  restraints. 
There  is  therefore   an  inconsistency  somewhere  between 
the  earlier  attitude  and  the  later  one. 

According  to  Green,  the  attempt  to  interfere  with  free- 
dom of  contract  in  tiie  late  seventies  is  essentially  the 
same  as  the  earlier  attempt  to  remove  the  restraints  from 
freedom  of  contract.    In  the  early  days  tiie  liberals  fought 
the  fight  of  reform  in  tiie  name  of  individual  liberty  against 
class  privilege.     They  are  at  tiie  time  of  Green's  writing 
fighting  tiie  same  battie  of  reform  for  social  good  in  a 
different  name  and  under  a  different  banner,  but  the  object 
of  tiie  reformers  is  the  same.     As  far  as  contract  is  con- 
cerned, the  early  efforts  to  remove  its  restraints  and  the 
later  efforts  to  interfere  witii  its  conditions  of  operation 
have  tiie  same  effect  of  enhancing  the  freedom  of  the  con- 
tracting parties,  if  we  bear  in  mind  the  meaning  of  free- 
dom just  defined.    We  will  examine  into  the  concrete  cir- 
cumstances of  the  contracting  parties  so  as  to  ascertain 
whether  state  interference  is  justifiable. 

As  regards  public  healtii  and  sanitation,  the  state  has 


98 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


passed  laws  and  ordinances  compelling  people  to  conform 
to   certain  healthful   conditions   of   living.     Education   in 
England   at   the   same   timei  has   been  made   compulsory, 
though  the  plan  was  to  be  carried  out  only  gradually.    Fac- 
tory   legislation    was    started    somewhat    earlier,    but    the 
earlier  attempt  was   far  from  being  satisfactory,  neither 
was  It  effectual.    The  early  regulations  applied  to  the  cot- 
ton mdustry  alone  and  even  there  the  enforcement  was 
quite   loose.     They  aimed  for  one  thing  at  hmiting  the 
hours  of  labour  for  children  as  well  as  for  young  persons. 
Gradually,    however,    these    regulations   became   enforced 
and  even  extended  to  other  industries,  and  the  hmitations 
of  hours  formerly  applicable  to  children  only  were  made 
to  cover  also  women  laborers.     By  the  seventies   those 
regulations  were  extended  to  most  industries   and   were 
rigidly  enforced.     The  regulation  of  the  hours  of  labour, 
important  though  it  is,  is  not,  according  to  Green,   the 
whole  industrial  problem.     The  conditions  of  labour    the 
installation  of  safety  appliances   and  other  measures  of 
securing  safety  and  health  should  be  subject  to  legisla- 
tion.   They  are  the  legitimate  objects  of  state  interference. 
State  interference  in  such  cases  can  not  be  objected  to 
on  the  ground  that  it  interferes  with  freedom  of  contract 
for  freedom  in  the  correct  sense  does  not  mean  absence 
of  regulation. 

J.  State  interference  with  freedom  of  contract  is  indeed 
not  to  serve  moral  purposes  directly.  That  is  beyond  the 
J  function  of  the  state ;lbut  it  has  the^dubUo  maintain  con- 
ditions under  which  ilone  human  capacities  can  be  liber- 
ated and  morality  may  become  possible.]  There  are  some 
who  always  have  an  enormous  amounf  of  confidence  in 
human  nature.  They  think  people  ought  to  be  left  to 
themselves.  Industrial  conditions  may  not  be  desirable 
but  the  people,  they  argue,  are  not  dummies.    Left  to  them- 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


99 


selves,  to  their  own  resources,  they  would  of  themselves 
awaken  to  the  realization  that  reform  is  necessary,  and,  in 
that  case,  reform  is  a  voluntary  act.  The  instinct  of  self- 
preservation  is  capable  of  taking  care  of  itself  without  the 
help  of  legislation.  But  Green  says  we  must  take  people 
as  we  find  them.^  Many,  to  be  sure,  are  capable  of  taking 
care  of  themselves,  but  others  are  not.  State  interference 
is  not  a  burden  to  the  conscientious  and  self-relying  man,  ^ 
but  it  is  a  decided  help  to  those  who  happen  to  be  in  less 
favourable  circumstances. 

The  objections  raised  against  state  interference  seem  to 
Green  to  have  missed  the  point.  Some  of  them,  indeed, 
were  based  on  a  sort  of  individualistic  philosophy,  but 
others  were  directed  against  something  quite  different  from 
state  interference  as  such.  Some  people  ridiculed  the  so- 
called  "grand-motherly  government,"  but  what  they  ob- 
jected to  was  centralization  more  than  anything  else.  There 
was,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  a  tendency  to  centralize,  to  turn 
over  municipal  and  local  government  business  to  the  cen- 
tral government.  This  tendency  has  its  defects  as  well  as 
its  merits.  One  can,  however,  approve  or  disapprove  cen- 
tralization without  giving  any  satisfactory  reason  against 
state  interference.  It  is  one  question  whether  the  cen- 
tral government  is  unnecessarily  invading  the  legitimate 
area  of  local  governments  and  quite  another  whether  the 
state  is  unnecessarily  interfering. 

The  term  freedom  of  contract  has  its  chief  significance 
in  connection  with  industrial  and  commercial  enterprise. 
Because  It  is  a  part  of  the  property  rights,  it  is  closely 
interwoven  with  the  present  economic  order.  What  more 
important  problems  in  that  economic  order  are  there  than 
the  relations  of  land,  labour  and  capital?  Green  is  hostile 
to  land,  friendly  to  labour  and  capital. 

"Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  375. 


lOO        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

Propei^}^  as  has  been  pointed  out,  in  the  chapters  on  the 
principle  of  political  obligation,  has  a  (rational  justification. 

/  According  to  Green,  it  is  necessary  to  the  free  life  and  to 
the  fulfilment  of  our  moral  ideal.     He  realizes  that  accu- 

/  mulation  of  property  by  a  few  men,  when  it  becomes  ex- 
cessive, may  lead  to  disastrous  consequences.     However, 
the  blame  is  not  properly  chargeable  to  the  institution  of 
private  property  as   such,   but   rather  to  its  incidents  or 
accidents.    The  existence  of  a  proletarian  class  is  not  neces- 
sarily connected  with  the  institution  of  private  property; 
/    for  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  increased  wealth  of 
one  man  does  not  automatically  mean  the  decreased  wealth 
of  another.     Wealth  is  not  a  given  stock  of  which  a  large 
part  can  not  belong  to  one  without  taking  away  a  share 
that  should  go  to  another.    On  the  other  hand,  it  is  every 
,  day  increasing  in  proportion  to  the  surplus  of  production 
n/  of  new  wealth  over  the  amount  necessary  for  consump- 
tion in  the  process  of  production. 

It  is  true,  according  to  Green,  that  wherever  industries 
congregate,  there  also  one  will  find  large  numbers  of  cheap 
labourers,  untaught,  underfed  and  quite  incapable  to  freely 
contract.  They  have  no  intention  to  save,  or  if  they  have  the 
intention,  they  have  nothing  to  save  from,  since  they  live 
from  hand  to  mouth.  They  seem  to  breed  and  actually  do 
breed  in  many  cases  according  to  the  Malthusian  formula, 
without  consideration  as  to  the  possibility  of  bringing  these 
young  visitors  into  proper  environment  and  education.  But 
their  condition,  deplorable  as  it  is,  is  not  necessarily  the 
result  of  private  property  as  an  institution.  They  are 
traceable,  at  least  in  England,  to  two  causes.*  In  the  first 
place,  when  capital  was  applied  to  mining  of  manufacture 
^    or  any  other  industry,  it  attracted  and  absorbed  men  who 


*  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  226. 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


lOI 


^ 


were  either  themselves  serfs  or  descendents  of  those  who 
were  trained  in  serfdom.  Their  life  was  one  of  forced*^ 
labour,  relieved  by  church  charity  or  poor  law.  They 
were  always  dependent,  with  no  sense  of  responsibility, 
and  incapable  of  taking  care  of  themselves.  The  landless  ^ 
people  of  the  past  were  the  fathers  of  the  proletarians  of 
the  nineteenth  century.  Secondly,  this  deplorable  condi-  y 
tion  of  the  working  class  is  due  to  the  fact  that  privi- 
leges have  been  granted  to  the  land-owning  class  which 
are  incompatible  with  the  principle  on  which  property 
rights  rest.    However,  this  will  be  referred  to  later. 

As  far  as  we  can  see,  Green  does  not  condemn  capital. 
In  fact  he  has  very  little  positive  idea  about  wealth  as 
capital.  But  judging  from  his  broad  principles,  we  may 
safely  conclude,  that  if  concrete  evidence  of  the  crushing  y 
nature  of  capitalism  should  be  offered,  he  would  be  quite 
open  to  conviction.  When  convinced,  he  would  probably 
denounce  it  as  severely  as  he  attacked  the  particular  kind 
of  land  ownership. 

He  was  friendly  to  labour.  The  following  passage  will 
make  his  position  clearer  than  I  can  state  it  in  my  own 
words:  'Xabor,  the  economists  tell  us,  is  a  commodity 
exchangeable  like  other  commodities.  This  is  in  a  certain 
sense  true,  but  it  is  a  commodity  which  attaches  in  a  pe- 
culiar manner  to  the  person  of  man.  Hence  restriction 
may  need  to  be  placed  on  the  sale  of  this  commodity  which  v 
would  be  unnecessary  in  other  cases,  in  order  to  prevent 
labor  from  being  sold  under  conditions  which  make  it  im- 
possible for  the  person  selling  it  ever  to  become  a  free 
contributor  to  social  good  in  any  form.  .  .  .  Society  is, 
therefore,  plainly  within  its  right  when  it  limits  freedom 
of  contract  for  the  sale  of  labor,  so  far  as  is  done  by  our 
laws  for  the  sanitary  regulations  of  factories,  workshops, 


I02        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

and  mines.  It  is  equally  within  its  right  in  prohibiting  the 
labor  of  women  and  young  persons  beyond  certain  hours. 
If  they  work  beyond  these  hours,  the  result  is  demon- 
strably physical  deterioration;  which,  as  demonstrably, 
carries  with  it  a  lowering  of  the  moral  forces  of  society. 
For  the  sake  of  that  general  freedom  of  its  members  to 
/    make  the  best  of  themselves,  which  it  is  the  object  of  civil 

^  society  to  secure,  a  prohibition  should  be  put  by  law,  which 
is  the  deliberate  voice  of  society,  on  all  such  contracts  of 
service  as  in  a  general  way  yield  such  a  result." ' 

In  a  later  passage,  he  urges  state  intervention  in  behalf 
of  labour,  not  trusting  to  leave  it  to  itself.  "Left 
to  itself  or  to  the  operation  of  casual  benevolence,  a 
degraded  population  perpetuates  and  increases  itself. 
Read  any  of  the  authorised  accounts,  given  before  royal 
or  parliamentary  commissions,  of  the  state  of  the  laborers, 
especially  of  the  women  and  children,  as  they  were  in  our 
great  industries  before  the  law  was  first  brought  to  bear 
on  them,  and  before  freedom  of  contract  was  first  inter- 
fered with  in  them.     Ask  yourself  what  chance  there  was 

X,  of  a  generation,  born  and  bred  under  such  conditions,  ever 
contracting  itself  out  of  them.  Given  a  certain  standard 
of  moral  and  material  well  being,  people  may  be  trusted 
not  to  sell  their  labor,  or  the. labor  of  their  children,  on 
terms  which  would  not  allow  that  standard  to  be  main- 
tained. But  with  large  masses  of  our  population,  until  the 
laws  we  have  been  considering  took  effect,  there  was  no 
such  standard.  There  was  nothing  on  their  part,  in  the 
way  either  of  self-respect  or  established  demand  for  com- 

>i     forts,  to  prevent  them  from  working  and  living,  or  from 

putting  their  children  to  work  and  live,  in  a  way  in  which 

no  one  who  is  to  be  a  healthy  and  free  citizen  can  work 

and  live.     No  doubt  there   were  many  high-minded  em- 

«  Works.  Vol.  Ill,  p.  373. 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


103 


ployers  who  did  their  best  for  their  work  people  before  the 
days  of  state  interference,  but  they  could  not  prevent  less 
scrupulous  hirers  of  labor  from  hiring  it  on  the  cheapest 
terms.  It  is  true  that  cheap  labor  is  in  the  long  run  dear 
labor,  but  it  is  only  in  the  long  run,  and  eager  traders  do 
not  think  of  the  long  run.  If  labor  is  to  be  had  under 
conditions  incompatible  with  the  health  or  decent  housing, 
or  education  of  the  laborer,  there  will  always  be  plenty 
of  people  to  buy  it  under  those  conditions,  careless  of  the 
burden  in  the  shape  of  rates  and  taxes  which  they  may 
be  laying  up  for  posterity.  Either  the  standard  of  well- 
being  on  the  part  of  the  sellers  of  labor  must  prevent 
them  from  selling  their  labor  under  those  conditions,  or 
the  law  must  prevent  it.  With  a  population  such  as  ours 
was  forty  years  ago,  and  still  largely  is,  the  law  must 
prevent  it  and  continue  the  prevention  for  some  genera- 
tions, before  the  sellers  will  be  in  a  state  to  prevent  it  for 
themselves."  • 

As  far  as  land  is  concerned.  Green  speaks  without  re- 
serve.    In  connection  with  the  existence  of  a  proletarian 
class,  he  has  pointed  out  that  privileges  have  been  granted 
to  landlords  that  are  incompatible  with  the  true  principle 
upon  which  property  rights  are  based.     No  one  has  the 
right  to  do  what  he  likes  with  his  own,  especially  if  what 
he  has  as  his  own  happens  to  be  land.    Land,  like  labour,  y 
is  not  a  commodity  in  the  ordinary  sense-     "It  is  from 
the  land  or  through  the  land  that  the  raw  material  of  all 
weahh  is  obtained.     It  is  only  upon  the  land  that  we  can   y 
live ;  only  across  the  land  that  we  can  move  from  one  place 
to  another."  ^     "It   is   just   as  much   an  original   natural 
material  necessary  to  productive  industry  as  are  air,  light    ^ 
and  water,  but  while  the  latter  from  the  nature  of  the 

•  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  376-377. 
T  Works,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  377. 


V" 


104 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


V 


case  can  not  be  appropriated,  the  earth  can  be  and  has 
been;'«  The  only  justification  for  this  appropriation  is 
that  it  is  used  towards  contributing  to  social  good.     That 

/  justification  disappears  when  appropriation  of  land  does 
not  serve  this  purpose.  Landowners  have  been  given  too 
much  privilege  in  the  past.  They  were  permitted  to  do 
what  they  liked  with  their  own,  even  if  what  they  actually 
did  decreased  productive  capacity,  endangered  the  health 
of  the  farmers  and  increased  their  misery  and  poverty. 
Misery  and  poverty  of  the  farmers  affect  the  public  wel- 
fare.    The  state  in  the  interest  of  public  freedom  which 

/  it  is  its  business  to  maintain  can  not  allow  the  individual 
owner  to  deal  as  he  likes  with  his  land  to  the  same  extent 
as  it  permits  him  to  deal  with  other  commodities  that  he 
may  happen  to  own. 

One  of  the  practical  aspects  of  the  land  problem  is  the 
bad  system  of  settlements.  Under  that  system,  the  land 
invariably  goes  to  the  eldest  son.  It  has  at  least  two  bad 
effects.  First,  it  prevents  the  division  of  an  estate  into  a 
number  6f  small  holdings.  Here  Green  seems  to  uphold 
one  of  the  traditions  of  Jeffersonian  democracy;  for  he 
unhesitatingly  declares  that  the  small  proprietors  who  till 
their  own  land  are  the  mainstay  of  social  order.  Second, 
it  keeps  land  in  the  hands  of  persons  who  are  too  much 
burdened  by  personal  as  well  as  family  debts  and  there- 
fore unable  to  improve  the  land  in  any  way.  As  a  result, 
land  is  not  half  as  productive  as  it  ought  to  be,  given  the 
necessary  improvements.  Various  remedies  have  been 
suggested,  but  they  do  not  solve  the  problem.  The  prob- 
lem will  not  be  solved  as  long  as  this  system  of  settlement 
remains  in  force.  It  is  against  public  interest  to  permit 
landowners  to  transfer  property  in  such  a  way  as  to  pre- 


•  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  227. 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


105 


vent  improvement.  If  property  is  not  used  according  to 
the  principle  upon  which  alone  property  can  be  justified, 
then  state  has  every  right  to  step  in.  In  this  case,  then, 
state  should  withhold  legal  sanction  from  the  kind  of  land 
settlement  under  discussion. 

The  relation  between  landlords  and  tenants  demands 
attention.  Generally  speaking,  freedom  of  contract  should  ^ 
be  allowed  so  as  to  facilitate  any  voluntary  action  for  good 
and  the  initiative  of  the  citizens  to  fulfil  their  moral  ideal 
in  the  positive  sense.  But  Green's  warning  is  that  we  ^ 
must  not  sacrifice  the  end  to  the  means.  There  are  cer- 
tain contracts  which  affect  public  convenience,  but  in  re- 
spect to  which  the  contracting  parties  directly  concerned 
are  not  capable  of  taking  public  interests  into  considera- 
tion. Such  contracts  ought  to  be  invalidated  by  law.  Take, 
for  instance,  the  agreement  between  landlords  and  tenants 
reserving  game  grounds  for  the  former.  It  involves  the 
reservation  of  large  tracts  of  land  for  no  other  purpose 
than  that  the  landlords  may  occasionally  hunt.  Hunting 
is  not  of  itself  objectionable,  but  in  this  particular  case  it 
takes  away  agricultural  land  from  legitimate  agricultural 
purposes.  Not  only  do  landlords  make  reservations,  but 
they  can  and  often  do  prevent  land  from  cultivation  so 
that  there  might  be  a  forest  in  its  stead  for  their  amuse- 
ment. The  tenants  who  are  used  to  such  treatment  by 
their  superiors  will  generally  enter  any  agreement  by  mere 
force  of  habit.  But  again,  it  is  not  a  matter  that  affects 
the  farmer  alone.  Public  interests  are  also  at  stake.  The 
country  can  not  afford  to  see  good  land  for  food  produc- 
tion turned  into  a  game  resort  or  a  sort  of  garden  for 
mere  amusement  of  a  few.  In  this  case,  again,  the  state 
finds  it  necessary  to  resort  to  interference. 

Individualists   always   claim   that,   left   to   itself,   every- 
thing will  be  all  right.    The  farmers  will  in  time  be  con- 


io6        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

scious  of  their  own  interests,  and  the  landlords  will  be 
enlightened  enough  to  take  public   interests   into   consid- 
eration.    Perhaps  this  will  happen.     Green  wishes  that  it 
might,  but  derives  from  the  facts  the  conviction  that  it  will 
not.    The  great  majority  of  English  farmers  can  be  turned 
out  without  compensation  at  six  months  or  a  year's  notice. 
Under  such  conditions,  farming  does  not  attract  sufficient 
capital  for  improvement,  since  landlords  are  spendthrifts 
and  tenants  can  be  kicked  out  at  any  time-     Best  farming 
is  generally  done  where  there  is  a  lease,  and  the  worst 
farming  is  generally  done  where  tenancy  relies  upon  the 
honour  of  the  lords.     It  is  true  that  a  good  landlord  is 
as  good  as,  if  not  better  than,  a  lease,  but  not  all  of  them 
are  good,  and  if  any  one  is  good,  he  is  not  immortal.    Ag- 
riculture can  not  be  made  dependent  upon  the  whims  of 
a   few.     In  order  to  secure  proficient  use  of   land,   the 
farmers  need  protection,  so  that  necessary  capital  may  as 
a  result  be  directed  towards  agriculture.     When   such  a 
problem  confronts  the  state,  the  state  must  take  people  and 
situation  as  it  finds  them  to  be  and  must  act  accordingly, 
In  this  case  the  state  can  not  wait,  since  the  subsistence  of 
the  population  depends  upon  its  action. 

As  to  the  complete  and  comprehensive  programme  in 
regard  to  land  reform.  Green  does  not  say  anything  defi- 
nite. Conditions  vary  in  different  places,  hence  any  hard 
and  fast  plan  can  not  bt^  formulated.  However,  we  are 
sure  that  he  does  not  believe  in  either  single  tax  or  the 
confiscation  of  unearned  increment.  To  him  "the  great 
objection  is  that  the  relation  between  earned  and  unearned 
increment  is  so  complicated,  that  a  system  of  appropriating 
the  latter  to  the  state  could  scarcely  be  established  without 
lessening  the  stimulus  to  the  individual  to  make  most  of 
the  land,  and  thus  ultimately  lessening  its  serviceableness 

to  society."  ^ 
^Principles  of   Political   Obligation.     P.  229. 


\ 


CHAPTER  VII 


APPLICATIONS  OF  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  STATE 
INTERFERENCE  (Continued) 


The  greatest  and  the  obvious  interference  with  free  life 
in  history  as  well  as  at  the  present  time  is  certainly  war. 
However  German  his  ideas  may  be  in  other  respects, 
Green's  idea  of  war  is  far  from  being  Teutonic.  War,  he 
says,  is  a  violation  of  the  right  of  Hfe,  even  if  it  should 
not  be  considered  as  "multitudmous  murder."  It  is  not 
murder  in  either  the  legal  or  the  moral  sense.  It  is  not 
legal  murder  because  murder  is  unlawful  killing  and  war 
is  lawful  killing,  if  by  lawful  is  meant  conforming  to 
man-made  laws.  Neither  is  war  a  "multitudinous  mur- 
der" in  the  strict  moral  sense;  for,  taken  in  that  strict 
sense,  murder  necessarily  involves  ill  will  between  those 
killed  and  those  who  do  the  killing.  In  war  there  is  no 
particular  personal  ill  feeling.  Again,  a  murder,  as  gen- 
erally understood,  involves  the  violation  of  determinate 
person  or  persons.  It  generally  implies  that  a  scheme  has 
been  planned  by  a  murderer  who  is  responsible  for  the  mur- 
der. But  there  can  hardly  be  any  definite  person  or  per- 
sons who  may  be  said  to  be  entirely  responsible  for  any 
war.  No  doubt  there  are  wars  in  which  one  or  a  few 
determinate  persons  is  or  are  especially  blamable,  or  at 
least  more  so  than  others,  hut  they  can  not  have  willed  a 
war  as  a  murderer  is  capable  of  willing  someone's  death- 


's 


To8        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

They  are  not  murderers  in  the  strict  sense,  however  selfish 
they  may  be.  However  wrong  or  disastrous  war  may  be, 
it  is  not  murder. 

But  the  above  statement  should  not  be  taken  to  mean 
that  war  is  not  a  violation  of  the  right  to  hfe.  It  is.^  And 
it  can  not  be  argued  that  because  there  is  a  lack  of  intention 
on  the  part  of  one  soldier  to  kill  any  particular  enemy, 
there  is,  therefore,  no  ground  for  characterizing  war  as 
a  violation  of  the  right  to  life;  for  killing  in  war  is  caused 
by  human  agency  and  is  on  the  whole  intentional  in  the 
sense  that  it  is  preventable  but  not  prevented.  It  matters 
not  whether  any  particular  soldier  has  a  definite  intention 
to  kill  any  one  in  particular  he  is  violating  the  right  to 
life  just  the  same.  Nor  does  it  avail  to  argue  that  in 
killing  another,  one  soldier  is  just  as  irresponsible  as  the 
lightning  that  occasionally  takes  its  tolls  from  among 
mankind ;  for  in  the  latter  case  no  right  is  involved.  There 
is  no  human  relationship  between  man  and  lightning, 
neither  is  there  any  mutual  claim  and  recognition.  If  there 
is  no  right  involved  there  certainly  can  not  be  any  violation 
of  right. 

Modem  warfare  admits  both  the  method  of  conscrip- 
tion and  voluntary  service.  If  a  man  volunteers  to  the 
colours,  he  takes  the  chance  of  being  killed  on  his  own 
initiative,  and  therefore  has  given  up  his  right  to  life  of 
which  there  can  not  be  any  violation.  It  is  argued  that 
he  is  in  the  same  position  as  a  man  who  works  in  a  dan- 
gerous mine  for  a  certain  wage.  The  answer  is,  that  if 
both — the  volunteer  and  the  miner — are  killed,  the  right 
to  life  is  violated  in  both  cases.  The  right  to  life  can  not 
be  voluntarily  given  up  in  either  case;  for  it  always  in- 
vol^^'es  both  th**  individual  claim  and  the  social  recnqjiition. 

1  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  162. 


\ 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


109 


Society  has  an  interest  in  the  right  to  life  which  the  indi- 
vidual  representing  one   party   can  not   disregard.^     The 
same  is  true  of  industrial  work.     If  a  man  works  in  a 
dangerous  pit  and  is  killed,   there  is  a  violation  of  tht 
right  to  life,  no  matter  whether  the  man  works  voluntarily 
or  not.     War  is  therefore  no  less  wrong  when  a  soldier 
volunteers   to   fijght.     Besides,   whatever   3ystem  may  be 
adopted  by  the  state,   whether  conscription  or  voluntary 
service,  there  is  always  an  element  of  compulsion.^    Con- 
scription is  of  course  compulsory.     Though  under  a  sys- 
tem of  voluntary  service  there  is  not  compulsion  exerted 
on  particular  persons,  yet  there  is  an  element  of  com- 
pulsion in  the  fact  that  the  state  decides  on  war  and  com- 
pels a  certain  number  of  lives  to  be  deprived.     After  all, 
then,  war  is  a  violation  of  the  right  to  hfe. 

It  may  yet  be  argued  that  war  is  justifiable  in  case  of 
self-defense.  The  right  of  life,  it  may  be  said,  is  im- 
portant, but  there  are  yet  more  precious  things  at  stake 
when  one  is  subject  to  unprovoked  attack.  The  existence 
of  society  and  of  state  guaranteeing  the  whole  system  of 
rights  and  obligations  is  more  important,  it  is  often  urged, 
than  the  maintenance  of  the  particular  right  to  life.  Hence 
war  in  the  defense  of  society  and  of  the  state  has  justifica- 
tion in  the  greater  purpose  it  serves,  even  if  in  serving  that 
purpose,  it  results  in  killing. 

Green  answers  that  this  argument  is  really  not  to  justify 
war  per  se,  but  rather  to  remove  blame  from  those  who 
resort  to  it  for  the  purpose  of  defense.  *  As  a  matter  of 
fact,  we  are  only  told  that  the  state  in  sending  soldiers  to 
the  field  may  be  compelled  to  do  so  against  its  will,  hence 
responsibility  for  destruction  of  life  and  property  is  not 

2  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  163. 
«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  163. 
*  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  164. 


no        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

chargeable  to  those  who  have  no  other  ahernative  than  to 
resort  to  force.     But  war  is  not  a  natural  recurring  phe- 
nomenon that   can  not  be  avoided.     It  has  come  about 
through  human  effort  and  human  energy.    If  one  party  is 
exempt  from  blame,  some  other  party  is  not.     War  as  a 
violation  of  the  right  to  life  is  none  the  less  wrong  even  if 
the  blame  is  transferred  from  one  party  to  another.    Thus 
j      a  war  for  the  defense  of  freedom,  or  for  liberation,  or  for 
4      the  existence  of  a  nation  is  just  as  wrong  as  anything  that 
violates  the  right  to  life,  but  it  is  a  wrong  chargeable  not 
to  defenders  but  to  the  aggressors.     Historically  the  rec- 
ords are  most  disappointing.    Few  wars  in  Green's  opinion 
can  be  said  to  be  waged  for  the  purpose  of  political  liber- 
ation.    Most  of  the  wars  are  waged  for  the  purpose  of 
aggrandisement,    brought   out   by   personal   jealousies   and 
dynastic  ambitions.     With  the  growth  of  nationalism,  pa- 
triotism has  taken  place  of  dynastic  loyalty.     Somehow  or 
other,  the  fallacious  notion  that  advantage  to  one  nation  is 
always  a  disadvantage  to  some  other  nation  has  been  gen- 
erally accepted  by  people  at  large,  and  as  a  result  all  na- 
tions are  at  potential  if  not  actual  warfare  with  one  an- 
other. 

War  is  wrong  no  matter  who  is  blamable  for  it.  It  is 
wrong  whatever  may  be  the  result.  That  there  are  good 
results  arising  out  of  war  Green  does  not  deny,  but  the 
claim  that  they  transform  the  character  of  the  wkr  Green 
can  not  concede.  "Wrong  doing  is  a  voluntary  action 
either  proceeding  from  a  will  uninfluenced  by  the  desire 
to  be  good  on  the  part  of  the  agent,  or  it  is  an  action  that 
interferes  with  the  conditions  necessary  to  the  free  play 
and  development  of  a  good  will  on  the  part  of  the 
others."  »  "If  an  action,  so  far  as  any  results  go  which  the 
agent  can  have  in  view  or  over  which  he  has  control,  in- 
6  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  167. 


\ 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


III 


lerferes  with  conditions  necessary  to  the  free  play  and  the 
development  of  a  good  will  on  the  part  of  others,  it  is  not 
the  less  wrong  doing  because,  through  some  agency  which 
is  not  his,  the  effects  which  he  intended,  and  which  ren- 
dered it  wrong  doing,  come  to  contribute  to  an  ulterior 
good.     Nor,  if  it  issues  from  bad  will   (in  the  sense  ex- 
plained), is  it  less  wrong   (in  the  moral  sense)   because 
this  will  is  itself,  in  the  view  of  some  higher  being,  con- 
tributary  to  a  moral  good  which  is  not,  in  whole  or  in  part, 
within  the  view  of  the  agent.    If  then  war  is  wrong  doing 
in  both  the  above  senses  .  .  .  ,  it  does  not  cease  to  be  so 
on  account  of  any  good  resulting  from  it  in  a  scheme  of 
providence."  «     There  are  probably  desirable  results  from 
Caesar's  wars  with  the  Gauls,  from  English  occupation  of 
distant  territories,   from  German  and  Italian  unification, 
but  incident  to   these   results   are   also   innumerable   acts 
which  do  not  cease  to  be  wrong  merely  because  something 
good  and  desirable  has  been  achieved. 

War  then  is  a  wrong,  but  is  it  a  wrong  that  is  neces- 
sarily inherent  in  the  organization  of  the  nation  states? 
According  to  Green,  there  can  be  no  war  if  the  states  are  in 
any  way  organized  according  to  the  idea  back  of  them. 
State  according  to  its  idea  is  an  institution  "in  which  all     y 
rights  are  harmoniously  maintained,  in  which  all  the  ca- 
pacities that  give  rise  to  rights  have  free  play  given  to 
them."  ^     No  state  thus  organized  will  ever  have  any  in-  v 
evitable  conflict  with  any  state  similarly  organized.    There  / 
is  no  truth  in  the  notion  that  the  gain  of  one  is  the  loss  of 
another.     In  fact  the  better  the  states  are  organized  the 
freer  is  the  scope  for  the  individuals  to  fulfil  their  capaci- 
ties.    Consequently  much  less  will  be  the  danger  of  con- 
flict.   War  is  therefore  not  inherent  in  states.    Its  appear- 

«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     Pp.  167-168. 
T  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  170. 


112        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

ance  is  more  due  to  the  defective  organization  of  states. 

Green  gives  full  consideration  to  the  division  of  society 
into  different  classes  of  people  and  the  different  interests 
they  represent.  The  familiar  division  into  two  dominant 
classes,  the  privileged  on  the  one  side  and  the  oppressed 

^  on  the  other,  he  shows  to  be  not  a  matter  of  internal  poli- 
tics alone,  but  one  that  often  gives  rise  to  international  con- 
flict.     "The    privileged    class    involuntarily    believes    and 

y/  spreads  the  belief  that  the  interest  of  the  state  lies  in  some 
extension  without,  not  in  an  improvement  of  organization 
from  within."  ^  It  looks  as  if  right  here  Green  is  some- 
what prophetic  without  comprehending  the  full  significance 
of  his  prophecy-  We  now  know  that  the  priviledged  class 
benefits  by  national  expansion.  The  militarists  want  con- 
quest, the  merchants  want  market  and  the  capitalists  want 
industrially  undeveloped  areas.  Their  gain  is  not  the  gain 
of  the  state.  The  state  according  to  its  idea  does  not  and 
should  not  involve  either  a  privileged  class  or  a  suffering 
class.  The  sooner  they  are  removed,  the  better  it  is  for  the 
state  and  also  for  international  peace. 

It  is  suggested  by  some  that  state  is  not  an  abstract  for- 
mula; it  is  not  a  complex  of  institutions  consciously  estab- 
lished for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  and  harmonizing 
rights.  It  is  now  generally  a  nation  and  all  that  a  nation 
implies.  A  nation  implies  a  homogeneous  people,  possess- 
ing peculiar  institutions,  certain  dominant  passions  and  a 
nationalistic  psychology.  Nations  are  now  existing  in  the 
kind  of  state  of  nature  in  which  individuals  were  once 
claimed  to  be  living  by  Hobbes.  They  are  independent 
and  sovereign,  and  they  have  only  themselves  to  serve.  Since 
their  situations  are  diverse  and  their  interests  conflicting,  war 
is  inevitable.     It  can  only  be  avoided  by  the  establishment 

•  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  171. 


X 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


113 


of  a  world  empire  transcending  all  the  nation  states,  but 
that  is  neither  practical  nor  desirable.     It  is  true  Green 
concedes  that  states  at  present  are  nations  and  nations  at 
cresent  are  not  free  from  egoistic  passions.    But,  he  says, 
there  is  little  occasion  for  pessimism.^     Nations  may  yet 
become  true  states.    The  more  truly  the  nation  becomes  the 
state    the  greater  the  scope  for  national  spirit.     National 
spiri;  has  nothing  objectionable  if  it  is  directed  to  worthy 
objects,  and  it  will  be,  when  states  become  true  m  the  ideal 
sense     Other  things  are  also  facilitated  when  states  become 
organized  more  in  accordance  with  the  ideal.     Frequent 
trade   and  communication   and  better  understanding  may 
eventually  produce  a  consciousness  of  a  social  bond  be- 
tween nations  so  that  the  demand  for  justice  and  peace  may 
eventually  speak  louder  than  the  bugle  of  war     ^Vhenjhat 
time  comes,  this  sort  of  wholesale  violation  of  the  right  to 
life  may  be  eliminated. 

Another  phase  of  state  interference  with  free  life  is  the 
right  of  the  state  to  impose  punishment  on  citizens.    Free 
life  on  the  part  of  the  citizens  involves  the  assumption  that 
every  man  can  freely  act  to  contribute  to  the  social  good- 
The  right  on  the  part  of  the  state  to  punish  involves  the 
assumption  that  it,  the  state,  functions  in  certain  ways  to 
prevent  such  actions  as  interfere  with  the  possibihty  of 
free   activity  contributory  to  the  social  good.     In  other 
words,  in  exercising  the  right  to  punish,  the  state  is  trying  ^ 
to  maintain  conditions  under  which  it  may  be  possible  for 
the  citizens  to  realize  their  moral  capacities.    Thus  consid- 
ered the  right  to  punish  as  well  as  the  nature  of  the  pun- 
ishments in  detail  can  not  be  satisfactorily  presented  with- 
out an  examination  into  the  whole  system  of  rights  and  ob- 
ligations.    For  us,  it  is  unnecessary  to  go  into  the  details 


•Principles   of  Political  Obligation.     P.    179. 


114        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

of  these  rights  and  obligations,  since  we  need  only  dwell  on 
the  broad  principles  of  punishment.  There  has  been  fre- 
quent discussion  as  to  whether  punishments  are  retributiye 
in  nature,  or  preventive  or  reformatory.  The  true  concep- 
tion, according  to  Green,,  is  that  they  are  all  three.^°  The 
following  discussion  will  therefore  consist  of  three  divisions 
starting  with  the  retributive  element  in  punishment. 

At  the  outset,  we  have  to  point  out  that  punishment  is 
incapable  of  having  private  vengeance  as  an  element."  In 
fact  private  vengeance,  which  in  popular  expression  im- 
plies taking  law  into  one's  hands,  is  incompatible  with  the 
right  of  punishment  vested  in  a  political  authority,  much 
less  is  there  a  "right  of  private  vengeance."  There  is  a 
contradiction  in  terms  in  that  expression.  Private  ven- 
geance implies  an  interest  purely  individual  while  a  right 
is  always  social  and  in  that  sense  also  public.  Abstract 
the  social  recognition  and  a  claim  is  not  a  right.  Hence  the 
right  of  punishment  on  the  part  of  the  state  does  not  admit 
of  purely  individual  interest. 

But,  it  has  been  asked,  is  a  state  capable  of  the  feeling  of 
vengeance  at  all?  U  it  is  so  capable,  according  to  Green, 
It  IS  not  so  in  the  same  way  as  the  individuals  are.  France 
may  have  felt  revengeful  toward  Germany,  but  in  that  case 
it  was  against  a  foreign  nation  that  France  felt  the  feeling 
of  vengeance.  Vengeance  in  the  sense  of  the  feeling  of 
one  individual  towards  another,  the  nation  is  incapable  of. 
As  far  as  punishment  is  concerned,  if  there  is  the  element 
of  vengeance  at  all,  it  is  in  the  nature  of  popular  indigna- 
tion. When  a  child  is  murdered  the  public  will  likely  de- 
mand that  the  criminal  should  have  his  due,  should  be  dealt 
with  according  to  his  deserts  and  be  punished  "justly." 

^0  Principles  of  Political  Obligatioas.     P.   181. 
"Principles  of  Political  Obligations.     P.  181. 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


115 


This  leads  to  the  idea  of  the  just  and  justice.  Accord- 
ing to  Green,  the  just  means  "that  complex  of  social  con- 
ditions which  for  each  individual  is  necessary  to  enable  him 
to  realize  his  capacity  of  contributing  to  social  good.'*" 
"Justice  is  the  habit  of  mind  which  leads  us  to  respect  those 
conditions  in  dealing  with  others — not  to  interfere  with 
them  so  far  as  they  already  exist,  and  to  bring  them  into 
existence  so  far  as  they  are  not  found  in  existence"  "  A 
punishment  would  be  unjust  "if  either  the  act  punished  is 
not  a  violation  of  known  rights,  or  an  omission  to  fulfil 
known  obligations  of  a  kind  which  the  agent  might  have 
prevented,  or  the  punishment  is  not  required  for  the  main- 
tenance of  rights."  ^*  The  criminal  when  justly  punished  y^ 
sees  the  punishment  in  his  own  action  returning  on  himself 
and  may  as  a  result  become  more  susceptible  of  the  idea  of 
common  and  public  good.  Thus  it  will  be  seen  that  even  in  y/ 
this  theory  of  punishment,  rights  and  obligations  are  the 
real  nucleus  from  which  its  justification  is  derived.  And 
when  Green  speaks  of  rights  and  obligations,  it  is  necessary 
to  bear  in  mind  the  moral  idea  and  the  idea  of  common 
good.  It  must  be  understood  that  the  general  principle  here 
laid  down  does  not  offer  a  practical  guidance  in  specific 
cases.  In  fact,  justice  in  specific  cases  can  not  be  deter- 
mined without  having  a  more  complete  and  a  more  har- 
monized system  of  rights  and  obligations  than  at  the  pres- 
ent time.  An  intentional  violation  of  right  must  be  pun- 
ished whether  that  be  a  true  right  or  not,  since  such  viola-  y 
tion  endangers  the  social  well-being  more  than  any  wrong 
punishment. 

Let  us  next  turn  to  the  preventive  nature  of  punishment. 
The  argument  in  this  case  is  that  whatever  has  been  done 

12  Principles  of  Political   Obligation.     P.    188.     Footnote. 

13  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.   188.     Footnote. 
1*  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  186. 


\ 


I 


ii6        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

is  done,  and  that  no  amount  of  punishment  will  undo  the 
injury  caused  by  the  criminal  act.  What  punishment  can 
do  is  to  prevent  further  occurrences  of  like  sort.  Punish- 
ment on  the  criminal  produces  a  terror  in  society  and  that 
terror,  it  is  claimed,  has  a  restraining  effect  on  those  who 
contemplate  similar  crimes.  In  order  to  have  the  proper 
quality  of  preventiveness,  it  is  believed  that  the  greater  the 
crime,  the  heavier  should  be  the  punishment.  This  Green 
agrees  with,  if  by  heavier  punishment  is  meant  that  which 
produces  greater  terror  in  popular  imagination,  and  by 
greater  crime  is  not  meant  a  greater  degree  of 
moral  guilt.^'  It  is  a  fallacy,  he  holds,  to  identify 
heavy  punishment  with  great  pain  to  the  criminal; 
for  that  makes  the  effectiveness  of  punishment  depend  upon 
the  amount  of  pain,  and  this  varies  so  from  individual 
to  individual  as  to  be  incapable  of  calculation.  A  given 
punishment  may  be  extremely  painful  to  one  without  being 
so  to  another,  since  sensitiveness  to  pain  differs  with  dif- 
ferent temperaments,  experiences  and  circumstances,  none 
of  which  the  state  or  its  agent  can  exactly  ascertain.  And 
even  if  they  could  be  ascertained,  since  their  difference  is 
undeniable,  the  punishment  will  be  different  for  different 
individuals  and  a  general  rule  for  punishment  will  neces- 
sarily be  impossible.** 

The  fallacy  of  identifying  greater  crime  with  the  greater 
degree  of  moral  guilt  is  probably  a  confusion  of  both  the 
aim  and  the  function  of  the  state.  The  state  has  nothing  *^ 
to  do  with  the  moral  depravity  of  the  criminal  and  in  pun- 
ishing him  it  is  not  counting  the  effect  on  him  so  much  as 
the  effect  on  others  who  might  be  tempted  to  do  as  he  has 
done.     In  fact  there  may  be  moral  depravity  of  an  equal 

15  Principles  of  Political  Obligaion.  P.  190. 
i«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.  P.  191. 
IT  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  191. 


\ 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


117 


amount  in  two  criminals,  as  for  instance,  the  wealthy 
banker  who  embezzles  and  the  poverty-stricken  tramp  who 
steals,  and  yet  the  punishments  may  profitably  be  different ; 
for  the  same  preventive  effect  may  be  secured  by  different 
punishments. 

There  are  other  difficulties  confronting  the  attempt  to 
base  punishment  on  moral  depravity.    In  the  first  place,  the 
degree  of  moral  depravity  can  not  be  ascertained.    No  one 
can  ascertain  it  for  himself,  for  an  action  often  involves  a 
complexity  of  good  motives  mixed  with  bad  ones,  and  you 
can  not  measure  the  goodness  of  the  good  motives  just  as 
you  can  not  measure  the  badness  of  bad  motives.     The 
man  himself  can  not  do  it,  his  friends  can  not  do  it,  much 
less  can  a  judge  or  an  agent  of  the  state.     Secondly,  the 
state  has  no  business  to  punish  wickedness  as  such.     The 
moment  it  starts  to  punish  wickedness,  immorality  or  vice,  \/ 
it  vitiates  the  disinterestedness  of  effort  to  escape  wicked- 
ness, immorality  or  vice  and  checks  the  growth  of  true 
goodness.    To  refuse  to  be  wicked  for  fear  of  consequences 
is  not  the  same  as  to  obey  disinterestedly  the  self-imposed 
laws,  which  latter  alone  makes  up  morality. 

It  may  be  argued  that  crimes  committed  under  the  so- 
called  "extenuating  circumstances"  should  be  and  are  gen- 
erally punished  with  leniency.  The  reason  claimed  to  be 
the  determining  factor  is  that  such  crimes  involve  less 
moral  guilt,  and  punishment,  being  proportionate  to  the 
moral  depravity  of  the  criminal,  is  ipso  facto  Hght.  Hence 
a  man  who  steals  a  bottle  of  milk  because  he  has  not  had 
food  for  two  days  is  punished  differently  from  a  man  who 
does  the  same  thing  because  he  is  in  the  habit  of  doing  it, 
or  because  he  is  mahciously  trying  to  deprive  some  people 
of  something.  Cases  of  such  circumstances  are  abimdant 
and  practice  seems  to  agree  with  the  theory ;  but  according 
to  Green,  while  the  fact  may  be  true,  the  explanation  is  not 


ii8        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

correct.  If  crimes  under  extenuating  circumstances  are 
punished  with  more  leniency  than  those  not  under  such  cir- 
cumstances, it  is  not  because  they  involve  less  moral  de- 
pravity, but  because  it  needs  less  unpleasantness  and  less 
terror  to  prevent  a  like  occurrence.^®  In  this  as  well  as  in 
other  cases,  morality  or  rather  moral  depravity  is  not  the 
measure,  neither  the  ground  for  punishment.  It  does  not 
mean  that  punishment  has  no  moral  purpose.  It  is  one  of 
the  instruments  to  maintain  conditions  under  which  mor- 
ality may  be  possible.  It  also  serves  the  moral  purpose  of 
protecting  rights  the  maintenance  of  which  advances  the 
moral  well  being. 

Generally,  according  to  Green,  popular  indignation  or 
disapproval  is  founded  on  the  outward  aspects  of  a  crimi- 
nal's conduct,  that  is,  it  comes  essentially  from  a  response 
in  men  to  the  stimulation  which  the  outward  aspects  of  the 
criminal  act  generally  afford.^*  It  may  even  be  said  that 
if  crimes  can  not  and  should  not  be  punished  according  to 
the  degree  of  moral  depravity  of  the  criminal,  they  should 
be,  if  they  are  not,  punished  according  to  the  outward  con- 
sequences of  the  criminal  act.  The  degree  of  criminality 
of  the  individual  depends  or  should  depend  upon  the  con- 
sequences of  his  act,  that  is,  upon  the  relative  importance  of 
the  rights  he  violates;  and  the  more  disastrous  the  conse- 
quences, the  severer  should  be  the  punishment.^^  The 
engine  driver  who  overlooks  the  signal  through  careless- 
ness is  and  should  be  accused  of  manslaughter  and  punished 
accordingly,  though  his  moral  qualities  may  not  be  in  a 
worse  condition  than  those  of  many  whose  carelessness 
does  not  result  in  such  an  accident.  The  difference  in  pun- 
ishment can  not  be  accounted  for  by  the  difference  in  kind 

18  Principles  of  Political   Obligation.     P.   193. 
"  Principles  of  Poliical  Obligation.     P.   196. 
20  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.   197. 


X 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


119 


or  degree  of  the  carelessness  in  the  two  cases,  for  it  is  after 
all  the  consequences  that  uhimately  determine  the  differ- 
ence.    Another  example  is  drunkenness-     The  man  who 
drinks  may  not  have  such  moral  depravity  as  intentionally 
to  violate  others'  rights ;  but  if  he  does  commit  a  crime  the 
consequences  do  not  become  less  disastrous  merely  because 
he  is  under  the  influence  of  liquor.    An  intoxicated  mother 
may  smother  her  child  by  sleeping  on  it  without  the  least 
bit  of  intention  to  do  any  harm.    None  the  less  she  should 
be  punished ;  for  though  she  has  no  intention  of  committing 
the  crime,  the  condition  that  causes  it  is  capable  of  preven- 
tion.   Punishment  in  such  cases  will  produce  a  terror  which 
will  make  people  more  careful  about  drinking  and  will  pre- 
vent some  accidental  violation  of  the  right  to  free  Ufe.    It 
is  in  connection  with  the  preventive  nature  of  punishment 
that  there  is  the  necessity  and  actual  practice  of  distinguish- 
ing civil  injuries  from  crimes.    According  to  Green,  the  be- 
lief that  civil  injuries  are  "violations  of  rights  when  con- 
sidered in  reference  to  the  injury  sustained  by  the  individ- 
ual," while  crimes  are  ^'violations  of  rights  when  considered 
in  reference  to  their  evil  tendencies  as  regards  the  com- 
munity at  large,"  is  quite  nri^sleading.     Nothing  is  punish- 
able which  does  not  violate  some  kind  of  rights ;  and  since 
rights  are  social,  any  violation  of  them  can  not  be  regarded 
as  merely  an  injury  sustained  by  the  individual.     If  the      j 
injury  to  the  individual  is  not  an  injury  to  the  community,  ^ 
it  is  not  a  violation  of  rights  and  therefore  should  not  be 
pimishable. 

The  real  distinction  between  crimes  and  civil  injuries 
comes  from  the  preventive  nature  of  punishments.  Civil 
injuries  can  not  generally  be  prevented  by  arousing  terror 
in  the  public  mind.*^    Let  us  take  for  instance  the  breach 


21  Principles   of   Political   Obligation.     F.    199. 


I20        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

of  contract.  The  party  who  breaks  the  contract  may  not 
know  tliat  he  is  violating  its  provisions,  and  therefore  may 
not  be  responsible  for  not  knowing  that  he  has  violated  a 
right.  No  amount  of  terror  associated  with  such  a  viola- 
tion of  rights  will  prevent  similar  violations  of  rights  under 
given  circumstances.  It  may  be  argued  that  even  in  civil 
cases,  the  delinquent  party  may  know  his  obligations  but 
have  no  means  at  his  disposal  to  fulfil  them,  and  therefore 
punishment  in  such  cases  may  make  him  providential;  but 
even  here  it  must  be  conceded  that  his  inability  to  fulfil  his 
obligations  may  not  be  due  to  forces  of  his  own  making, 
and,  if  not,  terror  as  a  result  of  punishment  will  not  im- 
prove the  ability  of  people  under  like  circumstances.  It 
is,  therefore,  from  the  preventive  nature  of  punishment 
that  there  has  come  to  be  a  distinction  between  civil  and 
criminal  offenses.  The  actual  distinction  in  English  law  is 
more  or  less  an  accident.^^ 

Let  us  turn  to  the  reformatory  character  of  punishment. 
Crime  involves  the  violation  of  rights,  but  it  also  involves  a 
violator  of  rights,  namely  the  criminal.  In  punishing  him, 
the  state  may  likely  forget  that  he,  too,  had  or  will  have 
rights  which,  though  they  may  be  temporarily  suspended,  are 
yet  his  due  after  serving  his  term.  He  must  be  given  a 
certain  freedom  of  action  conducive  to  an  intelligent  exer- 
cise of  rights  so  that  in  being  punished  once,  he  may  not 
have  to  be  punished  twice,  and  in  having  served  his  term,  he 
may  not  have  to  meet  social  ostracism-  Capital  punishment 
and  hfe  imprisonment  can  not  be  justified  except  on  two 
grounds :  ^^  first,  when  public  order  will  be  easily  endan- 
gered, if  the  crime  committed  is  not  associated  with  the 
punishment  that  produces  the  greatest  terror ;  second,  when 

22  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  201. 
2»  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  203. 


\ 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


121 


the  crime  is  such  as  to  warrant  the  assumption  of  a  per- 
manent incapacity  of  the  criminal  for  enjoying  and  respect- 
ing rights      But  these  conditions  are  themselves  unsatis- 
factory    Given  the  condition  of  the  criminal,  whether  the 
state  has  the  right  to  presume  his  permanent  incapacity  for 
rights  or  not  may  still  be  open  to  doubt.    It  may  very  well 
be  that  the  state  is  not  entitled  to  such  presumption.    And 
certainly  it  does  not  call  for  greater  terror  to  keep  public 
order  when  public  education  has  attained  its  present  stand- 
ard and  police  force  its  present  efficiency.    Considering  the 
rights  of  the  criminal  as  well  as  those  of  the  rest  of  the    / 
citizens,  punishment  should  also  be  reformatory,  and  if  so, 
capital  punishment  and  life  imprisonment  can  not  be  justi- 
fied except  in  extreme  cases. 

According  to  Green,  "there  is  no  direct  reference  in  pun- 
ishment by  state  .  .  .  to  moral  good  or  evil.  The 
state  in  its  judicial  action  does  not  look  to  the  moral  guilt 
of  the  criminal  whom  it  punishes,  or  to  the  promotion  of 
moral  good  by  means  of  punishment  in  him  or  in  others. 
It  looks  not  to  virtue  and  vice  but  to  rights  and  wrongs. 
If  looks  back  to  the  wrong  done  in  crime  which  it  pumshes ; 
not  however,  in  order  to  avenge  it  but  in  order  to  the 
consideration  of  the  sort  of  terror  which  needs  to  be  as- 
sociated  with  such  wrong  doing  in  order  to  the  future  main- 
tenance of  rights  ...  Thus  punishment  of  crime 
is  preventive  in  its  object  .  .  .  justly  preventive  of 
injustice.  But  in  order  to  effectually  attain  its  preventive 
object  and  to  attain  it  justly,  it  should  be  reformatory. 

Human  beings  are  capable  of  rights,  because  they  are 
capable  of  a  conception  of  a  common  good  which  each 
shares  with  the  other.  They  act  not  only  with  an  end  m 
view  but  also  with  a  conception  of  that  end.     They  are, 

2*  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    P.  202. 


J 


122        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

according  to  Green,  performing  or  seeking  to  perform  self 
imposed  duties;  they  are  moral,  and  in  order  to  facilitate 
the  realization  of  their  moral  ideal,  they  must  be  allowed 
a  certain  spontaneity  of  action.  The  state,  instead  of  ac- 
tually and  actively  promoting  morality,  should  devote  itself 
to  the  task  of  removing  obstacles.  Compulsory  education 
j  and  prohibition  or  temperance  are  state  interferences  gov- 
erned by  this  principle. 

However  mystic  Green  may  have  seemed  to  many  a 
student  at  times,  he  was  not  merely  a  closet  philosopher. 
He  was  elected  to  the  Oxford  Town  Council,  and  ex- 
pressed his  idea  of  a  true  liberal  program  as  "the  removal 
of  all  obstructions  which  the  law  can  remove  to  the  free 
development  of  English  citizens.*' "  Qn  the  two  subjects 
that  interested  him  more  than  anything  else,  namely,  edu- 
cation and  temperance,  he  often  got  into  heated  controversy. 
As  to  education,  he  stood  for  compulsory  attendance,  the 
maintenance  of  schools  out  of  public  funds  and  unsectarian 
instruction.^®  State  interference  in  education  may  seem  to 
be  an  enforcement  of  moral  duties,  for  education  of  chil- 
dren is  a  moral  duty.  But  Green  argued,  "on  the  other 
hand,  the  neglect  of  it  does  tend  to  prevent  the  growth  of 
the  capacity  for  beneficially  exercising  rights  on  the  part 
of  those  whose  education  is  neglected,  and  it  is  on  this  ac- 
count, not  as  a  purely  moral  duty  on  the  part  of  the  parent, 
but  as  a  prevention  of  a  hindrance  to  the  capacity  for  rights 
on  the  part  of  children,  that  education  should  be  enforced 
by  the  state.*'  ^^  Nor  can  compulsory  education  be  objected 
to. on  the  ground  that  it  interferes  with  the  spontaneous 
action  of  the  individuals;  for  so  far  as  those  parents  are 
concerned  who  have  the  rights  of  their  children  in  view,  the 


25  Works  Vol.  HI.    Memoir  CXX. 

26  Works  Vol.  III.   Memoir  CXXIII. 

27  Principles   of  Political  Obligation. 


P.  209. 


\ 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


123 


law  that  compels  education  does  not  interfere  with  spon- 
taneity of  action.  The  man  who  prevents  his  wife  from 
overwork  and  sends  his  children  to  school  instead  of  factory 
and  does  all  this  of  his  own  will,  suffers  no  moral  degrada- 
tion from  a  law  which  would  compel  him  to  do  so.  He 
does  not  feel  the  constraint.  And  for  the  parents  who  are 
unwilling  to  educate  their  children,  it  may  be  said  that  the 
state  seeks  to  remove  the  hindrances  to  the  exercise  of 
rights  on  the  part  of  the  children  and  does  not  aim  at  im- 
posing inconveniences  on  the  part  of  the  parents. 

The  question  of  the  liquor  traffic  was  the  one  in  which 
Green  was  drawn  into  political  controversy  in  1872  with 
Sir  William  Harcourt.     In  a  letter  to  the  Oxford  Chron- 
icle he  declared  that  he  would  not  support  "a  representa- 
tive who  bids  for  the  votes  of  the  politicians  by  trying  to 
pooh  pooh  the  drinking  evil  altogether  and  to  run  down  all 
the  legislative  attempts  to  check  it."  ^^     But  Green  was  not 
originally  a  total  abstainer.     His  ideas  were  probably  in- 
fluenced by  personal  as  well  as  social  relations.     The  dis- 
astrous career  of  his  elder  brother  constantly  weighed  upon 
his  mind  and  the  conviction  that  the  political  morale  was 
being  sapped  by  drink  came  later  to  be  added  to  his  personal 
experience.     In  fact,  he  spoke  quite  vehemently  of  "the 
untaught  and  underfed  denizen  of  a  London  yard  with 
gin-shops  on  the  right  hand  and  on  the  left."  ^^    At  any  rate 
he  became  an  ardent  supporter  of  temperance.     In  1872, 
he  joined  the  United  Kingdom  Alliance,  and  later,  1875,  he 
joined  also  the  Church  of  England  Temperance  Society. 

Green's  practical  policy  in  this  matter  was  regulation  and  r 
limitation  but  not  prohibition.    The  aim  was  to  devise  a  pro- 
cess of  licensing,  to   limit  liquor  traffic  to  certain  hours,   v/ 
and    if    possible    to    enable    neighbors    to    exclude    liquor 


28  Works  III.    Memoir  CXVII. 

29  Principles  of  Political  Obligation. 


P.  8. 


124        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


V 


V 


establishments  from  their  area  through  legislation.  On 
what  ground,  then,  can  legislation  be  justified  in  interfering 
with  this  particular  traffic?  "We  justify  it  on  the  ground 
of  the  recognized  right  on  the  part  of  the  society  to  prevent 
men  from  doing  what  they  Uke,  if,  in  exercising  their  pe- 
culiar tastes,  in  doing  as  they  like,  they  create  a  social 
nuisance.  There  is  no  right  to  freedom  in  the  purchase  or 
sale  of  a  particular  commodity,  if  the  general  result  of  al- 
lowing such  a  freedom  is  to  detract  from  freedom  in  the 
higher  sense,  from  the  general  power  of  men  to  make  the 
best  of  themselves.     .      .      .     Excessive  drinking  of  one 

^  man  means  an  injury  to  others  in  health,  purse  and  capa- 
bility to  which  no  limit  can  be  placed.    Dnmkenness  in  the 

y/  head  of  a  family  means,  as  a  rule,  the  impoverishment  and 
degradation  of  all  the  members  of  the  family;  and  the 
pressure  of  a  drinking  shop  at  the  comer  of  the  street 
means,  as  a  rule,  the  dnmkenness  of  a  certain  nimiber  of 
heads  of  families  in  that  street."  ^^  Such  an  obstruction  to 
free  life  must  be  removed  by  the  authority  of  the  state. 

y  Tolerance  of  any  particular  liberty  of  action  implies  that 
liberty  is  not  and  must  not  be  an  impediment  to  social  good. 

Even  in  connection  with  liquor,  there  is  the  laissez  faire 
argimient  that  state  interference  will  not  do  any  good. 
Leave  the  people  to  themselves,  and  as  soon  as  they  know 
the  danger  of  drinking  and  as  soon  as  they  acquire  more 
self  respect,  they  will  give  up  liquor  of  their  own  free  will. 
Giving  it  up  voluntarily  is  much  better  than  giving  it  up  by 
compulsion ;  for  in  the  former  you  facilitate  the  spontaneity 
of  action  and  in  the  latter  you  compel  obedience  merely 
through  fear  of  consequences.  But  the  trouble  is,  Green 
replies,  we  can  not  wait.  The  longer  you  let  liquor  go,  the 
greater  harm  it  does  and  the  more  difficult  it  becomes  for 


J 


80  Works,  Vol.  III.     Pp.  383-384. 


\ 


Applications  of  The  Principle 


125 


the  state  to  interfere.  On  the  one  hand,  the  interests  that 
are  fattening  themselves  through  intoxication  of  drunkards 
would  be  more  influential,  more  deep  rooted  in  their  foot- 
hold and  much  harder  to  deal  with ;  on  the  other,  intoxica- 
tion is  more  or  less  contagious.  Aside  from  the  fact  that 
the  friends  of  a  liquor  fiend  may  become  themselves  vic- 
tims the  scientists  claim  that  offspring  from  drunkards 
inherit  the  tendency  to  drink,  hence,  given  the  liquor,  they 
will  readily  victimize  themselves.  Green  seems  to  have 
such  an  idea  in  view  and  that  is  why  he  urges  not  only 
legislation,  but  also  speedy  legislation  to  limit  liquor  traffic. 


Green's  Influence 


127 


CHAPTER  VIII 

GREEN'S   INFLUENCE 

Turning  from  Green's  theories  to  the  views  of  his  fol- 
lowers and  his  critics,  we  need  bear  in  mind  that  modem 
tendencies,  especially  after  the  war,  are  away  from  political 
idealism.    The  advancement  of  science  makes  possible  new 
approaches  to  the  study  of  politics.     Sociology  brings  out 
facts  hitherto  unknown  and  therefore  not  within  the  com- 
pass of  political  speculation  in  Green's  time.     The  division 
of  society  into  different  groups  with  conflicting  interests 
was  only  vaguely  guessed  at  in  the  late  seventies,  but  it  is 
now  a  familiar  fact.     Modem  industrialism  has  produced 
several  tendencies,  none   of  which  subscribes  to  political 
idealism.     Socialism,  or  more  correctly  Marxism,  involves 
economic  determinism  as  its  philosophic  background.    Guild 
Socialism  in  England  and  Syndicalism  in  France  represent 
a  revolt  against  central  authority  in  politics,  but  in  philos- 
ophy they  are  more  affiliated  with  realism  than  idealism. 
The  war  and  its  consequences  have  encouraged  radicalism, 
and  radicalism,  while  speaking  in  the  same  old  name  of 
freedom  and  justice,  never  fails  to  keep  its  eye  on  the  cold 
facts  of  every  day  life. 

Among  scholars  who  are  disinterestedly  searching  for 
knowledge,  political  idealism  is  also  fading.  Those  who  are 
realistic  in  temperament  are  apt  to  look  at  facts  as  they  are 
rather  than  as  they  should  be.  Investigation  often  shows 
that  what  they  should  be  is  generally  far  from  being  what 


^ 


they  actually  are.    Therefore,  instead  of  building  castles  in 
the  air  it  is  considered  more  profitable  to  state  the  actual 
facts  and  to  suggest  possible  remedies.     Others  feel  that 
political  idealism  deals  merely  with  the  conscious  and  con- 
scientious part  of  human  nature  in  politics.     The  subtle 
psychology  of  the  group  as  well  as  of  the  individual,  the 
subconscious  action  of  human  beings,  the  influence  of  hered- 
ity and  environment,  the  biological  and  social  inheritance 
of    the    people    are    important    factors    for    consideration, 
but   political    idealism    ignores    them    all   by   mere    refer- 
ence to  an  all  embracing  and  all  pervading  consciousness. 
The  above  spells  doom  for  Green  and  his  idealism.    Such 
is  the  case,  but  it  does  not  necessarily  have  to  be.     Two 
factors  need  be  considered.     First,  the  political  philosophy  y 
of  Green  has  little,  if  any,  of  the  absolutism  of  the  German 
idealist.    The  foregoing  analysis,  it  is  hoped,  has  made  that 
clear.    Therefore  it  is  not  exactly  correct  to  identify  Green 
with  the  idealists  of  the  German  type,  though  he  was  a 
thorough-going  idealist.    A  revolt  against  political  idealism 
is  not  necessarily  a  revolt  against  Green.    Second,  some  of 
the  new  tendencies  do  not  necessarily  contradict  the  broad 
principles  laid  down  by  Green.    They  may  qualify,  and  they 
may  supplement,  but  they  do  not  necessarily  deny  the  funda- 
mentals in  his  philosophy.    A  radical,  for  instance,  may  be- 
come his  follower  to  a  marked  extent  without  ceasing  to  be 
radical.    The  thing  to  bear  in  mind,  as  Mr.  Barker  has  ad- 
vised us,  is  the  broad  principle  and  not  the  detailed  applica- 
tion.   You  can  no  more  blame  Green  for  his  leniency  to-    y 
wards  capital  than  you  can  despise  Aristotle  for  his  justifi- 
cation of  slavery.     These  two  considerations  explain  the 
fact  that  although  broadsides  have  been  fired  against  politi- 
cal idealism,  Green  has  not  been  the  target,  and  although 
new  tendencies  have  gained  ground,  Green's  influence  has 
not  entirely  faded  away.    In  fact,  of  the  writers  who  have 


\ 


J 


128        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

,  expressed  opinions  on  him,  few,  if  any,  reveal  any  hostility 
towards  him.^  Disciples  and  critics  alike  may  qualify  and 
destroy  his  doctrines  in  view  of  the  better  understanding  of 
social  facts,  but  none  the  less  they  admire  him  for  the  able 
formulation  of  political  principles,  at  least  in  English,  into 
idealistic  philosophical  terminology. 

The  champions  of  the  idealistic  school  of  thought  of  the 
present  day  England  are  Messrs.  Bosanquet  and  Bradley. 

•^   Both  are  more  Hegelian  than  Green  ever  was.  ]JAr.  Brad- 

y  ley  believes   that  the  community  and   the   individual   are 
^    so  interwoven  that  the  latter's  existence  implies  a  compre- 
hensive system  of  relationship  with  the  former.  (  An  in- 
/  dividual  becomes  what  he  is,  by  including  in  his  being  his 
relationship  with  society  and  state.;  If  morality  by  defini- 

/  tion  consists  of  the  realization  of  the  self,  it  also  consists  in 
the  realization  of  these  relations  with  the  society.  Mr. 
Bradley  believes  in  a  sort  of  regimentation  in  society  ac- 
cording to  which  each  has  his  station  and  therefore  also 
duties,  the  fulfilment  of  which  constitutes  the  realization  of 
the  self  and  social  relations,  that  is,  constitutes  morality. 
Dr.  Bosanquet  admits  in  his  "Philosophical  Theory  of  the 
State'*  that  he  follows  the  footsteps  of  Green,  but  that  if  he 
has  to  part  company,  it  is  because  Green  seems  to  him  to 
have  erred  on  the  score  of  excessive  caution  rather  than 
carelessness.^  And  he  does  part  company  with  Green  at 
many  points.  He  maintains,  for  instance,  that  society  is 
within  the  state.  If  by  state  is  meant  not  a  mere  political 
mechanism,  but  a  general  organization  over  and  above  other 
organizations,  it  is  essentially  a  community  of  communities. 
It  is  above  society.    This  is  already  different  from  Green's 

1  Except  H.  Spencer,  Essays  Scientific,  Political  and  Specula- 
tive.   Vol.  II.    P.  332. 

2  Bosanquet,  The  Philosophical  Theory  of  The  State,  Intro- 
duction. 


v/ 


\ 


Green's  Influence 


129 


point  of  view,  but  it  leads  to  a  greater  and  a  still  more  sig- 
nificant difference.     Green  condemns  war  as  a  violation     ^ 
of  the  rights  of  life  and  liberty;  to  that  extent,  he  argues 
the  action  of  the  state  declaring  war  is  itself  wrong  and 
therefore  not  conducive  to  the  end  for  which  state  exists. 
But  Dr.  Bosanquet  has  a  different  point  of  view.    Accord- 
ing to  him  acts  of  the  state  and  acts  of  its  agents  arc  to  be      - 
distinguished,  and  the  terms  moral  and  immoral,  properly 
applicable  to  the  latter,  are  inappropriate  for  the  former. 
The  state  as  a  state  can  not  act  within  the  relations  of  pri- 
vate life  in  which  organized  morality  exists.     It  "is  the    y 
guardian  of  our  world  and  not  a  factor  of  our  organized 
moral  world"  ^     It  can  not  be  bound  by  the  system  of    / 
rights  and  obligations  it  enforces,  nor  can  it  be  Umited  by 
the  social  ethics  it  maintains. 

There  are  two  other  points  of  difference  which  should 
be  mentioned.    Dr.  Bosanquet  writes  with  the  advantage  of 
the  new  and  fashionable  theories  of  the  present  age.    "Na- 
tional spirit,"  "social  mind,"  and  "group  consciousness"  are 
more  talked  about  now  than  in  the  late  seventies  and  early 
eighties.    Armed  with  these  new  weapons,  Dr.  Bosanquet 
presents  with  greater  freedom  than  Green  did  the  concep- 
tion of  general  will  and  the  idea  of  a  common  good  as 
working  instruments.    Here  he  makes  use  of  the  progress 
made  by  psychology  and  sociology  and  in  so  doing,  accord- 
ing to  Prof.  Barker,  he  approaches  quite  near  to  Hegel. 
Institutions  are  regarded  as  the  embodiment  of  living  spirits 
without  which  they  can  not  be  what  they  are.    Green  has 
the  same  idea  but  it  is  not  strained  to  the  same  extent. 
State  interference  can  only  apply  to  the  externals;  what 
Green  calls  the  removal  of  obstructions  Bosanquet  calls  the 
hindrance  of  hindrances.     State  action  is,  therefore,  pri- 

»  Bosanquet.    The  Philosophical  Theory  of  The  State.    P.  325. 


I30        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

marily  negative  with  both,  but  throughout  their  works 
there  is  discernible  a  difference  of  degree  of  negativity.  I 
mention  these  differences  between  Green  and  Bosanquet 
not  for  the  purpose  of  indicating  a  revolt  against  the 
former  from  among  the  ideaUsts  themselves,  but  with  the 
view  of  demonstrating  that  Green,  has  little  in  common 
with  the  absolutists  of  the  idealistic  school  of  thought.  A3 
will  be  shown  later,  an  idealist  is  not  necessarily  an  abso- 
lutist. 

Prof.  Fairbrother  is  an  outspoken  disciple.  In  his  Phil- 
osophy of  T.  H.  Green,*  he  declares  in  a  prefatory  note 
that  Green's  philosophy  is  "perhaps  the  only  complete  and 
consistent  philosophy  which  derives  and  justifies  both  moral 
responsibility  in  the  present  and  hope  for  the  future  from 
a  rigorously  scientific  metaphysic."  Widi  this  view  in 
mind,  he  defended  Green  from  the  onslaught  of  Prof, 
^eth,  Mr.  Balfour  and  Prof.  Sedgwick.  However,  the  at- 
tack as  well  as  the  defence  deals  so  exclusively  with  philo- 
sophy and  metaphysics  that  it  is  entirely  beyond  our  sphere 
to  examine  it. 

Prof.  Ritchie  in  his  ^'Principles  of  State  Interference" 
points  out  that  we  can  not  find  out  one's  attitude  in  politics 
from  one's  philosophical  speculation.  Green  is  an  idealist  in 
philosophy  and  a  liberal  in  politics.  Hobbes  is  a  materiaHst 
in  philosophy  and  an  absolutist  in  politics.  Locke  is  an  em- 
piricist in  philosophy  and  a  whig  in  politics.  There  is  no 
mystery  involved  in  any  of  the  cases.  In  regard  to  Green's 
philosophy.  Prof.  Ritchie  sees  a  mistake  in  characterizing 
it  as  Hegelian.'  As  far  as  he  can  see.  Green's  is  a  correc- 
tion of  Kant  by  Aristotle  and  of  Aristotle  by  Kant.  In  re- 
gard to  freedom,  Mr.  Ritchie  points  out  Green's  departure 

*  Fairbrother.     The   Philosophy  of  T.   H.   Green. 
5  Ritchie,  Principles  of  State  Interference.     P.  139. 


Green's  Influence 


131 


\ 


from  the  traditional  conception.  Freedom  as  is  generally 
understood  means  a  removal  or  absence  of  obstruction  and 
as  such  it  is  merely  negative.  But  with  Green,  it  is  positive, 
it  is  the  capacity  or  power  to  do  or  enjoy  something  worth 
doing  or  enjoying.  Out  of  this  conception  of  freedom,  Mr. 
Ritchie  argues,  the  principle  of  state  interference  can  be 
predicted.  The  state  necessarily  has  to  maintain  condi- 
tions under  which  it  is  possible  for  the  people  to  do  or  enjoy 
that  which  is  worth  doing  or  enjoying.  That  is,  in  inter- 
fering, the  state  in  its  very  act  of  interference  is  maintain- 
ing conditions  of  freedom.  It  is  evident  that  Mr.  Ritchie 
is  very  sympathetic  in  his  comments  and  towards  the  end 
of  the  book  he  praises  the  democratic  attitude  that  Green 
maintains  both  in  active  work  and  in  writings. 

Of  the  six  writers  whom  Mr.  MacCunn  considers  radi- 
cal, Green  is  one.    The  account  is  on  the  whole  laudatory, 
though  little  of  it  is  devoted  to  political  theory.    His  com- 
parison between  Green  and  Bentham  will  voice  his  senti- 
ment more  adequately  than  any  effort  on  my  part.    "Ben- 
tham's  philosophy  was  a  fighting  philosophy.    When  it  was 
given  to  the  world,  democracy  was  still  an  aspiration  and 
a  struggle.     What  democracy  needed  was  a  rallying  cry 
rather  than  a  reasoned  justification.    It  found  that  in  Ben- 
tham    .      .     .     But  time  had  passed.     Democracy  had 
won     ...     It  was  when  democratic  citizenship  had  be- 
come actually  and  potentially  a  recognized  fact  of  the  first 
magnitude,  when  it  had  passed  from  struggle  to  success, 
from  aspiration  to  fruition  that  Green     .      .     .     began  to 
propound  his  civic  idealism,  thereby  bringing  to  citizenship 
a  new  dignity  and  elevation,  and  it  may  be  added,  fresh 
grounds  of  confidence  and  hope.    The  poHtical  philosophy 
of  Bentham  at  the  beinning  of  the  19th  century  was  still 
a  prophecy.    The  civic  idealism  of  Green  towards  the  end 
of  the  century  was  the  justification  of  the  prophecy  ful- 


w/ 

^ 


132        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

filled."  ^  Many  in  the  present  age  will  refuse  to  share  the 
optimism  of  Prof.  MacCunn;  they  will  probably  deny  that 
democracy  as  an  ideal  has  already  become  an  accomplished 
fact. 

Prof.  Muirhead  has  a  profoimd  respect  for  Green.  In 
some  instances  he  attributes  to  Green  what  the  latter  would 
probably  hesitate  to  claim  for  himself.  Clearly  Green 
wrote  in  a  period  in  which  the  chief  characteristic  was  said 
by  Prof.  Dicey  to  be  collectivism,  and  the  reason  why  there 
was  not  a  strong  opposition  to  state  regulation  at  the  time 
when  The  Service  of  The  State  (1908)  ^  was  pubHshed 
was  not  entirely  due  to  Green's  effort.  In  regard  to  social- 
ism, Prof.  Muirhead  points  out  that  if  by  it  is  meant  the 
reaUty  of  a  social  will  as  a  practical  working  principle  then 
Green  is  emphatically  socialistic.  But  if  by  socialism  revo- 
lution is  implied,  then  Green  is  opposed  to  it.  He  is,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  opposed  to  revolution ;  for  he  maintains 
^  that  the  object  sought  through  revolution  may  not  be  worth 
the  disorder  and  probable  destruction  it  entails.  To  the 
socialism  that  seeks  to  overthrow  capitalism  Green  will  un- 
doubtedly also  object,  since  he  sees  no  defect  inherent  in 
capitalistic  control  of  private  property.  Any  possible  connec- 
tion between  Green  and  socialism  can  only  be  urged  with 
extreme  caution.  Socialism  can  not  be  divested  of  its  eco- 
nomic origin  and  its  economic  significance  and  as  such  it 
can  not  merely  mean  "the  reality  of  a  social  will  as  a  work- 
ing principle." 

Mr.  Barker  has  probably  given  thei  best  account  of 
Green's  theory.®  He  advises  us  to  pay  more  attention  to 
the  general  principles  than  to  the  analysis  of  particular  doc- 
trines, as,  for  instance,  Green's  treatment  of  capital  and 


Green's  Influence 


133 


/ 


^/     - 


•  MacCunn.     Six  Radical  Thinkers.     Pp.  215-216. 
T  Muirhead.     The  Service  of  The  State.     1908. 

*  Barker.     Political  Thought  From  Spencer  to  Today. 


'\ 


\/ 


of  unearned  increment.     He  points  out  that  Green  com-  ^ 
bines  Greek  and  German  philosophy  with  English  caution.  ^ 
The  individual  is  nowhere  overwhebned.     Not  only  that, 
but  in  Green  there  is  also  a  recognition  of  the  idea  of  uni- 
versal brotherhood.    The  state  is  Hmited  internally  as  well  ^ 
as  externally.    It  must  have  a  guiding  principle  in  order  to 
function   property,   and  that  principle,   according  to   Mr. 
Barker,  is  better  than  the  one  Mill  adopted.    The  distinction 
of  self-regarding  and  others-regarding  acts  is   false,   for 
they  can  not  be  distinguished,  while  outward  acts  and  in- 
ward will  can  be  distinguished  and  that  distinction  is  a  good^ 
criterion  for  state  action.    While  state  action  is  not  itself 
moral,  it  yet  serves  a  moral  purpose.    It  is  to  maintain  the 
conditions  under  which  morality  may  be  possible.     'If  it 
does  not  interfere  with  morality,  it  is  for  the  sake  of  mor- 
aUty  that  it  refrains;  if  it  does  interfere  with  external  acts, 
it  is  also  for  the  sake  of  morality  that  it  intervenes."  * 

Mr.  H.  J.  Laski  permits  disagreement  of  opinions  to  a 
remarkable  extent;  for  though  he  abhors  the  doctrines  of 
the  idealists,  he  admires  their  ability,  and  though  he  attacks 
them  with  all  the  power  he  has  at  his  command,  he  does 
not  hesitate  to  admit  that  Green's  "Principles  of  PoUtical 
ObUgation"  and  Bosanquet's  "Philosophical  Theory  of  The 
State"  are  the  two  greatest  works  in  English  political  the- 
ory since  Mill's  time.^«    While  recognizing  the  differences 
between  Green  and  the  other  idealists,  Mr.  Laski  criticises 
him  in  the  same  way  as  he  criticises  them;  for  as  far  as 
Green  is  concerned,  it  is  not  what  he  was,  but  what  he  has 
been  understood  or  misunderstood  to  be  that  invites  criti- 
cism.   In  other  words,  it  is  not  Green's  doctrines  but  their 
consequences  that  need  be  corrected.     Green,  more  than 
anyone  else,  in  Mr.  Laski's  opinion,  is  responsible  for  what 

»  Barker.    Political  Thought  From  Spencer  to  Today.    J.  60. 
10  Laski.    Authority  in  The  Modem  State.    P.  (i^.    Footnote 


y^ 


^v 


134        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

Prof.  Hobhouse  has  called  the  flowing  of  the  Rhine  into 
the  Thames,  and  is  on  that  account  blamable. 

But  after  all  Mr.  Laski's  criticism  is  more  or  less  centered 
around  the  conception  of  "general  will"  ^^  and  is  by  no 
means  a  total  rejection  of  Green's  theories.  The  latter's 
influence  is  easily  traceable  in  the  "Authority  in  the 
Modem  State."  Mr.  Laski  is  one  of  those  who  are 
now  "reviving"  the  doctrines  of  natural  rights.  The  word 
"reviving"  is  misleading;  for  what  is  at  present  termed 
natural  rights  is  quite  different  from  the  "rights"  of  The 
Virginia  Constitution  of  1776,  or  of  the  American  Decla- 
v^  ration  of  Independence,  or  of  the  French  Declaration  of 
^  ^  Rights,  and  since  they  are  different  they  need  no  "reviving." 
According  to  Mr.  Laski,  a  right  is  natural  "in  the  sense  that 
^  V^  /  the  given  conditions  of  society  at  the  particular  time  require 
its  recognition.  It  is  not  justified  on  grounds  of  history. 
It  is  not  justified  on  grounds  of  any  abstract  or  absolute 
ethic.  It  is  simply  insisted  that  if,  in  a  given  condition  of 
society,  power  is  so  exerted  as  to  refuse  the  recognition  of 
that  right,  resistance  is  bound  to  be  encountered.  By  right, 
that  is  to  say,  we  mean  a  demand  that  has  behind  the  bur- 
den of  the  general  experience  of  the  society.  It  is,  as  Green 
has  said,  "a  power  of  which  the  exercise  by  the  individual 
or  by  some  body  of  men  is  recognized  by  a  society  either  as 
itself  directly  essential  to  the  common  good,  or  as  conferred 
by  an  authority  of  which  the  maintenance  is  recognized  as 
so  essential." "  It  is,  therefore,  Green's  idea  garbed  in 
realistic  terms. 

Again,  take  for  instance  the  conception  of  liberty.  Mr. 
Laski  quotes  Green's  definition  with  approvaV^  and  de- 
clares that  it  is  more  valuable  than  the  negative  conception, 

"  Laski.  Authority  in  The  Modern  State.  P.  67. 
^*  Laski.  Authority  in  The  Modern  State.  P.  43. 
"  Laski.    Authority  in  The  Modern  State.     P.  55. 


Green's  Influence 


135 


because  it  insists  on  what,  in  this  age,  we  feel  to  be  funda- 
mental in  liberty — the  power  of  adding  something  to  the 
quality  of  the  common  Ufe.^*  In  this  connection,  it  may  be 
observed  that   Mr.   Laski   is   even  over-enthusiastic   about 

f^  Green.  He  claims  that  Green  in  the  "Prolegomena  to 
Ethics"  has  answered  the  question  as  to  what  is  worth 
while  to  do  and  to  enjoy,  that  is,  as  to  what  good  is.  It  is 
true  that  Green  defines  true  good  as  that  which  satisfies  the 
moral  agent,^^  and  a  moral  agent  is  endowed  with  moral  ca- 
pabiUties,  the  realization  of  which  forms  the  moral  good.^' 

^  But  according  to  Green,  we  do  not  know  our  moral  capa- 
bilities till  their  realization  and  they  are  not  and  can  not 
be  completely  realized.  He  therefore  admits  his  inability 
to  define  exactly  what  true  good  consists  of.^^  He  is  only 
able  to  form  general  ideas  about  it.  The  conclusion  is  that 
as  true  good  is  or  would  be  complete  realization  of  moral 

^  capabilities,  so  goodness  is  proportional  to  one's  habitual 
responsiveness  to  the  idea  of  there  being  such  a  true  good 
in  the  various  forms  of  recognized  duty  and  beneficent 
work  in  which  that  idea  has  so  far  taken  shape  among 
men."  If  a  definition  is  to  render  a  defined  subject  definite, 
then,  the  conclusion  arrived  at  by  Green  falls  short  of  a  de- 

X        finition. 

Mr.  Lilly  believes  in  the  doctrine  of  natural  rights  and 
adopts  Green's  definition.^^  His  adoption  of  Green's  idea  is 
not  so  apparent  but  the  substance  of  it  is  there.  The  foun- 
dation of  the  state  is,  for  instance,  declared  to  be  justice.^** 


t^ 


1*  Laski.    Authority  in  The  Modern  State.     P.  55. 
15  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics.     P.  195. 
i«  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics.     P.  196. 

17  Green,  Prolegomena  to  Ethics.     P.  18. 

18  Green,  Prolegomena  to   Ethics.     P.  207. 

19  Lilly,  First  Principles  in  Politics.     P,  vil 
20Lilly,  First   Principles  in   Politics.     P.   10. 


y 


136        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

Justice  is  based  on  the  conception  of  an  absolute  order  of 
right  which  demands  a  system  of  rights  and  obUgations 
that  should  be  maintained  by  law  whether  they  are  so  or 
not.  These  rights,  to  employ  Green's  expression,  "may 
properly  be  called  natural."  "  The  definition  of  the  word 
"natural"  is,  therefore,  admittedly  the  same  as  that  of 
Green.  The  conception  of  a  right  as  necessarily  involving 
a  claim  on  the  part  of  an  individual  to  a  free  exercise  of 
some  faculty,  and  a  recognition  of  that  claim  by  society, 
is  also  essentially  Green's  idea.  The  ultimate  foundation 
of  the  state  is  "the  law  of  man's  rational  nature,  in  virtue 
of  which  he  is  a  person  invested  with  rights  and  encom- 
passed by  duties."  "  That  is  to  say,  will  and  not  force  is 
the  true  basis  of  the  state.  Thus  in  broad  outline,  Mr.  Lilly 
may  be  considered  a  follower  of  Green. 

Sir  Roland  Wilson  is  trained  in  law,  and  lawyers  are  not 
generally  given  to  metaphysical  speculation.  He  is,  there- 
fore, expected  to  disagree  with  the  idealists,  but  he  is  care- 
ful in  dealing  with  the  doctrines  with  which  he  finds  him- 
self in  disagreement.  He  agrees  with  the  idealists  that  man 
is  by  nature  a  social  being,  and  that  he  can  not  realize  his 
full  self  except  in  a  community,^^  but  he  doubts  and,  I 
think,  rightly,  that  that  community  is  necessarily  the  state. 
If,  he  argues,  the  principle  of  state  interference  is  to  main- 
tain conditions  under  which  morality  may  be  possible,  then 
it  leaves  room  for  all  sorts  of  restrictive  measures  which 
are  not  properly  within  the  province  of  the  state.**  Sir 
Roland  Wilson  clearly  distinguishes  moral  from  legal 
rights,*'  but,  it  seems  to  me,  he  contradicts  himself  in  criti- 

"  Lilly,  First  Principles  in  Politics.  P.  9. 

22  Lilly,  First  Principles  in  Politics.  P.  9. 

23  Sir  Roland  Wilson,  The  Province  of  The  State.  P.  212. 
2*  Sir  Roland  Wilson,  The  Province  of  The  State.  P.  215. 
25  Sir  Roland  Wilson,  The  Province  of  The  State.     P.  216. 


Green's  Influence 


137 


? 


i 


s 


\x 


cising  Green's  theory  of  natural  rights ;  for  in  his  criticism 
he  confuses  that  which  should  be  in  principle  with  that 
which  is  as  a  matter  of  fact  enforced.^®  Being  a  lawyer, 
he  prefers  the  legal  conception  of  rights  in  which  neither 
reciprocity  nor  consciousness  of  a  common  good  are  neces- 
sary elements."  However,  when  he  argues  that  "to  stretch 
the  state  so  as  to  cover  all  these  non-official  agencies  is  to 
bebase  our  linguistic  coinage  without  any  compensating 
gain,2*  it  must  be  said,  his  argument  is  not  applicable  to 
Green.  He  is  decidedly  in  error  when  he  says  that  "state" 
and  "sovereign"  are  by  both  of  these  writers  [Green  and  Bo- 
sanquet]  treated  as  interchangeable ;  for  as  far  as  Green  is 
concerned,  state  and  sovereign  are  expressly  distinguished.^' 
Even  in  America  Green's  influence  is  noticeable.  Prof. 
Willoughby  has  few  references  to  Green  in  his  "Nature  of 
The  State,"  but  these  few  are  sufficient  to  indicate  Green's 
influence.  Prof.  Willoughby  agrees  with  Green  that  mor- 
ality is  incapable  of  legal  enforcement  ^°  and,  in  so  agreeing, 
he  necessarily  accepts  also  Green's  definition  of  morality. 
Like  Green,  he  is  dissatisfied  with  the  theory  of  Social  Con- 
tract, and  his  arguments  against  it  are  in  some  ways  similar 
to  those  of  Green.  He  agrees,  for  instance,  that  natural 
right  as  "a  right  in  a  state  of  nature  which  is  not  a  state 
of  society  is  a  contradiction,"  "  and  in  thus  agreeing  with 
Green  he  also  accepts  the  latter's  idea  of  rights  as  involving 
both  a  claim  on  the  part  of  the  individual  and  also  a  recog-^ 
nition  of  that  claim  by  society.  Rights  thus  conceived  can 
only  exist  in  a  society,  and  if  they  exist  in  a  state  of  nature 

2«Sir  Roland  Wilson.  The  Province  of  The  State.     P.  217. 
2TSir  Roland  Wilson,  The  Province  of  The  State.     P.  219. 

28  Sir  Roland  Wilson,  The  Province  of  The   State.     P.  223. 

29  Green,   Principles  of  Political  Obligation,  Pp.   136-137. 
80  Willoughby,  The  Nature  of  the  State.     P.  S3. 

"  Willoughby,  The  Nature  of  the  State.     P.  107. 


x^ 


138        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

at  all,  that  state  of  nature,  as  Green  has  pointed  out,  is  al- 
ready a  political  society.  Hence  Prof.  Willoughby  comes 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  true  origin  of  the  state  "must  be 
conceived  as  an  act  of  a  people  rather  than  of  individuals. 
The  existence  of  a  common  or  'general  will'  must  be 
predicated,  and  the  creation  of  the  state  held  to  be  due  to 

its  volition."  32 

For  the  rest  of  the  chapter,  I  shall  content  myself  with 
four  books  recently  published.    The  first  is  'The  Principles 
of  Citizenship,"  by  Sir  Henry  Jones.    The  author  declares 
that  the  point  of  view  that  he  has  adopted  is  neither  psycho- 
logical nor  economic,  but  ethical.    In  fact,  according  to  his 
estimation,  "the  modem  economist  will  now  admit  that  his 
science  is  abstract  just  as  the  modern  psychologist  will  ad- 
mit that  faculties  of  the  human  mind  are  not  separable 
powers  with  an  empty  ego  in  the  back-ground."  ^^     This 
should  be  quite  encouraging,  if  in  adopting  the  ethical  point 
of  view  in  treating  political  theory,  Sir  Henry  Jones  has 
either  a  new  programme  to  offer  or  a  decided  improvement 
of  the  old  political  idealism.     He  does  not  seem  to  have 
offered  either.     While  following  Green  in  many  respects, 
his  philosophy  is  essentially  along  the  lines  of  Bradley  and 
Bosanquet.    State,  to  him,  is  a  moral  agent  and  in  function- 
ing it   should  not   limit  itself  merely  to  the  externals   as 
Green  has  so  cautiously  preached.    According  to  Sir  Henry 
Jones,  externals  and  internals  can  not  be  separated.    If  the 
state  has  to  intervene  at  all,  it  has  to  intervene  not  only  with 
the  external  action,  but  also  with  the  supposedly  internal 
motive.     In  fact,  state  interference  should  be  positive  in 
nature  so  as  to  secure  the  desired  end,  that  is,  "to  make 
human  nature  in  citizens  all  that  it  has  in  it  to  become."  ^* 

32  Willoughby,  The  Nature  of  the  State.     P.  123. 

33  Sir  Henry  Jones,  The  Principles  of  Citizenship.     P.  161. 
3*  Sir  Henry  Jones,  The  Principles  of  Citizenship.     P.   132. 


Green's  Influence 


139 


it 


> 


It  may  and  ought  to  exercise  authority  over  the  external 
conditions  of  life  of  its  members  with  the  view  of  chang- 
ing not  only  their  outward  actions  and  intentions,  but  their 
motives  and   character."  ^^ 

Sir  Henry  Jones  accepts  Green's  theory  of  natural  rights, 
and  in  so  considering  rights  and  duties,  he  also  accords  the 
state  the  right  to  act  positively.  If  state  action  is  not  merely 
negative  but  also  positive,  what,  it  may  be  asked,  is  the  cri- 
terion of  state  action?  The  criterion  is  declared  to  be  the 
positive  promotion  of  the  good  life.^^  This  criterion  is  ap- 
plicable to  war.  The  state  has  the  right  to  summon  citi- 
zens to  a  just  war  and  to  no  other;  and  the  citizen,  on  his 
part,  has  a  right  and  duty  to  fight  for  a  just  war,  and  no 
other.  But,  who  is  to  judge  as  to  whether  a  war  is  just  or 
unjust?  The  answer  is  both  state  and  citizen.  The  state, 
being  a  moral  agent,  can  not  delegate  its  power  for  judging. 
The  citizen  has  the  right  and  duty  to  judge  for  himself  and 
to  act  accordingly.  It  may  even  be  his  duty  to  fight  his 
own  country.  This  sounds  quite  radical,  but — "what  can 
not  be  his  duty  is  that  of  taking  no  sides  when  the  question 
of  right  or  wrong  is  being  decided  by  means  of  war.  The 
pacifist's  protest  against  the  war  when  his  country  is  fight- 
ing is  the  affirmation  of  the  moral  principle  when  it  can  not 
be  applied.  .  .  .  The  good  man  deals  with  the  present 
circumstances  and  finds  his  duty  at  his  hand."  ®^ 

I  wonder  if  it  may  not  be  inferred  from  this  that  if  a 
citizen  opposes  war,  he  must  leave  the  country,  lest  the 
subsequent  circumstances  may  compel  him  to  discharge 
fresh  duties  at  his  hand.  But,  then,  that  leaves  the  state 
practically  alone  to  decide  whether  a  war  is  just  or  unjust. 


"Sir  Henry  Jones,  The  Principles  of  Citizenship.  P.  132. 
3«  Sir  Henry  Jones,  The  Principles  of  Citizenship.  P.  153. 
37  Sir  Henry  Jones,  The  Principles  of  Citizenship.     F.  158. 


I40        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

In  regard  to  property,  the  rights  of  the  state  and  the  citi- 
zen are,  according  to  Sir  Henry  Jones,  in  similar  way  lim- 
ited. The  four  principles  ^^  to  be  observed  are:  1.  Rights 
of  free  life  mean  nothing  without  sustenance ;  2.  the  right 
of  property  is  sacred  on  the  same  ground  as  the  right  to  life 
and  liberty ;  3.  state  must  faciUtate  the  means  that  helps  to 
exercise  this  right ;  4.  right  of  property  is  made  contingent 
upon  the  use  made  of  it. 

Sir  Henry  Jones  follows  Green,  but  he  follows  Bradley 
and  Bosanquet  to  a  much  greater  extent. 

Prof.  Watson  is  confessedly  an  ideaUst  and  as  far  as  po- 
litical theory  is  concerned  admits  his  debt  to  both  Green 
and  Bosanquet.  He  believes  of  course  that  the  true  basis 
of  the  state  is  will.  He  believes  in  general  will  but  argues 
that  Rousseau  confuses  the  general  will  with  the  will  of 
all ;  ®^  but  if  there  is  any  confusion  at  all,  it  is  not  Rousseau 
but  Prof.  Watson  who  is  really  confused.  At  any  rate  he 
believes  in  general  will  as  a  will  common  to  the  citizens  of 
a  state,  a  rational  will— "that  will  which  the  individual  in 
his  best  mind  recognizes."  ^'^  Ultimately  it  is  the  general 
will  which  is  sovereign  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  legal  sov- 
ereign to  discover  what  this  general  will  is. 

The  general  will  creates  rights  and  the  system  of  rules 
for  the  maintenance  of  these  rights  which  are  necessary  for 
the  realization  of  the  good  will.  These  rights  may  be 
termed  "natural"  but  they  neither  belong  to  men  in  isolation 
as  the  advocates  of  Social  Contract  believed,  nor  are  they 
created  by  law  as  Bentham  held.  They  are  justified  on  the 
ground  that  if  they  are  not  secured,  man  is  not  able  to  live 
his  own  life  freely  and  to  contribute  his  share  to  the  com- 

"Sir  Henry  Jones,  The  Principles  of  Citizenship.    Pp.165-166. 
8»  Watson,  The  State  in  War  and  Peace.    P.  192. 
*o  Watson,  The  State  in  War  and  Peace.    P.  223. 


Green's  Influence 


141 


'1 


i 


mon  good.  They  involve  a  claim  on  the  part  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  a  recognition  of  that  claim  by  either  society 
or  the  state.  Prof.  Watson  here  uses  the  terms  society  and 
the  state  interchangeably.*^  The  specific  rights  are  life, 
liberty,  equality  and  property.  The  last  also  includes  the 
right  to  the  freedom  of  contract. 

The  state  is  an  organized  society  of  men,  and  is  sov- 
ereign. Sovereignty  is  supreme  power,  but  the  supremacy 
of  the  state  is  relative  and  not  absolute.*^  That  is,  the 
state  has  supreme  power  within  a  certain  sphere  to  dictate 
or  to  prevent  the  action  of  others.  It  has  no  power  to 
interfere  with  all  sorts  of  activities.  The  state  is  above  all 
other  organizations  not  in  the  sense  that  it  can  make  and 
unmake  them  at  will,  but  in  the  sense  that  it  is  the  high 
court  of  appeal  through  which  their  conflicting  claims  are 
harmonized.*^  The  principle  of  state  interference  is  to  make 
moral  acts  possible  by  regulation,  but  not  to  enforce  them.** 
The  morality  of  the  state  is  different  from  the  morality  of 
individuals.  That  does  not  exempt  the  state  from  moral 
responsibility.  Like  Green,  Prof.  Watson  is  against  war, 
but  he  does  not  go  to  the  same  extent  as  Green  does  in 
denouncing  war.  His  idea  of  the  cause  of  war  is  very 
much  Green's;  so  also  is  his  idea  of  its  prevention.  Like- 
wise he  believes  in  having  better  political  organization  in- 
ternally so  as  to  diminish  friction  externally.  He  agrees 
with  Bosanquet  that  a  healthy  state  is  not  a  militant  state. 

From  the  above  account,  it  is  only  evident  that  Prof. 
Watson  follows  Green  closely  and  if  there  is  any  diver- 
gence of  view  at  all  between  the  two,  it  is  hardly  noticeable. 

"  Watson,  The  State  in  War  and  Peace.  P.  222. 

*2  Watson,  The  State  in  War  and  Peace.  P.  198. 

*«  Watson,  The  State  in  War  and  Peace.  P.  208. 

**  Watson,  The  State  in  War  and  Peace.  P.  217. 


V 


142        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

On  the  whole,  no  improvement  is  made,  and  very  Ukely  none 

is  intended. 

However,  the  modem  tendency  is  unmistakably  agamst 
political  idealism.     Mr.  Joad,  in  his  "Essays  in  Common 
Sense  Philosophy,"  launches  a  well-considered  attack  on 
ideaUstic  political  philosophy.    He  points  out  that  political 
idealism  regards  the  state  as  self-sufficing  and  as  above 
morality,  and  that  it  believes  that  the  state  and  individuals 
are  so  intimately  interwoven  with  each  other  that  the  act 
of  the  state  is  never  unrepresentative  of  the  individuals,  and 
the  act  of  the  individuals  has  inseparable  reference  to  the 
state.    One  of  the  shortcomings  of  idealistic  absolutism  is 
that  it  identifies  state  with  society.     But  state  and  society 
are  two  different  entities.     Human  society  is  greater  and 
more  comprehensive  than  a  state.     In  fact,  judging  from 
the  past,  just  as  families  unite  into  tribes  and  tribes  into 
nations,  it  will  not  be  at  all  surprising  to  have  nations  unite 
into  one  great  society  in  the  future.    To  confound  human 
society  and  the  nation  state  is  a  mistake  of  the  first  magni- 
tude. 

Mr.  Joad  feels  that  the  idealist  philosophers  seem  to  be 
in  the  habit  of  philosophizing  in  utter  disregard  of  facts. 
In  the  first  place,  the  state,  that  is,  the  political  organiza- 
tion, is  not  the  only  organization  in  which  human  beings 
are  interested.  The  church,  to  many,  is  a  much  more  inti- 
mate organization;  for  while  the  state  touches  every-day 
life  hardly  at  all,  the  church  reminds  some  people  of  its 
existence  at  least  once  a  week-  Industrial  unions  touch 
economic  life  at  such  vital  spots  and  with  such  intimacy  that 
they  arouse  much  more  interest  among  their  members  than 
the  state  does  among  its  citizens.  Furthermore,  with 
churches  and  trade  unions  or  other  voluntary  organizations 
a  man  identifies  himself  by  choice.  The  claims  of  these 
voluntary  organizations  may  be  said  to  be  moral,  but  the 


^11 


Green's  Influence 


143 


* 


Wi 


claims  of  the  state  seem  to  be  often  founded  on  "topo- 
graphical accident."  One  belongs  to  it  "because  he  hap- 
pened to  be  bom  in  a  certain  bedroom,  a  phenomenon  over 
which  he  has  no  control."  *®  This  sounds  wildly  radical, 
but  Mr.  Joad  is  neither  an  anarchist  nor  a  syndicalist.  He 
believes  in  the  necessity  of  a  state.  Because  society  is 
more  and  more  industrialized,  because  human  beings  are 
more  and  more  interdependent,  and  economic  efforts  are 
generally  blind,  a  political  association  like  the  state  is  all  the 
more  necessary.  But  the  kind  of  state  he  believes  in  is  far 
different  from  the  Utopia  of  the  political  idealists. 

I  have  no  quarrel  with  Mr.  Joad's  arguments  which,  when 
directed  towards  political  absolutists,  are  on  the  whole 
sound.  But  it  does  not  seem  to  be  exactly  correct  to  bring 
Green  almost  indiscriminately  into  the  company  of  Hegel, 
Bradley  and  Bosanquet  as  Mr.  Joad  does  in  the  first  part 
of  his  chapter.  I  think  there  are  differences  which  it  will 
be  profitable  for  us  not  to  disregard.  Mr.  Joad  seems  to 
realize  that  fact  later  on  in  his  book  when  Green's  name 
disappears,  but  it  is  not  certain  whether  that  disappearance 
is  due  to  careless  omission  or  intentional  exclusion. 

Mr.  Hobhouse  in  this  respect  makes  his  position  unmis- 
takable. He  enters  into  the  controversy  with  a  grave  pur- 
pose.*^ Like  his  son,  he  is  engaged  in  a  battle  to  make  the 
world  safe  for  democracy,  but  unlike  his  son  his  efforts 
run  in  a  different  channel-  In  order  that  the  end  may  be 
obtained,  not  only  must  the  swords  be  sharpened,  but  the 
pen  must  also  contribute  its  share.  While  militarism  is 
being  destroyed  in  the  world  of  practice,  idealistic  abso- 
lutism should  be  repudiated  in  the  world  of  thought.  Thus 
Prof.  Hobhouse  takes  Hegelianism  to  task.  It  is  not  neces- 


*^  Joad,  Essays  in  Common  Sense  Philosophy.     P.  189. 
*^  Hobhouse,  The  Metaphysical  Theory  of  The  State. 


144 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


Green's  Influence 


145 


J 


«ary  to  examine  the  specific  charges  which  are  brought 
against  Dr.  Bosanquet  with  the  strength  of  reasoning  and 
lucidity  of  expression  generally  expected  from  such  a  vet- 
eran writer  as  Hobhouse.  My  purpose  in  introducing  him 
is  to  indicate,  as  he  has  indicated,  that  Green  is  far  differ- 
ent from  the  thoroughly  idealistic  absolutists. 

Prof.  Hobhouse  thinks  that  Green  has  retained  his  fun- 
J   damental  humanity  *«  and  that  at  his  hands  Hegelianism 
has  been  transformed  into  social  idealism.'*®    He  points  out 
that  Green  is  always  cautious  where  the  rights  of  the  indi- 
viduals are  concerned  and  that  individuals  are  not  absorbed 
in  the  state.    He  accepts  Green's  theory  of  natural  rights 
with  the  exception  of  its  idealistic  ingredients.    According 
to  Green,  a  claim  on  the  part  of  the  individual  becomes  a 
right  only  when  it  is  met  with  social  and  presumably  con- 
scious recognition,   for  idealistically  speaking,  nothing  is 
but  thinking  makes  it  so.     According  to  Professor  Hob- 
house, a  right  is  a  right,  whether  recognized  or  not,  when- 
ever proof  is  given  of  its  necessity.    The  general  will  with 
Green  is  really  conceived,  according  to  Mr.  Hobhouse,  in 
the  psychological  sense.    "It  is  the  impalpable  congeries  of 
hopes  and    fears  of  a  people  bound  together  by  common 
interest  and  sympathy."  ^^    "It  is  the  common  will  and  rea- 
son of  men  as  determined  by  social  relations,  as  interested 
in  each  other,  as  acting  together  for  common  ends"  "    With 
Green,  general  will  is  not  to  overwhelm  the  individual, 
neither  to  override  the  moral  law.    When  he  declares  that 
will  and  not  force  is  the  basis  of  the  state,  it  is  the  state 
that  is  dependent  upon  will.    If  the  state  is  not  so  depend- 
ent, it  is  a  state  only  by  courtesy,  as  Green  said  of  Russia. 


J 


J 


*8  Hobhouse,  Metaphysical  Theory  of  The  State. 
*»  Hobhouse,  Metaphysical  Theory  of  The  State, 
w  Principles  of   Political   Obligation.     P.  98. 
51  Principles   of  Political  Obligation.     P.    103. 


P.  83. 
P.  120. 


Professor  Hobhouse  may  not  have  pointed  out  all  the  dif- 
ferences between  Green  and  the  other  idealists,  but  he 
does  distinguish  him  from  them-  Hence  in  fighting  to  make 
the  world  safe  for  democracy,  he  is  not  fighting  against 
Green  so  much  as  against  Messrs.  Bradley  and  Bosanquet. 


? 


I 


(I 


CHAPTER  IX 


CONCLUSION 


The  above  survey  of  criticisms  and  comments  indicates 
that  Green  has  not  been  properly  dealt  with.  His  followers 
praise  him  too  highly  and  attribute  virtues  to  him  that  do 
not  belong  to  his  share,  while  his  critics  sometimes  reveal 
a  hostility  that  should  not  be  his  due.    It  is  my  purpose  in 
this  chapter  to  bring  out  the  distinct  merits  as  well  as  the 
defects  embodied  in  Green's  philosophy,  but  before  starting 
on  that,  one  erroneous  impression  should  be  cleared  off. 
The  belief  that  political  idealism  is  necessarily  political  ab- 
solutism is  entirely  unwarranted.     The  factors  leading  to 
such  a  belief  are  probably  accidental.     Locke  was  one  of 
the  most  influential  advocates  of  democracy  and  it  happened 
that  he  was  an  empiricist.    Hegel  was  the  intellectual  leader 
of  German  absolutism  and  it  happened  that  Hegel  was  an 
idealist.    It  might  be  urged  that  Locke  wrote  as  a  practical 
politician,  and  was  influential  because  Englishmen  admired 
the  practical ;  while  Hegel  wrote  as  a  philosopher,  and  was 
followed  because  the  Germans  worshipped  the  profound. 
But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  empiricism  is  no  more  wedded  to 
democracy  than  idealism  to  absolutism.     We  need  only 
bear  in  mind  that  the  absolutism  of  Thomas  Hobbes  pro- 
ceeded from  his  materialism  and  the  democratic  tendencies 
of  the  18th  century  attributable  to  the  eloquence  of  Jean 
Jacques  Rousseau  could  be  traced  to  the  idealism  back  of 
his  doctrines.     Whether  or  not  the  "determinism  distilled 
out  of  evolutionary  science"  *  has  surrendered  to  the  tactics 

^Hobson,  The  Crisis  of  Liberalism.     P.  187. 


Conclusion 


147 


of  conservatism,  as  Mr.  Hobson  claims,  it  is  easy  to  point 
out  that  empiricism  has  sometimes  played  into  the  clutching 
hands  of  either  autocracy  or  plutocracy.  Neither  is  it  hard 
to  single  out  instances  where  idealism  has  generated  cen- 
trifugal forces  in  modem  politics.  Philosophical  labels  do 
not  matter  much,  but  a  great  deal  depends  upon  their  appli- 
cation. 

A  few  words  need  be  said  of  the  age  in  which  Green 
wrote.  The  years  1776  and  1870  inaugurated  different 
eras.  The  period  of  the  American  Revolution  was  memor- 
able for  many  reasons.  In  the  sphere  of  everyday  life,  the 
world  had  started  on  its  great  transformation.  Hand  in- 
dustry was  about  to  be  replaced  by  machine  industry.  The 
thing  we  made — to  employ  the  expression  of  William  Mor- 
ns— had  begun  to  "drive"  in  the  beginning  of  the  19th  cen- 
tury. Misery  and  poverty  had  gotten  hold  of  the  working 
classes.  In  the  field  of  intellectual  speculation,  the  year 
1776  was  memorable.  Adam  Smith's  Wealth  of  Nations 
and  Bentham's  Fragment  on  Government  appeared  in  the 
same  year.  With  physiocratic  tendencies  and  the  traditions 
of  the  18th  century  philosophy  the  world  might  be  said  to 
have  chosen  an  extremely  individualistic  path.  Intellectually 
and  factually,  the  period  between  1776  and  1870  is  one  of 
laisses  faire. 

The  last  quarter  of  the  last  century  marked  a  decided 
change.  From  1870  to  1914  we  have  a  period  of  collec- 
tivism, a  period  which  Professor  Hayes  has  characterized 
as  the  Era  of  Benevolent  Bourgeoisie.  Politically  speaking, 
it  is  a  period  of  intense  nationalism  in  regard  to  foreign 
relations.  Competitive  armaments,  the  exodus  of  capital, 
and  secret  diplomacy  are  the  distinguishing  marks  of  inter- 
national politics.  It  is  a  period  of  statism  internally.  The 
bourgeoisie,  emerging  from  what  was  formerly  called  the 
middle  class,  gained  political  ascendancy.     The  successjEul 


148        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

business  men  who  are  proudly  described  as  being  "self- 
made  men"  are  often  remindful  of  the  bitter  cup  of  expen- 
ence  they  had  once  drunk  and,  thanks  to  democracy,  they 
have  attained  success.  Success  seems  to  be  the  magic  goal. 
A  few  succeed,  some  are  succeeding,  all  are  trying  to  suc- 
ceed and  in  their  frantic  efforts  to  attain  success,  people  of 
all  classes,  contrary  to  Marxian  prediction,  have  worked 
together  for  "development"  and  "progress."  National  con- 
sciousness prevails  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  class  con- 
sciousness. In  order  to  have  peace  within  and  honor 
abroad,  the  state  must  have  necessary  power  to  "regulate," 
to  "adjust"  and  eventually  to  guide.  That  is  the  spirit  of 
the  age  and  it  is  with  that  spirit  that  Green  has  formulated 

his  theories. 

Obviously,  merits  are  not  lacking  in  Green's  philosophy, 
but  unfortunately  its  Hegelian  label  has  prejudiced  its  con- 
tent. Those  who  have  studied  him,  however,  generally 
deny  that  he  is  a  Hegelian  at  all.  Mr.  Alfred  William 
Benn,  in  his  History  of  English  Rationalism  in  the  I9th 
Century,  asserts  vigorously  that  Green  is  not  a  Hegelian. 
Professor  Barker  describes  Green's  writings  as  a  product 
of  Oxford,  immediately  influenced  by  German  philosophy, 
but  ultimately  traceable  to  Greek  thought. 

More  specifically  Green  is  more  of  an  Aristotelian  than 
>/  a  Platonist,  and  tnore  of  'a  Kantian  than  a  Hegelian. 
Professor  Barker  is  not  alone  in  his  estimation,  for  Pro- 
fessor Ritchie  has  come  to  almost  the  same  conclusion  in 
different  words.  The  latter  is  of  the  opinion  that  Green's 
philosophy  is  a  correction  of  Kant  by  Aristotle  and  of 
Aristotle  by  Kant.  If  so,  he  may  be  said  to  be  "both  Kantian 
and  Aristotelian.  The  same  may  in  a  certain  sense  be  said 
of  Hegel,  but  that  in  no  sense  identifies  him  with  Green. 
In  fact,  referring  to  Hegel's  work,  Green  has  himself  said 
that  it  must  be  done  over  again.    These  opinions  indicate 


Conclusion 


149 


i 


that  Green  has  really  no  occasion  for  borrowing  a  Hegelian 
mantle.  Love  for  Hegel  should  not  be  cultivated  on  ac- 
count of  Green  and  prejudice  against  Hegel  should  not  be 
carried  over  to  Green. 

Of  the  merits  the  first  to  be  mentioned  is  Green's  theory  y 
of  natural  rights.     First  of  all  it  serves  two  distinct  pur-   >/ 
poses  as  far  as  Green  himself  is  concerned.     It  discredits      . 
the  kind  of  absolutism  that  attributes  rights  to  the  grace  of 
the  sovereign,  and  it  proves  the  falsity  of  the  doctrine  of 
government  by  the  consent  of  the  governed.     If  consent 
is  a  supreme  necessity,  then  vote  counting  is  a  necessary 
part  of  the  government.    If  vote  counting  is  necessary,  then 
there  is  always  the  difficulty  of  explaining  and  justifying 
the  obedience  of  the  minority.     That  justification  has  not 
been  furnished  by  anybody  and  is  not  furnished  by  Green ; 
but  Green's  theory  of  natural  rights  decreases  the  neces- 
sity of  such  a  justification  to  a  considerable  extent.    Green 
abhors  mathematical  government.    Government  based  upon     / 
a  counting  of  noses  may  be  a  practical  expedient,  but  it 
can  not  be  our  democratic  ideal.    Government  is,  after  all,  y 
a  means  to  an  end;  make  your  means  your  end,  and  you 
defeat  your  ultimate  purpose  in  life. 

Further,  Green's  theory  of  natural  rights  is  in  harmony 
with  modern  economic  facts  and  sociological  theories-  Di- 
vision of  labor  prevails  on  a  greater  scale  than  ever  before 
and  interdependence  of  individuals  is  much  more  in  evi- 
dence. A  breakfast  in  London  today  may  involve  coflFee 
from  South  America,  wheat  from  North  Dakota,  tea  from 
Ceylon,  sugar  from  Cuba  and  probably  potatoes  from  Ire- 
land. Not  only  is  the  fact  of  economic  interdependence 
indisputable,  but  also,  as  is  claimed  by  sociologists,  there 
Is  constantly  in  evidence  a  social  consciousness  working 
for  a  social  good.  We  hear  a  great  deal  of  "the  conscious- 
ness of  kind."  of  "social  mentality,"  of  "social  mind"  a^d 
of  "social  consciousness,"  and  if  we  deduce  any  lesson  from 


4 


J 


/ 


J 


J 


/ 


J 


150        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

them  at  all,  it  is  that  of  mutual  interdependence  and  the 
necessity  of  cooperation. 

Now  the  old  traditional  theory  of  natural  rights  does 
not  harmonize  with  these,  if  not  new,  at  least  more  clearly 
defined  facts  and  tendencies.  One  can  not  live  in  a  society 
of  mutual  interdependence  and  retain  at  the  same  time  the 
kind  of  natural  rights  that  are  supposedly  existent  in  an  iso- 
lated state  of  nature.  One  can  not  live  in  a  society  whose 
predominant  characteristic  is  cooperation  and  at  the  same 
time  assert  fully  the  rights  that  are  supposedly  carried  over 
from  a  state  of  nature,  the  chief  feature  of  which  is  in- 
dividual independence  and  isolation.  Eighteenth  century 
economics  has  been  tried  and  found  wanting.  Eighteenth 
century  political  philosophy  is  equally  so,  and  as  far  as  the 
theory  of  natural  rights  is  concerned,  Green's  correction  is 
very  likely  in  the  right  direction. 

Green's  theory  of  state  interference  will  be  found  valu- 
able. Mill,  it  will  be  remembered,  divides  human  actions 
into  the  self -regarding  and  others-regarding  and  considers 
the  latter  alone  as  subject  to  state  interference.  The  dis- 
tinction is  not  sound,  for  human  actions  are  far  more  often 
both  self -regarding  and  others-regarding  rather  than  either 
alone.  A  principle  that  is  itself  defective  offers  no  guidance 
to  the  practice  of  state  interference.  Green's  distinction 
between  outward  acts  and  inward  will  is  one  which,  though 
not  ideal,  offers  guidance  to  better  advantage  in  view  of 
the  complexity  of  human  relations.  Outward  acts  alone 
are  subject  to  state  interference,  because  inward  will  not 
only  should  not  be  but  also  cannot  be. 

Many  will  not  concede  that  Green  has  scored  over  Mill 
in  this  matter;  for  they  say  that  it  is  just  as  hard  to  decide 
which  of  the  outward  acts  should  be  a  subject  for  state 
interference  as  it  is  to  distinguish  between  the  self-regard- 
ing and  others-regarding.     The  advantage  lies  in  the  fact 


Conclusion 


151 


\ 


that  by  Green's  distinction,  at  least  one  part  of  human 
effort  is  excluded  from  the  political  area.  Furthermore, 
Green's  distinction  is,  after  all,  a  real  distinction,  while 
Mill's  is  not.  As  to  which  of  the  outward  acts  should  be 
subject  to  state  interference.  Green's  answer  is  that  only 
those  should  be  that  obstruct  the  possibility  of  a  moral  life. 
Basically  it  is  to  remove  obstructions  that  the  state  inter- 
venes. Dr.  Bosanquet  seeks  to  improve  the  phraseology  by 
urging  the  expression,  ^'Hindrance  of  hindrances."  This, 
being  the  one  Kant^  used,  Green  must  have  been  well 
aware  of. 

The  difference  between  Mill  and  Green,  as  stated  above, 
is  fundamentally  a  difference  in  the  conception  of  liberty. 
Mill's  conception  of  liberty  is  negative,  it  is  freedom  from 
obstruction.  Green's  conception  is  positive.  It  is  a  positive 
power  or  capacity  of  doing  or  enjoying  something  worth 
doing  or  enjoying  and  something  we  do  or  enjoy  in  common 
with  others.  The  difference  is  probably  natural.  Mill's 
conception  is  the  traditional  conception  that  has  the  18th 
century  philosophy  at  the  background.  The  natural  man 
is  the  good  man.  Left  to  themselves  the  people  will  be  all 
right.  It  was  restraint  that  forced  people  to  be  other  than 
good ;  hence  the  negative  conception  of  liberty.  By  Green's 
time,  however,  the  evils  of  laxssez  faire  have  already  be- 
come evident.  The  freedom  of  contract  in  commerce,  in 
labor,  in  factory  conditions  and  in  industry  in  general  has 
produced  child  and  woman  labor,  misery,  poverty  and  slav- 
ery which  can  not  be  tolerated  by  a  man  of  Green's  tem- 
perament and  religious  fervor.  Something  must  be  done, 
and  who  can  do  it  better  than  the  state.  The  18th  century 
philosophers  were  primarily  concerned  with  removing  op- 
pression from  above.    Oppression  is  obstruction,  hence,  lib- 

2  Kant,  Mctaphysischc  Anfangsgriinde  der  Rechtslehre,  Ein- 
leitung  XXXV,  Sec.  D. 


1/ 


152        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

erty  is  freedom  from  obstruction,  primarily  from  above. 
By  Green's  time  the  problem  is  to  remove  the  conditions 
voluntarily  imposed  by  the  people  themselves  that  deprive 
them  of  any  exercise  of  the  power  or  capacity  that  is  within 
them.  The  problem  is  to  remove  these  conditions,  these 
obstructions,  not  so  much  from  above  as  from  the  stronger 
who  are  able  to  impose  their  will  on  the  weaker.  There- 
fore if  the  state  intervenes,  it  does  so  for  the  purpose  of 
maintaining  rather  than  obstructing  freedom- 

Apart  from  its  connection  with  the  principle  of  state 
interference,  the  positive  conception  of  freedom  is  itself 
useful.  Some  disadvantages  of  the  negative  conception  are 
the  advantages  of  the  positive  conception.  The  negative 
conception  of  liberty  easily  degenerates  into  license.  It  is 
often  taken  to  be  the  right  of  doing  whatsoever  one  will 
with  what  he  is  or  has  as  his  own.  If  such  is  the  case, 
there  will  be  the  greatest  scramble  in  society  and  anarchy 
may  likely  result.  The  positive  conception  of  freedom 
means  creative  human  effort.  By  definition  it  consists  of 
doing  or  enjoying  something  worth  doing  or  enjoying.  The 
importance  of  conscious  creative  human  effort  can  not  be 
over- emphasi zed ;  for  there  is  too  much  evidence  every- 
where of  blind  confidence  that  the  future  will  be  bright  or 
fatalistic  submission  to  the  conviction  that  it  will  be  dark. 
Either  of  the  two  is  dangerous  and  detrimental  to  human 
progress,  and  by  identifying  freedom  with  creative  human 
effort,  this  danger  may  be,  if  not  avoided,  at  least  lessened. 
This  positive  conception,  again,  has  the  advantage  of  im- 
plying the  idea  of  a  common  good.  Freedom  is  not  merely 
the  power  to  do  or  to  enjoy  something  worth  doing  or  en- 
joying, but  also  to  do  or  enjoy  in  common  with  others.  It 
is  not  doing  what  one  likes  with  his  own,  for  doing  what 
one  likes  with  his  own  may  not  be  doing  in  common  with 
others. 


Conclusion 


153 


i 


t 


i 


Closely  related  to  the  conception  of  freedom  and  the    ^ 
principle  of  state  interference  is  the  reconciUation  of  in- 
dividualism and  collectivism.    It  is  no  more  correct  to  say  ^ 
that  Green   is   a   thorough-going   collectivist   than   to   say 
that  he  is  a  thorough-going  individuaUst.     He  is  neither 
and  both,   viz.,   in   him   there   is   a   happy   reconciliation. 
Green's  conception  of  reason  and  of  the  will  to  good  in- 
volves the  idea  of  perfection  or  of  a  possibility  of  perfec- 
tion.     Man  is  determined  to  action  by  this  idea  of  a  pos-  K 
sible  perfection  of  himself.    But  along  just  what  lines  one 
will  seek  his  own  good  and  improvement  must  depend  upon 
his  own  capacity  or  power.    This  brings  us  back  to  the  con- 
ception of  freedom. 

If  by  reason  in  the  moral  sense  is  meant  a  consciousness 
of  a  possibility  of  perfection  to  be  realized  in  and  by  the 
subject  of  consciousness,  and  if  by  freedom  in  the  political 
sense  is  meant  the  power  or  capacity  to  do  or  enjoy  certain 
things  worth  doing  or  enjoying;  the  two  taken  together  will 
amount  to  nothing  less  than  "self  expression"  in  the  pres- 
ent day  terminology.  They  mean  a  consciousness  in  a 
man  of  the  possibility  of  perfection  in  his  power  or  capacity 
to  do  that  which  is  worth  doing  to  satisfy  himself.  This  is 
individualism  and  it  is  individualism  of  the  highest  order. 
It  is  free  from  anarchistic  tendencies,  for  they  are  excluded 
from  its  constituent  elements. 

As  to  collectivism,  we  need  not  repeat  wjiat  has  already 
been  said  with  reference  to  the  principle  of  state  interfer- 
ence. The  only  point  to  be  singled  out  is  that  with  Green 
individualism  and  collectivism  are  harmonious  with  rather 
than  antagonistic  to  each  other.  Collectivism  under  the 
guidance  and  application  of  the  principle  of  state  interfer- 
ence facilitates  and  strengthens  individualism.  Indeed,  what 
Professor  Barker  has  said  of  morality  may  also  be  said  of 
individualism.    If  the  state  does  not  intervene,  it  is  for  the 


iX 


154        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

sake  of  individuality  that  the  state  refrains ;  and  if  it  does 
intervene,  it  is  also  for  the  sake  of  individuality  that  it 
intervenes. 

There  is  one  point  in  Green's  philosophy  that  is  espe- 
cially in  keeping  with  the  spirit  of  the  present  time.  He  dis- 
tinguishes state  from  what  may  be  called  Great  Society.  To 
v' Green,  the  state  presupposes  other  associations.  It  does 
not,  for  instance,  create  rights  but  gives  fuller  reality  to 
rights  already  existing.^  But  what  rights  are  already  ex- 
isting, viz.,  what  rights  existed  previous  to  the  formation 
of  the  state? 

For  answer  let  us  refer  to  Green's  theory  of  natural 

rights.     Men  by  virtue  of  being  in  society  are  in  certain 

/  relations  and  conditions  that  must  be  secured  to  them  in 

"•'    order  that  they  may  fulfil  their  moral  ideal,  that  is,  in  order 
that  they  may  develop  their  power  and  capacity.    This  is  in 

y  essence  the  foundation  of  rights.    Do  they  depend  upon  the 

•  state?  According  to  Green,  they  "arise  out  of  social  rela- 
tions that  may  exist  where  a  state  is  not.     .      .      .     They 

/  depend  for  their  existence  indeed  on  society  but  not  on  so- 
ciety's having  assumed  the  form  of  a  state."  *  Therefore 
there  are  rights  that  are  independent  of  any  state-  Not  only 
are  they  independent  of,  but  in  a  sense,  more  fundamental 
than  the  state.  For  in  the  first  place  the  purpose  for  which 
the  state  exists  at  all  is  to  give  fuller  reality  to  them.  Sec- 
ondly, some  of  them  the  state  should  never  violate.  Green 
is  positive  in  his  denunciation  of  war,  and  the  reason  given 
is  that  it  violates  the  rights  to  life  in  the  members  of  both 
the  offending  and  the  defending  state.  When  discussing 
the  question  whether  or  not  conflict  between  states  is  in- 
evitable, Green  says:  "No  action  in  its  own  interest  of  a 
state  that  fulfilled  this  idea,"  viz.,  the  idea  of  a  state  as  a 

8  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  138. 
*  Principles  of  Politiical  Obligation.    P.  150. 


Conclusion 


155 


« 


i 


maintainer  and  harmonizer  of  rights,  "could  conflict  with 
any  true  interest  or  right  of  general  society."  ^  Later  on 
he  expresses  his  hope  that  an  idea  of  justice,  as  a  relation 
which  should  subsist  among  the  whole  of  mankind,  as  well 
as  between  the  members  of  the  same  state,  may  come  to 
act  on  men's  minds  as  independently  of  all  calculation  of 
their  several  interests  as  does  the  idea  which  regulates  the 
conduct  of  a  good  citizen.® 

This  differentiation  between  the  state  and  human  society 
and  Green's  discussion  of  the  right  of  the  citizens  to  resist  v- 
the  state  reveals  his  attitude  towards  the  nature  of  state 
acts.  State  acts  are  not  something  irresistible  and  uncon- 
trolled, but  something  with  reference  to  which  the  terms 
right  and  wrong  may  be  correctly  used.  The  state  is  not » 
above  morality  internally  any  more  than  externally.  In- 
ternally,-the  state  may  do  wrong,  and  externally,  in  regard  " 
to  other  states  it  may  also  do  wrong ;  Green's  doctrine  has 
nothing  to  indicate  that  state  and  society  are  synonymous, 
as  Mr.  Joad  seems  to  imply.  In  fact,  Green  expects  that 
with  the  better  and  more  perfect  organization  of  the  state 
according  to  its  idea,  the  two  will  be  harmonized.  Neither 
is  there  any  ground  for  supposing  that,  according  to  Green, 
state  can  do  no  wrong,  for  he  has  at  least  shown  that  the 
state  does  do  wrong  in  many  instances.  The  state  as  Green 
conceives  it  is,  after  all,  not  the  horrible  being  that  indis- 
criminate critics  of  political  idealism  are  afraid  of. 

In  the  foregoing  paragraphs,  I  have  endeavored  to  pre- 
sent some  of  the  merits  of  Green's  system  which  seem  to 
be  well  worthy  of  acknowledgment.  In  the  following  par- 
agraphs, I  shall  deal  with  some  defects  which  admirers  of 
Green  would  like  to  see  eliminated. 

First  of  all,  the  theory  that  institutions  are  the  embodi-    ^ 

»  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  170. 
«  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  178. 


v." 


^' 


4 


*  156        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


/  / 


/ 


ment  of  reason^  is  decidedly  dangerous.  Eventually  it 
leads  to  conservatism,  to  a  preservation  and  justification 
of  the  status  quo.  We  are  not  asserting  that  institutions 
do  not  represent  reason  or  that  reason  was  not  instrumental 
in  the  origin  of  institutions-  Customs  and  conventions 
have  reasons  working  towards  their  adoption.  But  we  do 
affirm  that  the  conception  that  social  institutions  are  the 
embodiment  of  objective  reason  is  dangerous,  because  our 
tendency  to  admire  reason  may  be  converted  into  a  ten- 
dency to  admire  institutions,  and  institutions  that  existed 
or  are  existing  are  not  always  worthy  of  our  admiration. 

The  explanation  is  really  two-fold.  Firstly,  reasons 
that  operated  towards  adopting  a  given  institution,  while 
/  sound  at  the  time  of  adoption  of  that  institution,  may  not 
remain  sound  at  the  present  time  in  view  of  changing  and 
changed  circumstances.  Geographical  representation  at  a 
time  when  there  is  distinctive  and  individual  local  life  may 
be  an  adequate  method  for  representation,  but  it  may  not 
remain  adequate  when  modem  industrialism  sweeps  away 
local  individuality. 

Secondly,  institutions  may  have  been  adopted  through 
reasoning  but  not  through  sound  reasoning,  and  as  a  result 
they  may  be  as  defective  today  as  once  they  were  in  the 
past.  The  proper  spirit  is  the  spirit  of  improvement.  But 
if  we  glorify  the  majesty  of  reason  at  the  back  of  institu- 
^  tions,  we  are  liable  to  lose  our  spirit  of  improvement  and 
progress.  The  more  we  try  to  admire  our  past,  the  more 
convinced  we  are  that  the  past  really  deserves  our  admira- 
tion. Human  beings  are  a  curious  lot.  If  they  have  an 
ideal  and  exert  strenuous  efforts  toward  attaining  it,  they 
may  eventually  make  their  efforts  their  ideal.  If  they 
worship  reason  and  believe  that  institutions  are  the  em- 

7  See  P.  86. 


Conclusion 


157 


bodiment  of  reason,  they  may  eventually  worship  institu- 
tions. The  lack  of  inventiveness  in  China,  for  instance,  is 
largely  due  to  this  glorification  of  the  past.  Progressive 
people  should  look  forward,  and  in  this  connection  it  should 
be  said  in  fairness  to  Green  that  he  looks  to  the  future 
rather  than  the  past  for  his  inspiration.  He  himself  is 
constantly  looking  for  a  fuller  realization  and  a  fuller  de- 
velopment of  human  capacities. 

But  personal  virtue  should  not  be  employed  to  minimize   v^ 
J         a  doctrinal  defect.     Green  in  this  particular  instance  evi- 
'  dently  follows  Hegel.     But  Hegel  did  not  formulate  his 

theory  without  a  purpose.  What  he  aimed  at  was  the  uni- 
fication of  Germany  under  a  benevolent  monarch  and  in 
order  to  accomplish  that,  he  had  to  formulate  a  system  of 
philosophy  that  would  arrest  the  progress  of  the  revolution- 
ary doctrines  before  and  after  the  French  Revolution- 
He  had  to  contend  with  the  intellectuals  of  his  time  who 
knew  their  business.  They  knew  that  a  political  revolution 
could  not  be  effected  without  revolution  of  other  kinds. 
An  atheist  did  not  cut  God  off  for  nothing.  The  critics 
of  the  church  had  a  definite  purpose  to  serve.  The  wor- 
J  shippers  of  reason  did  not  worship  reason  for  the  fun  of  it. 

The  advocates  of  science  had  a  definite  axe  to  grind.  They 
knew  that  a  given  political  system  was  supported  by  and 
interwoven  with  the  whole  fabric  of  social,  ethical  and 
religious  concepts,  and  in  order  to  overturn  that  political 
system,  they  had  to  be  iconoclastic  towards  not  only  the 
political  but  also  the  social,  ethical  and  religious  idols.  In 
order  to  prepare  the  people  to  attain  the  desired  end,  they 
had  to  start  with  a  general  negation  of  all  the  existing, 
they  had  to  demolish  all  the  fondly  cherished  manners, 
customs  and  conventions.  Hegel  sought  to  undermine  the 
tactics  of  the  revolutionary  generalship  by  evolving  a  sys- 
tem of  philosophy  which  read  into  institutions  ftie  func- 


«/ 


y 


\ 


Conclusion 


159 


158 


Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 


tion  of  reason  so  that  the  worshippers  of  reason  would 
worship  institutions.  The  attempt  was  certainly  ingenious 
for  the  purpose  it  was  to  serve,  but  it  had  not  the  strength 
to  stem  the  tide  of  progressivism  and  radicahsm.  Since 
the  latter  is  here  to  stay,  there  is  very  little  excuse  for 
resuscitating  the  former. 

Sovereignty  is  always  a  thorny  problem  in  political  phil- 
osophy. Green's  discussion,  while  remarkably  to  the  point 
in  regard  to  the  distinction  or  rather  non-distinction  of 
sovereign  de  jure  and  sovereign  de  facto,  seems  neverthe- 
less to  be  a  futile  attempt  to  combine  Austin  with  Rousseau. 
He  agrees  with  Austin  to  the  extent  that  sovereignty  is  the 
supreme  law-giving  and  law-enforcing  power  vested  in 
determinate  person  or  persons  with  occasional  manifesta- 
tions of  coercive  force.  But  he  also  agrees  with  Rousseau 
that  sovereignty  is  basically  will.  Accordingly,  sovereignty 
is  supreme  power,  but  it  is  only  supreme  power  when  sup- 
ported by  general  will.  Thus  stated,  the  conception  is 
either  a  truism  that  needs  no  elaborate  polemics  or  an  in- 
tellectual subterfuge  that  gets  us  nowhere.  Those  who  are 
not  in  the  habit  of  taking  refuge  in  mysticism  will  ask 
somewhat  realistically  not  whether  sovereignty  is  will  or 
power,  but  whose  power  it  is  that  is  supreme  and  whose 
will  it  is  that  supports  that  power.  The  privileged  persons 
who  wield  supreme  power  in  a  country  are  not  so  easily  as- 
certainable and  may  not,  therefore,  be  said  to-be  exactly  de- 
terminate. But  they  form  a  class  and  we  know  whose 
power  is  supreme.  We  can  not,  however,  generalize  so 
easily  as  to  whose  will  it  is  that  supports  the  power-  Ab- 
sence of  opposition  by  no  means  signifies  wholehearted 
support.  General  acquiescence  does  not  amount  to  general 
will.  Indeed,  we  are  tempted  to  agree  with  Professor 
Hobhouse  that  "in  so  far  as  it  is  will,  it  is  not  general,  and 


< 


1 


in  so  far  as  it  is  general  it  is  not  will."  ^  Neither  a  purely 
legalistic  nor  a  purely  metaphysical  conception  of  sover- 
eignty is  satisfactory;  hence,  it  may  be  expected,  a  hodge- 
podge of  the  two  will  not  fare  better  with  the  present  day 
political  theorists. 

The  bald  statement  that  will  and  not  force  is  the  true 
basis  of  the  state  will  be  encouraging  to  many  as  an  ab- 
stract principle  to  be  hoped  for  and  attained,  but  it  is 
hardly  an  analysis  of  facts.  While  we  do  not  believe  that 
might  is  right,  we  are  too  often  reminded  that  power  or 
force  is  a  strong  determining  factor  in  public  affairs  in 
history  as  well  as  at  the  present  time.  Green  is  particu- 
larly unfortunate  in  his  arguments  to  support  his  assertion. 
It  is  indeed  regrettable  enough  that  force,  physical  as  well 
as  economic,  has  been  as  unrestrained  in  directing  human 
affairs  as  experience  indicates;  it  is  far  more  regrettable 
that  if  an  end  is  attained  by  some  means,  in  fact,  by  any 
means  foul  or  fair,  there  is  always  some  philosopher,  true 
to  the  assertion  of  Frederick  the  Great,  to  applaud  the  end 
attained  and  to  whitewash  the  means.  We  will  be  sur- 
rendering to  the  cynicism  of  that  monarch,  if  we  follow 
Green  in  his  ex  post  facto  justification  of  Napoleonic  wars. 
If  good  when  incidental  to  bad  should  not  be  "overruled" 
for  bad,  then  bad  when  incidental  to  good  should  not  be 
"overruled"  for  good.  Green  himself  is  quite  aware  of  the 
fallacy  of  his  logic.®  It  may  be  tenderness  not  to  be  strict 
in  our  moral  estimation,  but  in  regard  to  a  guiding  principle 
it  is  dangerous  to  permit  sympathetic  feeling  to  get  the  bet- 
ter of  our  moral  judgment.  There  seems  to  be  a  persistent 
tendency  to  countenance  the  vicious  doctrine  that  the  end 
justifies  the  means.  It  should  be  pointed  out  that  instead  of 
the  end  justifying  the  means,  the  means  if  not  consistent 
with  the  end  destroys  the  end,  however  desirable  it  may  be. 

8  Hobhouse,  Metaphysical  Theory  of  State.     P.  127. 

0  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.     P.  168. 


i6o        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

In  connection  with  Green's  theory  of  the  true  basis  of  the 
state,  there  is  another  point  that  should  not  escape  our  at- 
tention. When  will  is  declared  to  be  the  true  basis  of  the 
state,  we  are  easily  led  to  believe  that  the  state  is  con- 
sciously formed  of  our  free  will,  because  the  word  will  gen- 
erally implies  positive  effort.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the 
psychologists  will  be  found  irrefutable  in  their  contention 
that  subconscious  psychological  phenomena  are  just  as  in- 
strumental as  conscious  will  in  maintaining  the  state.  Con- 
scious will  is  not  the  sole  foundation  of  the  state,  and  that 
is  probably  why  Green  in  several  places  speaks  of  assent 
instead  of  consent.  But  if  he  distinguishes  consent  from 
assent,  he  should  also  distinguish  active,  positive  conscious 
will  from  passive  or  negative  or  habitual  acquiescence. 
When  he  speaks  of  the  Roman  Empire  as  based  on  will,  it 
^  may  be  presumed  that  what  is  meant  by  will  is  really  pas- 
sive acquiescence.  It  is  only  easily  imaginable  that  if  the 
people  had  been  given  a  free  choice,  they  would  probably 
not  have  elected  to  pay  allegiance  to  Rome-  If  will  and 
acquiescence  were  distinguished  and  were  both  regarded  as 
the  basis  of  the  state,  the  argument  against  force  might  be 
better  appreciated  and  more  intelligently  understood. 

With  a  large  number  of  people  the  chief  ground  for  in- 
dictment against  Green  is  to  be  found  in  his  views  on  eco- 
nomic questions.  He  is  insistent  on  land  reform,  but  to  the 
single  taxers  he  has  rejected  the  only  remedy  that  would 
cure  the  evil  systems  he  so  eloquently  complains  of.  His 
idea  of  capital  is  not  up-to-date.  While  he  is  sensitive  to 
J  the  abuses  of  capital,  he  sees  no  inherent  danger  in  the  con- 
centration of  the  control  of  capital.  Above  all  his  approach 
to  this  subject  is  different  from  that  of  a  modem  liberal. 
A  modem  liberal  will  inquire  into  the  justice  of  the  dis- 
J  tribution  of  wealth,  while  Green  is  contented  with  a  pater- 
nal interest  in  the  gradual  improvement  of  the  material 


Conclusion 


i6i 


I 


( 


<<- 


conditions  of  the  workers.  The  fundamental  question  with 
a  modem  Socialist,  for  instance,  is  whether  it  is  just  to  al- 
low some  persons  to  accumulate  as  much  as  they  can 
under  the  present  circumstances,  leaving  a  large  number  of 
people,  in  Green's  phrase,  without  sufficient  means  to  rea- 
lize their  moral  ideal.  A  radical  today  is  not  bothered  about 
the  relative  condition  of  the  workman  today  as  compared 
with  the  condition  of  his  kind  in  the  early  part  of  the  19th 
century.  Green's  idea  of  legislation  and  freedom  of  con- 
tract may  be  objected  to  by  the  individualist  as  unnecessary 
interference  on  the  part  of  the  authority,  and  by  the  newer 
brands  of  Socialism  as  usurpation  of  arbitrary  power  by 
the  state.  His  economics  certainly  leaves  much  to  be  de- 
sired. He  does  not  fit  in  with  any  category.  If  we  call  him 
a  Christian  Socialist,  we  meet  the  opposition  that  he  is 
Christian  without  being  socialistic.  If  we  bring  him  into 
the  company  of  Roscher,  Wagner  and  Schmoller  and  call 
him  a  Historical  National  economist,  we  are  only  too  well 
aware  that  whether  or  not  he  is  national  enough,  he  is  not 
sufficiently  historical.  His  explanation  of  the  historical 
origin  of  the  proletariat  is  plainly  influenced  by  his  hos- 
tility toward  land.  The  safe  conclusion  is  that  he  is  not  an 
economist  at  all.  He  does  not  have  the  proper  grasp  of 
economic  facts.  If  we  criticise  the  economic  portions  of  ^ 
his  political  doctrine,  we  should  be  careful  to  consider  his 
lack  of  information  rather  than  to  impute  motives. 

The  most  noticeable  defect  of  Green's  political  theory 
is  the  absence  of  any  discussion  of  the  organization  of  gov- 
ernment. The  fundamental  questions  of  the  state  are,  of 
course,  important,  but  having  discussed  them  at  length,  the 
next  problem  is  to  formulate  a  programme  of  political  or- 
ganization through  which  alone  political  ideas  can  be 
worked  in  practice.  If  political  theory  does  not  deal  with 
principles  alone  but  also  with  their  practical  working,  then 


i62        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

it  should  also  indicate  the  kind  of  political  organization  that 
will  be  likely  to  facilitate  the  carrying  out  of  those  prin- 
ciples- If  government  is  to  be  based  upon  the  consent  of 
the  governed,  then  the  problem  of  getting  people  to  express 
their  approval  or  disapproval  on  certain  issues  is  certainly 
one  that  deserves  attention,  and  if  government  of  the  whole 
people  by  the  whole  people  is  impracticable,  then  problems 
of  representation  should  be  considered  so  as  to  find  out 
the  best  possible  solution.  If  government  is  not  to  be  based 
on  the  counting  of  noses,  what  is  the  substitute  ?  Some  ex- 
pedients will  have  to  be  adopted,  for  in  practical  affairs, 
some  determining  device  has  to  be  agreed  upon  through 
which  alone  things  can  be  accomplished.  If  it  is  not  a  ma- 
jority of  votes,  it  must  be  something  else.  So  far  as  this 
problem  is  concerned.  Green  has  not  offered  us  any  enlight- 
enment at  all.  Elsewhere  I  have  said  that  Green's  theory  of 
natural  rights  has  diminished  the  urgency  of  a  justification 
of  the  majority  rule  over  the  minority,  but  it  does  not  by 
any  means  eliminate  that  problem.  In  the  absence  of  a 
suggested  substitute,  it  may  be  presumed  that  Green  recog- 
nizes the  majority  rule  as  an  expedient  that  is  inevitable. 
If  so,  the  justification  of  the  subjection  of  minority  remains 
a  problem.  And  in  the  absence  of  a  programme  of  govern- 
mental organization,  it  may  be  concluded  that  that  problem 
remains  with  Green  unsolved. 

There  are,  of  course,  references  to  government,  but  in 
those  cases,  it  must  be  confessed,  their  meaning  is  rather 
obscure.  The  distinction  between  the  state  and  government 
is  not  as  clear  as  might  be  expected.  This  obscurity  is 
probably  due  to  English  conditions.  The  King  in  Parlia- 
ment is  often  described  as  being  the  legal  sovereign  in 
Great  Britain.  Whatever  it  may  do,  it  does  without  legal 
limitation.  If  there  is  not  the  tendency  to  confuse  gov- 
ernment with  the  state,  there  is  at  least  no  particular  neces- 


Conclusion 


163 


f 


■i 


•t 


V 


sity  for  their  rigid  distinction.  But  in  a  country  like  the 
United  States,  for  instance,  where  there  is  a  written  con- 
stitution limiting  the  government  in  some  well  defined  di- 
rections, where  laws  duly  passed  may  be  declared  unconsti- 
tutional and  where  constitution  can  only  be  amended  by  a 
certain  rigid  process,  one  gets  at  a  glance  the  difference  be- 
tween state  and  government;  and  when  one  looks  at  the 
adoption  of  the  initiative  and  referendum  in  some  of  the 
states  one  wonders  at  the  shrinkage  of  the  power  of  the 
government  and  the  expansion  of  that  of  the  state,  which  in 
this  case  is  generally  called  the  "people."  It  may  be  ques- 
tioned whether  for  Green  such  a  distinction  is  necessary. 
Personally,  I  think  it  is.  With  regard  to  the  principle 
of  political  obligation,  for  instance,  I  feel  that  we  are  bet- 
ter off  if  we  bear  in  mind  that  our  obligation  is  due  to  the 
state  and  not  to  any  particular  government.  Furthermore, 
instead  of  being  a  reactionary  doctrine,  the  distinction  be- 
tween government  and  state  is  highly  democratic,  in  that  it 
affords  oftentimes  the  opportunity  and  justification  for  re- 
sistance to  government,  if  necessary,  in  the  name  of  the 
state. 

Finally  it  may  be  asked  whether  Green  is  not,  after  all, 
following  the  footsteps  of  those  whose  onesidedness  he  has 
been  attacking.  The  economists  have  created  the  economic 
man;  we  agree  with  Green  that  there  is  no  such  economic 
man-  The  Utilitarians  described  men  as  pleasure  seekers; 
we  know  that  only  too  often  we  do  not  fit  in  with  their 
description.  The  sensationalists  reduced  us  to  a  kodak; 
but  the  objects  reflected  on  the  retina  of  our  eyes  do  not 
necessarily  print  pictures.  The  naturalists  regard  us  pri- 
marily as  animal  organisms;  but  we  are  more  than  mere 
animal  organisms.  Green  knows  that  and  in  his  efforts  to 
free  us  from  being  merely  economic,  exclusively  utilitarian, 
mechanically  sensational  and  simply  animal,  he  has   ren^ 


v/ 


164        Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

dered  us  almost  pure  consciousness.  May  it  not  be  ques- 
tioned whether  such  a  conscious  human  being  exists  ?  Will 
he  not  share  the  same  fate  with  the  economic  man,  the 
pleasure  seeker  and  the  mere  animal  organism? 

Logic  sometimes  drives  man  mad,  but  in  logic  there  is 
beauty.  Idealistic  as  well  as  materialistic  philosophy  has 
its  intellectual  charms.  It  has  been  said  of  Karl  Marx 
that  the  Marxian  system  is  a  credit  to  human  ingenuity; 
hence  rather  than  to  demolish  it  piecemeal,  it  is  better  to 
permit  its  structure  to  retain  its  sublimity  and  brilliance. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  Green.  Besides  the  intellectual 
charm  out  of  reading  him,  one  shares  his  social  idealism. 
He  actually  confesses  to  "hoping  for  a  time  when  the 
phrase  [the  education  of  a  gentleman]  will  have  lost  its 
meaning,  because  the  sort  of  education  which  alone  makes 
the  gentleman  in  any  sense  will  be  within  reach  of  all.  As 
It  was  the  aspiration  of  Moses  that  all  the  Lord's  people 
should  be  prophets,  so  with  all  seriousness  and  reverence, 
we  may  hope  and  pray  for  a  condition  of  English  society 
in  which  all  honest  citizens  will  recognize  themselves  and  be 
recognized  by  each  other  as  gentlemen."  *°  Such  an  ideal 
is  nowadays  too  often  lost  sight  of. 


^ 


loWorks,  Vol.  III.    P.  475. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Source  Books. 

Works  of  Thomas  Hill  Green ;  3  volumes.    Edited  by  R.  L. 
Nettleship. 

T.  H.  Green,  Principles  of  Political  Obligation.    1917  Edi- 
tion. 

T.   H.   Green,   Prolegomena  to  Ethics.     Edited  by  A.   C. 
Bradley. 

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Austin.    Lectures  on  Jurisprudence. 

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To-day. 

Bagehot,  Walter.     Physics  and  Politics. 

English  Constitution. 

Bentham,  Jeremy.    Fragment  on  Government. 

Blackstone.    Commentaries. 

Bradley,  F.  H.    Ethical  Studies. 

Bosanquet,  Bernard.     The  Philosophical  Theory  of  the 
State. 

Buckle,  H.  T    History  of  Civilization. 

Dunning.    History  of  Political  Theories. 

Fairbrother.    The  Philosophy  of  T.  H.  Green. 

George,  Henry.     Progress  and  Poverty. 

GiDDiNGS.     Democracy  and  Empire. 

HoBBES      Leviathan. 

Philosophical  Rudiments  concerning  Government 
and  Society. 

Hob  HOUSE,  L.  T    Democracy  and  Reaction. 

The  Metaphysical  Theory  of  the  State. 

Hobson,  J.  A.     The  Crisis  of  Liberalism. 

Hume,  David.    Essays  Moral,  Political  and  Literary. 


i66      Political  Theory  of  Thomas  Hill  Green 

JoAD.     Essays  in  Common  Sense  Philosophy. 
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Kant,    Immanual.      Metaphysische    Anfangsgriinde    der 

Rechtslehre. 
Laski,  H.  J.    Authority  in  the  Modem  State. 
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Essays  on  Human  Understanding. 
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Early  History  of  Instrtutions. 
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Representative  Government. 
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Essays  Scientific,  Political  and  Spec- 
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Smith,  Adam.    Wealth  of  Nations. 
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i 


VITA. 

The  writer  of  this  monograph  was  born  In  Hunan, 
China.  He  studied  in  Ming-teh,  Yale  and  Tsing  Hua  pre- 
paratory schools  before  coming  to  the  United  States.  In 
1917  he  was  graduated  from  the  University  of  Pennsylvania 
and  in  the  following  year  he  obtained  from  Columbia  the 
degree  of  A.M.,  for  which  he  wrote  ''The  Financial  Powers 
of  the  Governors  of  the  Different  States.*'  At  Columbia 
he  studied  under  Professors  Dunning,  Robinson,  Hayes, 
Schuyler,  McBain,  Powell,  Beard,  Sait,  J.  B.  Moore,  Munroe 
Smith,  Seligman,  Giddings  and  Simkhovitch. 


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